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 In recent years, deputies in the local People’s Congresses (LPCs) in China have 
become increasingly active in exercising their power. However, the involvement in active 
legislative participation remains a minority pursuit for the deputies. The vast majority of 
deputies tend to have few or no legislative activities. This dissertation, using interviews 
and survey data gathered from deputies at the provincial, municipal and district (county) 
levels of People’s Congresses in Guangdong and Shandong provinces, addresses the 
central question of why some deputies are more active in the legislative participation 
while others are not.  
 It investigates the institutional constraints on deputies’ legislative participation 
and elaborates the reasons and tactics for those active deputies to maneuver in their 
limited political arena. It exemplifies that most of the legislative participation activists are 
those deputies nominated directly by their constituents (or deputies in indirect elections). 
It argues that the legislative activism in LPCs can be attributed to electoral reforms on the 
nomination and the resulting limitedly competitive elections, which provide the deputies 
with strong motivations or preference to represent their constituents’ interest through 
community (constituent) pressure, rather than through the re-election (career) pressure in 
Western democracies. Meanwhile, the tactics used by the deputies have further facilitated 
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Chapter 1          Introduction        
                                     
We cannot deny the fact that China today is still an authoritarian regime 
dominated by the ruling Party, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Nonetheless, the 
reform and open-door policy initiated by former CCP leader-Deng Xiaoping during the 
past 30 years has given rise to rapid and far-reaching changes in the political and 
economic climates in China. Despite the absence of Western-style democracy in the 
political development of China, important institutional changes have occurred within 
China’s political system during the reform era. The epitome of these significant 
institutional changes is the strengthening of the People’s Congress system, China’s 
legislature, which was always called a “rubber stamp” by the Western media in the past.  
In fact, in recent years, a growing number of people in and outside China have 
begun to feel that the People’s Congresses at all levels have gradually become more and 
more assertive in exercising their formal power. More importantly, when compared with 
the National People’s Congress (NPC), the Local People’s Congresses (LPCs) have 
slowly but steadily become more independent and assertive since the late 1980s. There 
are many instances of the increasing importance and autonomy of LPCs. For example, 
dissenting votes and abstentions from the local deputies are far more common in recent 
years than unanimous votes. Moreover, veto of the local government policy proposals by 
the deputies has increased rapidly. Meanwhile, the LPCs have made significant progress 
in personnel appointment and supervision. For instance, in the early 1990s, the People’s 
Congresses of Guizhou and Zhejiang provinces made history when they rejected the 
candidates for governments nominated by the CCP’s Organization Department in 
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Beijing.1 Recently, two sensational cases arose in Shenyang city in Liaoning province2 
and Yueyang city in Hunan province3 where their respective deputies vetoed the court’s 
work report and the Party’s personnel appointment. 
The legislative participation of deputies is central to the working of LPCs at 
various levels. Therefore, the deputies at various levels have played a key role in 
spearheading the institutional development of LPCs from the late 1980s till now. 
However, not every deputy is active in the legislative participation in LPCs. In fact, by 
investigating the actual legislative behavior of the deputies, we find that only a few 
deputies are more active than most deputies in the legislative participation. That is to say, 
most of the deputies are still quiescent, although a “new breed” of deputies are younger 
and better educated than their predecessors.4 Given the costs and risks of legislative 
activism in light of the formal and informal institutional constraints in an authoritarian 
regime like China, it is understandable that most deputies are not active in the legislative 
participation in LPCs. However, the question remains: why are some deputies still active 
in legislative participation?  
Therefore, in this study, I will try to address the following questions in order to 
identify the decisive factors behind the legislative participation of deputies in the LPCs: 
                                                 
1 Cai Dingjian, Zhongguo renda zhidu (The Institution of the Chinese People's Congress) (Beijing: 
Falü chubanshe, 2003), 358-360.  
2 The Shenyang (capital of northeast China’s Liaoning province) Intermediate People’s Court’s 
work report was vetoed by the city People’s Congress on Feb. 14, 2001. More details can be 
found here: Http://dailynews.dayoo.com/content/2001-08/11/content_188117.htm (accessed 
August 18, 2004). 
3 More than half of the members of the Yueyang People’s Congress in Hunan province of central 
China voted against ex-mayor Luo Bisheng appointed by the Party for his re-election. More 
details can be found here: Http://news .sohu.com/89/18/news205531889.shtml(accessed August 
18, 2004). 
4 Kevin J. O’Brian and Lianjiang Li, “Chinese Political Reform and the Question of ‘Deputy 
Quality’,” China Information 8, no. 3 (Winter 1993/94): 20-31. 
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(1) why are most deputies not active in participating in legislative activities? (2) why are 
only a few deputies active in the legislative participation? (3) how could their active 
legislative participation be possible in the absence of a democratic political system in 
China? By answering these questions, I will highlight the most important variable-
constituent (or community) pressure-affecting the deputies’ different roles and functions 
in the institutional development of LPCs in China.  
 
I. The Existing Literature 
 
The increasing institutional autonomy and identity of the People’s Congress 
system in China has attracted more and more scholarly attention. In fact, as with Deng 
Xiaoping’s reform and open-door policy, there have been some important political 
changes towards restructuring political power among the Party, the government and the 
People’s Congress in China, which have brought profound influence on the development 
of People’s Congress system at both the national and local levels.5 Because of this limited 
institutional reform or “quiet revolution from within,”6 some scholars argue that the NPC 
has changed its “rubber stamp” role gradually. For example, Kevin O’Brien examines 
NPC’s institutional development and its changing role in China from both structural and 
                                                 
5 More details can be found in An Chen, Restructuring Political Power in China: Alliance and 
Opposition, 1978-98 (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999). 
6 A number of scholars have used the term “quiet revolution” to describe China’s reforms. See, 
for example, Andrew G. Walder, “The Quiet Revolution from Within: Economic Reform as a 
Source of Political Decline,” in The Waning of the Communist State: Economic Origins of 
Political Decline in China and Hungary, ed. Andrew G. Walder (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1995), 1-24; Doug Guthrie, “The Quiet Revolution: The 
Emergence of Capitalism in China,” Harvard International Review 25, no. 2 (2003): 48-53. 
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functional approaches.7 Murray Scot Tanner describes these similar changes in the NPC 
by examining the lawmaking process in his richly documented book.8  
Meanwhile, by investigating the workings of the provincial People’s Congresses 
in Shandong and Heilongjiang provinces, Roderick MacFarquhar argues that the LPCs 
are moving in a similar direction as the NPC’s rising influence.9 Comparing medieval 
Europe and modern China, Kevin O’Brien argues that the early institutional development 
of the People’s Congress is a process of embeddedness: getting support and attention 
from the Party and government authorities at the same level.10 Basically following Kevin 
O’Brien’s method, Young Nam Cho analyses the main embeddedness strategies of 
leaders from the LPCs. According to Cho, to attain institutional development, the LPCs 
have to gain the support from the Party and have to cooperate with different levels of 
governments concurrently. However, after achieving this goal, they have begun to use 
confrontational strategies against the government in recent years.11  
In all, O’Brien’s and Cho’s main argument on the development of LPCs is that 
becoming embedded in the existing, illiberal polity is more important than becoming 
autonomous for the development of the People’s Congress system. To put it simply, 
embeddedness for institutionalization is the first choice and autonomy for contestation is 
                                                 
7 Kevin J. O’Brien, Reform without Liberalization: China’s National People’s Congress and the 
Politics of Institutional Change (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
8 Murray Scot Tanner, The Politics of Lawmaking in China: Institutions, Processes, and 
Democratic Prospects (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).  
9 Roderick MacFarquhar, “Reports from the Field: Provincial People’s Congresses,” The China 
Quarterly 155 (September 1998): 656-667. 
10 Kevin J. O’Brien, “Chinese People’s Congresses and Legislative Embeddedness: 
Understanding Early Organizational Development,” Comparative Political Studies 27, no. 1 
(1994): 80-107. 
11 Young Nam Cho, “From ‘Rubber Stamps’ to ‘Iron Stamps’: The Emergence of Chinese Local 
People’s Congresses as Supervisory Powerhouses,” The China Quarterly 171 (September 2002): 
724-740. 
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the second choice for the development of the People’s Congresses. However, Ming Xia 
points out that these two kinds of strategies (embeddedness and autonomy) have been 
intertwined and occurred simultaneously. He employs a network theory to explain how 
leaders of LPCs use the institutional linkages and reciprocal strategy to achieve their 
goals.12 In all, it is very clear that all these scholars focus their researches on the 
importance of leaders’ strategies in the LPCs’ institutional development.  
Only a few researches have utilized a bottom-up approach to explore how the 
rank-and-file deputies have contributed to the institutional development of LPCs. For 
example, there is an article written by Kevin J. O’Brien focusing on the deputies’ 
different roles. In his article, O’Brien explores the deputy’s sub-roles: inactives, actives 
(including agents and remonstrators). He finds that among the active deputies, the 
dominant sub-role was still “the regime agent” and few active deputies evaded this role 
entirely. These active deputies “serve as leadership proxies and transmit the spirit, 
regulations and decisions’ of higher level.” However, a few deputies have begun to 
behave as “remonstrators,” although “most remonstrators continue to fulfill their 
responsibilities as regime agents.” But this sub-role is not based on the constituents’ 
support or public opinion. Instead, these remonstrations generally “have more to do with 
individual characteristics than with electoral sanctions or leadership demands.” Finally, 
O’Brien identifies five personal motivations for remonstrating.13 However, my following 
                                                 
12 Ming Xia, “Political Contestation and the Emergence of the Provincial People’s Congresses as 
Power Players in Chinese Politics: A Network Explanation,” Journal of Contemporary China 9, 
no. 24 (July 2000): 185-214. And Ming Xia, The People's Congresses and Governance in China: 
Toward a Network Mode of Governance (Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2007). 
13 Kevin J. O’Brien identifies five personal motivations: firstly, a number of deputies spoke of 
obligation, pride and a “desire to make a difference” in a chosen area; secondly, successful 
remonstrating can produce respect in the community and even notoriety; thirdly, remonstrating 
frees deputies from their normal job and many enhance their autonomy and status; fourthly, 
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study elucidates that most of the deputies’ legislative activism could be mainly attributed 
to the electoral sanctions from the constituents’ nomination and limitedly competitive 
elections, not only individual characteristics.  
In his article, Young Nam Cho maintains that deputies have changed their role in 
the 1990s and they have performed three main roles: supervision, reflection and policy-
providing. According to Cho, the deputies “act mainly as public supervisors and 
reflectors rather than ‘regime agents’” as O’Brien had suggested. Furthermore, he argues 
that the deputies’ different role fulfillments depend on their different social backgrounds. 
For example, “worker and peasant deputies pay more attention to reflection and 
supervision, while intellectual legislators and some cadre deputies tend to focus on the 
policy-providing role. Deputies-cum-entrepreneurs are more likely to concentrate on 
exemplary leadership and economic related roles.”14 Occupational background is a key 
indictor of socio-economic status. However, one major problem with occupational data is 
that occupational categories themselves are broad and imprecise, especially in today’s 
China. More importantly, Cho still does not explain why some deputies are active while 
others are not, in the legislative participation among the same social strata (such as 
workers, peasants, intellectuals, cadres and businessmen).  
As mentioned above, a handful of articles and books have been written by 
scholars on the changing roles and functions of LPCs. However, most of these studies, 
                                                                                                                                                 
remonstrating brings deputies into policy-making and implementation to an extent few pure 
agents achieve; lastly, remonstrators develop valuable connections and contacts that can often be 
transformed into material resources and other tangible benefits. Kevin J. O’Brien, “Agents and 
Remonstrators: Role Accumulation by Chinese People’s Congress Deputies,” The China 
Quarterly 138 (June 1994): 359-80. 
14 Young Nam Cho, “Pubic Supervisors and Reflectors: Role Fulfillment of the Chinese People’s 
Congress Deputies in the Market Socialism Era,” Development and Society 32, no. 2 (December 
2003): 197-227. 
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thus far, have focused almost exclusively on identifying the determinants of institutional 
development of the LPC from a top-down angle such as political reform, or leaders’ 
strategies. While a study of the deputies’ different roles has just been conducted by some 
scholars, so far the deputies have not been extensively and thoroughly examined by the 
students of Chinese politics. One can understand institutional development of LPCs only 
by first examining the individual deputies who serve as their members. The individual 
deputies ultimately are the local institutional actors who must make their own judgments. 
In an existing illiberal polity like China, without a comprehensive study of deputies, we 
cannot understand how the LPCs have become more and more powerful in the reform era. 
Thus, in order to gain a full appreciation of how the LPC system is developing as an 
institution in such a setting, one needs to examine the role of deputy as an institutional 
actor in this process.  
However, a systematic understanding of the roles and behaviors of the deputies is 
still lacking. Although scholars always think that a “new breed” of deputies are younger, 
better educated and are more active than their predecessors were, they neither analyze the 
social background characteristics of deputies nor investigate the actual legislative 
behavior of this “new breed” of deputies to see whether these individuals are in fact more 
active or not. Therefore, by understanding why some deputies are active in the legislative 
participation in LPCs but others are not, we can get a better understanding of the different 
roles of institutional actors (such as deputies) in the institutional development of LPCs in 





II. Theoretical Framework: Explaining the Legislative Behavior 
 
When analyzing the deputy’s legislative participation in LPCs in China, this study 
will adopt the new institutional approach. If the “behavioral revolution” in the political 
science arena in the 1950s and early 1960s was a rejection of the old institutionalism, 
“the rise of the new institutional analytic framework can be seen as a historical 
modification of rational choice perspectives that became fashionable in the social 
sciences starting in the 1970s.”15 In fact, “new institutionalism” was launched by 
American political scientists James March and Johan Olsen over 20 years ago as a 
reaction to behavioral revolution and the growing influence of rational choice theory.16 
While new institutional approach is very much vogue in many disciplines such as 
political science, economics and sociology, differences still exist among them in what an 
institution is and how to conceptualize the relations between institutions and behavior. 
For example, Douglas North defines the institutions as “any form of constraints that 
human beings devise to shape human interaction” and “rules of the game in a society.”17 
Elinor Ostrom defines the institutions as rules that prescribe which actions are required, 
prohibited, or permitted.18 
                                                 
15 Anil Hira and Ron Hira, “The New Institutionalism: Contradictory Notions of Change,” The 
American Journal of Economics and Sociology 59, no. 2 (April 2000): 267. 
16 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in 
Political Life,” The American Political Science Review 78, no. 3 (September 1984): 734-749. 
17 Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (Cambridge; 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 3. 
18 Elinor Ostrom, “An Agenda for the Study of Institutions,” Public Choice 48, no. 1 (January 
1986): 3-25. 
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In this study, I will use Douglas North’s definition on institution.19 According to 
North, “constraints” could be formal rules or informal constraints. In other words, the 
institutions should not refer only to rigid, well-defined, constraining, immutable, formal 
rules, but also includes considerations of informal constraints such as ideologies, altruism, 
social norms and routines.20  
 In fact, new institutionalism covers a wide range of categories. For example, Hall 
and Taylor identify three new institutionalisms: rational choice, sociological, and 
historical approaches.21 Guy Peters even goes further and identifies no less than seven 
new institutionalisms.22 The common points among these approaches in new 
institutionalism are: they are all concerned with the questions of how institutions shape 
political behavior and all include in “the analysis of both formal rules and organizations 
and informal routines and procedures.” However, socio-historical institutionalism regards 
institutions as a primary subject of analysis, but the rational choice institutionalism 
focuses on individual rational behavior and analyses its relationship with institutions. So, 
the key difference between them is over the issue of methodological individualism.23 
                                                 
19 Similarly, Barry Weigast defines the institutions as “humanly devised constraints on action.” In 
Weingast’s words, “methodologically, this definition translates into studying how institutions 
constraints the sequence of interactions among actors, the choices available to particular actors, 
the structure of information and hence beliefs of the actors, and payoffs to individuals and 
groups.” Barry R. Weingast, “Rational Choice Institutionalism,” in Political Science: The State of 
the Discipline, ed. Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner (New York: W.W.Norton, 2002), 661. 
20 North, op.cit., 3. 
21 Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New 
Institutionalisms,” Political Studies 44, no. 5 (December 1996): 936-957. 
22 B. Guy Peters, Institutional Theory in Political Science: The New Institutionalism (Washington, 
DC: Pinter, 1999). 
23 Thomas A. Koelble, “Review: The New Institutionalism in Political Science and Sociology,” 
Comparative Politics 27, no. 2 (January 1995): 231-243; Junko Kato, “Institutions and 
Rationality in Politics-Three Varieties of Neo-Institutionalists,” British Journal of Political 
Science 26, no. 4 (October 1996): 553-582; Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, The New 
Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Mary 
C. Brinton and Victor Nee, The New Institutionalism in Sociology (Stanford, Calif: Stanford 
 10 
 Because the level of analysis of this study focuses on the individual deputy’s 
legislative participation, the new institutionalism in rational choice tradition is a suitable 
analytical framework. The core claim of this new institutional theory in rational choice 
tradition is that political actors pursue their interests by making choices within 
institutional constraints. This approach assumes that political actors are rational and 
purposive and motivated by the goals that express their preferences. However, when 
political actors make choice to pursue their individual preferences or goals, they will 
calculate and compromise within different institutional contexts. This approach regards 
individual attributes (especially preferences) and institutional constraints as two major 
categories of determinants of individual behavior, but for methodological reasons it 
places greater emphasis on institutional determinants.24 Institutions shape behavior of 
political actors by providing opportunities and constraints which affect the preference 
ordering of the political actors. Therefore, behaviors of individual actors are determined 
by the preferences of the individual and the institutional opportunities or constraints the 
individual faces. 
 In fact, “this new perspective on the relationship between institutions and 
individuals has been emerging since the late 1980s and has come to be regarded as the 
new wave in legislative studies.”25 Many approaches have emerged from the rational 
choice framework to explain a legislator’s parliamentary behavior in a democratic polity. 
In general, most works on legislative behavior in the U.S. Congress adopt the assumption 
                                                                                                                                                 
University Press, 2001); Vivien Lownpes, “Varieties of New Institutionalism: A Critical 
Appraisal,” Public Administration 74, no. 2 (June 1996): 181-197. 
24 In general, this approach takes preferences as given and does not account for the optimal 
formation of individual preferences. 
25 Donald D. Searing, Westminster’s World: Understanding Political Roles (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1994), 3.  
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that legislator members are primarily concerned with getting reelected. In order to 
guarantee reelection, legislators tend to give priority to activities that help them achieve 
this goal.26  
 It is understandable that legislators want to be re-elected, but they also want other 
things such as career advancement and policy influence.27 For example, Richard F. Fenno 
argues that legislator members have three basic goals: getting reelected, enacting “good 
public policy” and obtaining career advancement within the institution.28 Richard Hall 
has also found evidence that members’ policy goals in part motivate them to participate 
in the legislative activities.29 
 Therefore, these approaches to parliamentary politics and behavior see the 
legislators as rational actors engaging in the conscious and strategic pursuit of their goals. 
They begin with the assumption that legislators have three main goals (preferences) in 
their legislative participation including re-election, and career advancement, as well as 
policy influence.30 Nonetheless, in these three goals, the re-election goal stands out from 
the other goals because the other two goals cannot be achieved if the legislator is not re-
elected  
However, according to the new institutional model in rational choice tradition, 
legislators’ actions do not follow directly from their preferences, but from a combination 
                                                 
26 David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1974); Richard F. Fenno, Home Style: House Members in Their Districts (New York: 
HarperCollins, 1978). 
27 Wolfgang C. Müller and Kaare Strøm, “Political Parties and Hard Choices,” in Policy, Office, 
or Votes?: How Political Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions, ed. Wolfgang C. 
Müller and Kaare Strøm (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1-35. 
28 Richard F. Fenno, Congressmen in Committees (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown & Co., 1973). 
29 Richard L. Hall, Participation in Congress (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996). 
30 Morris P. Fiorina, Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1977) and Kaare Strøm, “A Behavioral Theory of Competitive Political 
Parties,” American Journal of Political Science 34, no. 2 (May 1990): 565-98. 
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of preferences and institutional constraints. Clearly, legislative participation does not take 
place in an institutional vacuum. Legislators’ preferences and motivations are reinforced 
or constrained by different institutional arrangements. To put it simply, institutions can 
provide opportunities for and constraints on individual behaviors in a particular setting.  
Therefore, different institutional arrangements have a lot of influence on how 
legislators pursue these three goals in their legislative participation. For example, there is 
a seniority system in the American Congress. So, if a member of Congress gets elected to 
Washington repeatedly, especially without interruption, he will eventually be given a 
position in charge of a committee (“career advancement”) and thus have power to 
develop and influence policy(“policy influence”).31 Because of the seniority system, the 
legislators in American Congress regard re-election as their central objective.  
However, things are different in a Westminster parliamentary system. This is 
because there is no seniority system in this type of parliamentary system. In fact, under 
the Westminster parliamentary system, “career advancement” and “policy influence” are 
controlled by the party because party domination of the parliamentary career ladder is a 
key component of parliamentary behavior. Therefore, “‘re-election’ remains a necessity 
to ‘career advancement’ and ‘policy influence,’ but it is not sufficient to secure these 
things.”32  
New institutionalism in rational choice tradition seeks to integrate institutional 
analysis within a rational choice framework and it is a useful theoretical tool for my 
                                                 
31 David Epstein, David Brady, Sadafumi Kawato and Sharyn O’Halloran, “A Comparative 
Approach to Legislative Organization: Careerism and Seniority in the United States and Japan,” 
American Journal of Political Science 41, no. 3 (July 1997): 965-998. 
32 Christopher J. Kam, Parliaments, Parties, and MPs: A Comparative Perspective on Backbench 
Dissent, Party Discipline, and Intra-party Politics (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms 
International, 2002), 32. 
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analysis of deputies’ legislative behaviors in LPCs but it does not entirely fit the Chinese 
case. As noted above, most work on legislative behavior has been focused on U.S. 
Congress and has analyzed how the reelection goal motivates legislators to participate in 
the legislative activities. In fact, (re) elections provide the institutional linkage for 
constituency control which can guarantee the legislators represent constituents’ interest 
and perform their responsibility. That is, representatives are more loyal to the wishes and 
preferences of the represented when they face frequent elections. In the classic literature 
on constituency control, Miller and Stokes identified two ways in which constituencies 
control their representatives. The first is “for the district to choose a representative who 
so shares its views that in following his own convictions he does his constituents’ will.” 
The second is “for the Congressman to follow his (at least tolerably accurate) perceptions 
of district attitude in order to win re-election.”33 So, election and re-election institutions 
provide the constituency control (influence) mechanism which forces the legislative to 
align their preference with constituencies’. David Mayhew’s Congress: the Electoral 
Connection (1974) further described a legislator’s prime motivation as the desire for 
reelection and constituency control could be achieved by this mechanism.  
However, no all of the world’s legislatures operate under the same set of premises 
as U.S. In U.S., the legislators are professional and they concern about their career and 
reelection is their main goal (preference) in the legislative participation. Therefore, 
professional legislative institutions based on the (re)election system provide the 
institutional mechanism for constituents to control their representatives and create a 
natural incentive for representation because legislators are motivated to identify and 
                                                 
33 Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, “Constituency Influence in Congress,” American 
Political Science Review 57, no.1 (March 1963): 50.  
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respond to the interests of constituents. However, in China, the legislative institution 
(People's Congress) is still controlled by the ruling party-CCP and the deputies are not 
professional. They don’t need to worry about reelection. Reelection is not assumed to be 
the main goal for Chinese deputies. Therefore, reelection cannot provide the institutional 
mechanism between constituencies and representatives. Formal institutions for holding 
deputies accountable to constituents are absent in China. However, there are still some 
deputies actively participating in the legislative activities. If reelection is not a primary 
aim, deputies are likely to consider other incentives.  
 New institutionalism in rational choice mainly focuses on formal rules of the 
game in the legislative system but not pay enough attention to the informal rules of the 
game such as norm, traditions, and other informal ways of interaction which also 
constraint the behavior of legislators in broader context. In China, because of the reform 
on election institutions such as nomination, some people nominated by their constituents 
are elected as deputies. One characteristic of these deputies is that they are not 
professional legislators and they work in the same unit or live in the same community 
with their constituents, so the frequent interactions and close familiarity among them 
have created bonds of trust and a sense of community among the members. The 
constituents nominate and vote for their candidates, and there is a reasonable and 
widespread expectation that these individuals will represent the interest of their 
constituents. Therefore, deputies facing the community pressure are more likely to be 
active in the legislative participation. Informal rule-community pressure affects these 
deputies’ ordering of preferences and provides the institutional mechanism for 
constituents to control their deputies. Institutional reforms such as nomination in election 
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are important, nevertheless, none of these factors compel deputies to become active. At 
most they offer the institutional opportunity for these people to be nominated and elected 
as deputies. So, the incentives and constraints facing deputies are derived not only from 
the electoral institutions but mainly from the constituencies in which they live or work. In 
this study, the institutional factors include formal institution (the form of nomination in 
the election) and informal institution (community pressure). In China, there are two kinds 
of nominations in the election of deputies: “official” nomination includes candidates 
nominated by the Party and other social organizations controlled by the Party. “Non-
official” nominations include candidates nominated by the constituents (or deputies in 
indirect elections) and self-nominated candidates. In the constituencies, the more the 
deputies’ being approached and visited by their constituents to reflect problems and ask 
for help, the more community pressure they will feel. As far as the community pressure is 
concerned, I use the survey question to measure this informal institutional factor. In my 
survey, I asked the following question: how often do your constituents visit you and 
reflect their problems per year?  
 Meanwhile, according to new institutionalism, deputies’ individual characteristics 
influence their behaviors. In this study, individual characteristics include party affiliation, 
legislative experience, and individual preferences. Deputies’ party affiliation is 
particularly important because in a party-controlled legislative system like China, party 
loyalty is rather high and the deputies with CCP membership have to toe the party line. A 
non-party member normally does not have to deal with this problem in the legislative 
participation. In particular, if the deputies are democratic party member in China, they 
will have enough time and energy to conduct the legislative participation because in 
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general they have relatively relaxed work. It is necessary to assess the influence of party 
affiliation on legislative behavior. Legislative experience is a second factor that may 
influence some decisions of deputies. The more times deputies are elected, the more they 
have knowledge and skills in legislative participation and more likely to be active.  
 The deputies have their own preferences and motivations. However, the rational 
choice institutionalists pay insufficient attention to the formation of actors’ preferences 
and assume that actors have a fixed set of preferences.34 As Thelen and Steinmo argue 
“one, perhaps the core, difference between rational choice institutionalism and historical 
institutionalism lies in the question of preference formation, whether treated as 
exogenous (rational choice) or endogenous (historical institution).”35 Historical 
institutionalists argue that “preferences are formed by the institutional context within 
which they emerge and ought not to be treated as fixed.”36 
 Even if we adopt the rational choice institutionalism and assume that deputies 
have a fixed set of preferences, the deputies’ preferences are far harder to measure than 
their behavior; the latter after all can be observed. Therefore, “one must rely on that 
person’s behavior to indicate those preferences,” and “preferences are revealed through 
behavior.”37 For example, some scholars have devoted tremendous energy to measuring 
                                                 
34 Keith Dowding and Desmond King, Preferences, Institutions, and Rational Choice (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995), 5. 
35 Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” in 
Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis, ed. Sven Steinmo, 
Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstreth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 5. 
36 Koelble, op.cit., 232 and Thelen Kathleen, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative 
Politics,” Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1999): 374-377. 
37 Ellen M. Immergut, “The Theoretical Core of the New Institutionalism,” Politics & Society 26, 
no. 1 (1998): 6. 
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the revealed preferences of legislators, via the statistical analysis of roll call data.38 Based 
on the legislators’ roll call scores on policy issues such as civil rights, welfare and 
education, they measure the legislators’ policy preferences. However, In China, all 
deputies’ votes are either by a show of hands or by electronic vote (in some places), and 
under these two circumstances, we cannot know how each individual deputy votes. But 
the key problem in this method is that “behavior is often equated with revealed 
preference, a troubling assumption.”39 As Lee and Carol argue, “here lies the crux of the 
problem: the measures for the independent and dependent variables are identical.”40 So 
this kind of measurement can not be used in China case. One alternative to measures of 
legislators’ preferences is party affiliation and “it is (implicitly) assumed that all members 
of a party share the same political preferences.”41 The legislators from different parties 
have different policy preferences. But we can not judge one’s political preferences by 
merely identifying his party membership in China. However, some scholars have used 
attitudes on different issues the members of Congress expressed in survey questions to 
measure the preferences of these Congressmen.42 So, I will use the deputies’ position on 
the legislative job expressed in the survey to measure their preferences. In survey, I asked 
the following question: which of various job of being a deputy do they think the most 
important? 
                                                 
38 Joshua Clinton, Simon Jackman and Doug Rivers, ‘‘The Statistical Analysis of Roll Call 
Data,’’ American Political Science Review 98, no. 2 (May 2004):355-370.  
39 Barry C. Burden and Tammy M. Frisby, “Preferences, Partisanship, and Whip Activity in the 
U.S. House of Representatives,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 29, no. 4 (November 2004): 569. 
40 Lee Epstein and Carol Mershon, “Measuring Political Preferences,” American Journal of 
Political Science 40, no. 1 (February 1996): 263. 
41 Bruno Jeitzinger and Tobias Hohl, “Measuring Political Preferences: Ratings for Members of 
the Swiss National Council,” Swiss Political Science Review 3, no. 4 (Winter 1997):1-27. 
42 Stephen Ansolabehere, James M. Snyder and Jr., Charles Stewart III, “The Effect of Party and 
Preferences on Congressional Roll-call Voting,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 26, no. 4 
(November 2001):533-572. 
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 By recoding above independent variables into dummy variables, I conduct the 
multiple linear regression analysis to test these factors’ effect on the degree of deputy’s 
legislative activism (See Appendix 2). The regression analysis suggestions that forms of 
nomination, community pressure, individual preference and legislative experience 
significantly affect the degree of deputies’ legislative activism and these factors can 
explain 53% of variation of legislative activism. However, party affiliation and education 
level have no significant effect on the degree of deputies’ legislative activism.  
 
III. Institutional Constraints on Active Legislative Participation in China 
 
The growth of importance of the LPCs from the late 1980s is, of course, an 
important feature of institutional development in China. However, this development has 
always been within the confines and boundaries set by the Party. In fact, even in China 
today, the local Party committee and government still control the whole process of 
election by a series of formal and informal institutional arrangements. For example, in the 
election of deputies to the LPCs, confirmation of formal candidates is strictly controlled 
and managed by the Party-led election committees at various levels. Meanwhile, election 
campaigns are not permitted in accordance with China’s electoral law. In most cases, 
constituents barely know anything about the candidates except their basic biographical 
information. Moreover, a series of institutional arrangements in the process of election of 
deputy to LPCs has curtailed the competitiveness to such a minimal level, that there is 
almost no alternative for the constituents.  
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Under these institutional constraints, most of the people elected as deputies are 
people whom the Party trusts: CCP members, Party and state “cadres” at all levels. 
Because of their political and social background, they have no motivation and no interest 
in participating in People’s Congress’ affairs; and they also have no time or energy to 
participate in legislative activities. Strictly speaking, to a large extent, most deputies in 
China are not elected by the constituents but “conscripted” by the Party. 
Meanwhile, the formal institutional arrangement of the LPC system provides 
some constraints on the deputies’ active legislative participation. In China, the work of a 
deputy is basically amateurish, not professional. And the institution of LPC does not 
provide enough resources for the active deputies’ legislative participation. Therefore, if 
the deputies would like to actively participate in the legislative process, they have to 
utilize their own resources such as time and money.  
More importantly, the LPC is still under the Party’s institutional control. The 
primary control mechanism used by the Party is the power of Party committees at various 
levels (province, city, or county) to appoint and remove heads and members of the 
Standing Committees at the corresponding levels. Meanwhile, the Party control is 
realized through Party groups and Party members in LPCs. The Party has kept a 
dominating presence over its members in the LPCs and its member must toe to the Party 
line. Sometimes, it can issue orders to Party groups and Party members to get a majority 
vote and thus influence legislative behaviors. Depending on these formal mechanisms, 
the Party can basically control the deputies’ legislative activities. Besides the formal 
control mechanisms, some members of Party and government could inhibit active 
deputies by informal means such as threatening to inflict bodily harm, illegally detaining 
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the deputies and even incarcerating them. Because of these formal and informal 
institutional constraints, it is understandable that most deputies are not active in 
legislative participation.  
 
IV. Electoral Reform, Community (Constituent) Pressure and Legislative Activism  
 
Although the old institutional arrangements in China are strictly controlled by the 
CCP, some institutional reforms and changes still happened within the political system. 
In fact, even a small step in the transformation of the political system has led to far 
greater changes. For example, the election system for the deputies to People’s Congresses 
in China has undergone a fundamental change since the 1970s. In 1979, a new election 
law extended the direct election of deputies to the county level for the first time in China. 
Meanwhile, the election law requires the number of candidates in each electorate to be 
one-and-a-half to two times the number of deputies to be elected (“difference voting”) 
(Cha’e xuanju). More importantly, besides the parties and social organization nomination, 
the constituents now have the legal right to nominate their own candidates.  
Despite such tiny institutional changes in the electoral system, they have brought 
about profound influence on the deputies’ legislative behavior in the LPCs. In particular, 
because of the electoral reform in the nomination and “difference voting” (Cha’e xuanju), 
some candidates nominated by “non-official” means were elected as deputies, although 
the percentage is still very small compared with the “official” candidates.43  
                                                 
43 “Non-official” nominations include candidates nominated by the constituents (or deputies in 
indirect elections) and self-nominated candidates. 
 21 
Clearly, the deputies in LPCs in China have their own preferences and 
motivations. It is undeniable that there are a few deputies nominated by the Party who 
actively participate in the legislative activities; almost all of them solely for the sake of 
pursuing their self-interests such as self–satisfaction from gaining prestige and respect, 
developing valuable connections and getting contacts of important people, and so on. 
However, my study shows that most of the legislative participation activists are deputies 
nominated directly via the “non-official” way. It does not matter if the person is a worker, 
peasant, intellectual, cadre or businessman, so long as he is truly nominated by the 
constituents and elected as the deputy, he is more likely to be active in the legislative 
participation. 
No one denies that competitive election matters. In fact, elections function as an 
effective linkage mechanism between constituencies and representatives.44 “The 
empirical claim of elections as instruments of democracy is that the competitive election 
forges connections between the wishes of citizens and the behavior of policymakers.”45 
Elections align interests of leaders with interests of voters through two mechanisms: 
choice and monitoring.46 In the competitive election, not only must the candidates be 
allowed to freely contest the elections but the constituents should be allowed to make free 
choices.47 However, the monitoring mechanism through the re-election is more important 
to legislators’ behavior. 
                                                 
44 James H. Kuklinski, “Representativeness and Elections: A Policy Analysis,” American 
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47 Tianjian Shi, Political Participation in Beijing (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), 
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In fact, the modern theory of Western legislature is founded on the assumption 
that the legislators are motivated by the re-election.48 As noted above, the dominant 
explanation of legislative participation in a democratic polity generally uses the rational 
choice model to reveal the incentives of institutional actors engaging in legislative 
activities. The rational choice model posits that individual legislators have three goals 
when engaging in legislative activities: re-election, career advancement and policy 
influence. Among these three goals, re-election is a fundamental principle that underlies 
all else in the legislator’s legislative life. Legislators are primarily concerned with getting 
re-elected and constituents’ votes are ultimately what legislators need in order to achieve 
that. Therefore, to get votes, legislators must be active in legislative participation such as 
helping their constituents deal with government bureaucracies and submitting motions in 
their constituents favor. For an individual legislator, to cater to the voters in his 
constituency is to get re-elected, and finally getting re-elected will enhance his own 
career advancement. In the Western democratic countries, the legislators are professional. 
If a legislator cannot get re-elected, he will lose his job. Therefore, it should be the career 
(re-election) pressure that forces them to actively participate in legislative activities.  
In Chinese village elections, Melanie Manion demonstrates the “electoral 
connection” by showing that there is a significant congruence between elected village 
leaders and the villagers regarding the role of the state in the economy. She justifies that 
this congruence does not result from other factors but from competitive election. The 
competitive election makes village leaders responsive to their constituencies, as reflected 
in significant congruence between village leaders and villagers. Based on this analysis, 
                                                 
48 David Mayhew, “Congress: The Electoral Connection,” in American Politics: Core 
Argument/Current Controversy, ed. Peter J. Woolley and Albert R. Papa (Upper Saddle River, N. 
J.: Prentice Hall, 2002), 213-216. 
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she argues that “the causal mechanism underlying the electoral connection in the Chinese 
countryside is the familiar one of voter choice.” The more genuine the choice, the greater 
the congruence: “voters with more choice can choose candidates closer to them in 
orientation.”49 In fact, the monitoring mechanism through re-election is more important 
to village leader’s behavior. The primary goal toward which these village leaders direct 
their behavior is re-election (career) pressure because they need the villagers’ support for 
that. So the Chinese village election is similar to the election of professional legislators in 
Western democracies.  
However, the career (re-election) pressure is an unlikely explanation for deputies’ 
legislative participation in China because being a deputy is basically an amateurish, not a 
professional, full-time political job. They don’t need to worry about career pressure. In 
fact, if a deputy would like to be active in the legislative participation, his work will be 
physically and intellectually taxing, extremely time-consuming, insecure and even 
physically dangerous. So most of the deputies do not mind whether they get re-elected or 
not. Some deputies even do not wish to be elected.  
Although the deputies nominated by their constituents do not need to be 
concerned about re-election, they have to face the constituents (or community) pressure. 
Because of the constituents’ nomination in the election, the community which the 
deputies work or reside in would clearly express their expectations or anticipations on the 
candidates to represent their interest. To maintain their social status and reputations in the 
community, the candidates must perform as constituents expect once they are elected. So 
the constituent or community pressure forces those deputies to speak and act for their 
                                                 
49 Melanie Manion, “The Electoral Connection in the Chinese Countryside,” American Political 
Science Review 90, no. 4 (December 1996): 736-49. 
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constituents in legislative participation. However, this community pressure is different 
from the career pressure in the Western democracies. While the legislators in these 
countries also face the electorate or constituents’ pressure, however, in essence, they are 
worried about the career (re-election) pressure. 
In China, the electoral district for the deputy is usually divided along the 
residential district or work unit. If the electoral district intersects with the work unit, 
people in the same district will know each other. Even though the electoral district 
intersects with the residential district, the possibility of knowing each other is still high 
because people working in the same work unit tend to live in the same residential area 
built by that organization. In fact, throughout the 1980s and mid-1990s, the majority of 
Chinese urban residents still live in older neighborhoods where their houses were 
assigned by their original work unit. Few people could afford the expensive new 
commercial apartments until the late 1990s. 
Therefore, deputies work or live in the same community with their constituents 
and are embedded through social interactions with community members. The frequent 
interaction and close familiarity among them means that people know each other very 
well. And such frequent interaction has created bonds of trust and a sense of community 
among the members. In general, when the constituents nominate their own candidates for 
the deputies, they would nominate people they are very familiar with, especially friends 
and colleagues. Once being nominated and elected as deputies, they would have to fulfill 
their obligations to the community. The deputy would be approached by the members of 
the community (work unit or residential district) and asked to fulfill his obligations. In 
China, an individual who does not honor his obligations to the community while clearly 
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possessing the means to do so will lose “face” or social standing, and may even be 
ostracized from his community. In all, this community (constituent) pressure compels 
these deputies to actively engage in legislative participation in LPCs.  
So the main motivation of active deputies in China is to represent their 
constituents’ interest, not their own interest because of community (constituent) pressure. 
However, in a democracy polity, the overriding incentive behind legislators’ behavior is 
to get re-elected, and finally, for his own interest. We cannot deny that certain legislators 
ignore the re-election concerns for the sake of altruistic, publicly interested goal. Seeking 
“policy influence” is one of legislators’ goals in the legislative activities. Most of the time, 
the legislators try their best to produce policy programs that are good for their 
constituencies because they usually need them for re-election. But sometimes, they also 
make good public policies for the nation as a whole. For example, Richard F. Fenno 
pointed out that some legislators tried to get on certain congressional committees because 
they wanted to make good public policy.50 Steven Kelman also documented the 
motivation for making good public policy in Congress.51 However, this altruistic, public 
spirited motivation is different from deputies’ altruistic motivation in China. First, some 
members of Congress make an effort to achieve public policy which is good for the entire 
country, not their narrow constituencies. However, deputies’ altruistic motivation in 
China is to represent their constituents’ interest, not the good of society as a whole. 
Second, although many features of Congress as an institution encourage its member to 
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pursue self-interest, other features of the institution promote altruistic spirit.52 Thus, the 
formal institutions exert a strong influence on congressmen’s public spirit. However, 
informal institutions (social norms) play an important role in setting deputies’ altruistic 
motivation (or preference) in China. The obligations and duties imposed on deputies 
through traditional community ties (social norms) spur them to represent their 
constituents’ interest.  
 Therefore, I argue that the legislative activism in LPCs can be attributed to 
electoral institutional reform on the nomination and the resulting limitedly competitive 
election, which provides the deputies with strong motivation or preference to represent 
their constituents’ interest through the community (constituent) pressure, not the re-
election (career) pressure in the Western democracies.  
 
V. A Note on Methodology for Data Collection 
 
The role of deputies in the evolution of LPCs remains virtually unexplored, in part 
because of the difficulty of obtaining relevant data, in part because of the political 
sensitiveness of this issue in China. Information on individual deputies is so sparse partly 
because members do not make themselves easily accessible to researchers. Therefore, 
addressing this problem, in fact, is an important empirical concern. As most scholars are 
already aware, gaining access to the internal activities of any government institution in 
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Press, 1990), 200-206. 
 27 
China is not easy. To be sure, we can examine documents the LPC published and get a 
rather good sense of its formal process. However, in a culture like China’s, exploring the 
informal practice and activities of deputies are equally important.  
My original plan for the fieldwork included an in-depth interview and survey in 
Guangdong province. However, the fieldwork, especially conducting the survey, was 
more difficult than I had imagined. During the plenary session of Guangdong People’s 
Congress in February 2004, I planned to disseminate the questionnaires to all the deputies. 
However, due to the political sensitiveness of this research topic in China, the research 
office in Guangdong People’s Congress declined my request. Finally, my friend working 
at this office informed me that the survey must be approved by the director of the 
Standing Committee of Guangdong People’s Congress. To contact the director was so 
difficult, even impossible for me, that I had to change my strategy accordingly.  
Fortunately, two of my university professors in Guangzhou city are deputies of 
LPCs. One professor is a district deputy, lecturing at Sun Yat-Sen University where I 
studied for three years. Another is a provincial deputy, coming from Ji’nan University, 
where I worked for three years. Each of them introduced about five or six of their 
colleagues (friends) to me. These deputies again introduced their friends to me. Therefore, 
by this “snowballing” method, I interviewed about 40 deputies at different levels 
(provincial, municipal, district) of People's Congress in Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Zhanjiang 
and Foshan cities. Meanwhile, I also talked with other related informants including staff 
members of People’s Congresses as well as researchers and officials from related 
government agencies.  
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In February and March 2004, I had an opportunity to be a participant-observer in 
the plenary sessions in Guangzhou and Guangdong People’s Congresses. To show their 
transparency and openness to the constituents, they welcomed the citizens to audit their 
plenary sessions. The citizens must submit their applications and get prior permission 
from the People’s Congresses two weeks before the plenary sessions commenced. I 
applied using my status as a university lecturer and was accepted by them. So I had a 
very good chance to observe the activities of deputies and collect some written and oral 
information.  
This study originally was designed as a case study of Guangdong province in 
China. But restricting my study only to Guangdong was insufficient for my research. To 
remedy it, I started my fieldwork trip in Shandong province in March 2004, instead of 
staying in Guangdong province all the time. Compared with Guangdong, the fieldwork in 
Shandong was relatively easy. One of my relatives works as a Vice Head of one county 
in Shandong. With her generous help, I got the deputies’ name list, work units and 
contact numbers. Half of them are head or Party secretaries, or directors of bureaus from 
related township or county departments. Half of them are Party secretaries or heads from 
villages. In fact, the county is so small that I went to look for my informants by bicycle 
everyday. Sometimes I met and interviewed them on the farm because it was a season of 
harvesting. In total, I interviewed half of the deputies (about 70) in that county. At the 
same time, I interviewed some deputies from Yanzhou and Tai’an cities in person and six 
deputies from Wulian County by telephone in Shandong province. 
In general, before I talked with the deputies, I first acquainted myself with their 
backgrounds from newspaper, online or other resources. Then, I asked them the 
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following open-ended questions: how they were elected, what role they play in the 
People’s Congress and what factors affect their legislative participations. Finally, I let 
them fill out the questionnaire that I designed (see Table 1.1 and Appendix 1).53 Most of 
the deputies were frank and talkative during the interviews. In addition to interviews, I 
succeeded in collecting some “internal publications” from the People’s Congresses 
regarding the deputies’ legislative activities. I also gathered some online information of 
these deputies’ activities by reading the websites of some big and middle cities’ People’s 
Congresses. In today’s China, even some district or county People’s Congresses have 
their own websites. 
           Table 1.1:  The Basic Information of Deputies in My Survey (N=120) 
Level of 
People’sCongress 
Province 18 (15.0%) City 21 (17.5%) County or district 81 (67.5%)  
Education Elementary 8 (6.7%) Junior middle school 22(18.3%) Senior high 
school 33(27.5%) University and college (including post graduate) 
57(47.5%)     
Political 
Affiliation  
CCP member 102 (85.0%) Democratic party or non-party member 
18(15.0%)      
*Political 
Experience 
Yes: 59 (49.2%) No: 61 (50.8%) 
**Legislative 
Experience 
One time: 78(65.0%) Two times: 23(19.2%) More than two times: 
19(15.8%) 
The form of 
Nomination 
Party (or social organization) 109(90.8%) Constituents or self-
nominated 11(9.2%) 
 
Note: * I measure this factor by asking this question: Do you have any experience 
working for the government or Party department? (1) yes; (2) no 
** I measure this factor by asking this question: How many times have you been elected 
as a deputy of People’s Congress? (1) one time; (2) two times; (3) more than two times 
 
                                                 
53 In 2005, Shenzhen city and Anhui provincial People’s Congresses publicized their deputies’ 
email addresses on their websites.  In May 2006, I sent my revised questionnaire to these deputies 
(Shenzhen (339), and Anhui (346)). But only 11.5% (79/685) of the deputies (31 from Anhui 
province and 48 from Shenzhen city) responded. However, because of the selection bias, I 
decided not to use this survey in this study. 
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The strength of my study is that it furthers the knowledge of particular LPCs 
(Guangdong and Shandong provinces) in China and also permits us to further our 
understanding of the deputies’ role in them. The weakness of this approach is that one 
cannot generalize definitively the whole situation about LPCs in China because the 
survey sample is small. It would be hazardous to draw any firm conclusions about this. 
Thus, more systematic data is necessary to provide the basis for judging the extent and 
nature of the development of LPCs during the reform era. So this study does not try to 
generalize the situation of the whole China but focus only on some LPCs. Another 
possible bias of this method is that the legislative activists themselves are more likely to 
respond to the survey and interview.  
 
VI. Organization of Dissertation 
 
This dissertation will be organized as follows. In Chapter 2, I will firstly examine 
the institutional environment of deputies’ legislative participation: the rising power of 
LPCs in the Chinese political system. Then, I will explore the forms of deputies’ actual 
legislative participation in LPCs during the plenary session and its closing. Lastly, I will 
evaluate the degree of legislative activism among the deputies in some LPCs.  
In chapter 3, I will first focus on the institutional constraints (especially Party 
control) in the election system. And then I will point out the institutional constraints, 
especially informal ones in the LPC system and investigate individual costs and risks that 
the active deputies must face and bear in their legislative participation because of these 
institutional constraints. These institutional constraints in the election process and LPC 
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system can explain why most deputies’ are inactive in the legislative participation in 
LPCs.  
In Chapter 4, I will firstly discuss the evolving institutional reform and local 
innovations in the election of deputies to the LPCs. I will also examine the constituents 
and candidates’ increasing demand for more choices in the elections and further explore 
several major aspects associated with deputies’ struggle in the indirect electoral process. 
Lastly, I will describe the outcome of the election reform (especially nomination) and 
analyze its influence on the legislative participation in LPCs.  
In Chapter 5, I will examine the different motivations behind the active deputies’ 
legislative participation in LPCs under institutional changes and constraints. Then, I will 
explore the preference ordering of active deputies and its effect on the deputies’ 
legislative behavior. Lastly, I will examine how informal institutional factor-the 
community pressure constraint and shape the deputies’ behavior.  
  In Chapter 6, I will focus on the cost and risk-reducing tactics the active deputies 
have used in their legislative participations. These tactics have, to some degree, made the 
active legislative participation possible despite numerous political risks and institutional 
obstacles in China. In Chapter 7, I will examine the role and significance of legislative 
activism in LPCs and finally conclude with some implications of my findings for future 
political changes in China.
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Chapter Two      LPC Development and Deputies’ Legislative Participation  
 
I. Introduction  
 
The legislative participation of deputies is central to the working of People’s 
Congresses at all levels. It is estimated that there are more than 3 million deputies at local 
levels in China.1 Therefore, a study that focuses on the individual member can provide a 
better opportunity to understand legislative behavior and the development of the LPC 
system. Despite the increase in research into many areas of LPCs, there has been little 
detailed research using individual deputy as a unit of analysis for legislative participation.  
However, the study of legislative participation is often inhibited by the problems 
of terminology or definition and China is no exception. Therefore, in order to expedite a 
more detailed discussion, the definition of legislative participation must be worked out 
first. In fact, the notion of political participation occupies a central place in Western 
democratic theory. The study of political participation can provide a means of mapping 
different political powers and of defining the process of political interaction in a system. 
Especially in developing countries, political participation can become an important way 
for understanding regime support, consensus-building, and political conflicts during the 
process of political modernization.2 In general, political participation is always defined as 
the participatory behaviors of ordinary citizens. However, the activities of the deputies 
could be distinguished from those of the regular citizens. Therefore, in this study, I will 
                                                 
1 Zhao Chen, “Renda yao wei jianshe shehuizhuyi zhengzhi wenming zuochu gongxian (People's 
Congress must Make the Contribution for the Construction of Socialism Political Civilization),” 
Renmin ribao (People’s Daily), March 11, 2003. 
2 S. E. Bennett and L.L.M. Bennett, “Political Participation,” in Annual Review of Political 
Science( Vol.1), ed. Samuel Long (Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1986), 85-103. 
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focus only on the legislators’ (deputies in China) political participation in legislature, that 
is, legislative participation. For analytical purposes in this study, I will thus define 
legislative participation as a form of activity that involves deputies’ undertaking, 
individually or collectively within LPCs in China. 
In the following, I will firstly examine the institutional environment of deputies’ 
legislative participation: the rise of power of LPC in Chinese political system and will 
give two examples (“Guangdong and Haidian phenomena”) to show the development of 
LPCs. Then, I will give more details on the forms and differences of individual deputies’ 
legislative participation in LPCs. In all, this chapter will draw particular attention to the 
patterns and differences of individual deputy’s legislative participation within LPCs in 
China.  
 
II. The Strengthening Power of LPC System 
 
As a matter of fact, Chinese People’s Congress system has increased its autonomy 
in recent years. Not only the NPC but also the LPCs have begun to demonstrate their 
institutional assertiveness in the supervision of the governments at the corresponding 
levels. The rising power of LPCs could be attributed to the political reform carried out by 
the party-state in China, on the one hand. Almost no one doubts that unprecedented 
progress in economic reform and development occurred in China during the past more 
than two decades. Meanwhile, starting with the economic reforms in the late 1970’s, 
especially as China entered the 1980s with the economic reforms gaining momentum, the 
Party had to change its old control system to ensure the success of economic reform 
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agenda and maintain its political legitimacy. The change of control system, basically, was 
achieved via two processes: one is through restructuring political power among the Party, 
the government and the People’s Congress, as in the assignment of greater responsibility 
to the government and the People’s Congress still controlled by the Party; the other is 
through the decentralization or devolution of power from the center to the regional and 
local levels.3  
Under this circumstance, the Party’s tight grip on People’s Congress has to some 
extent weakened.4 In fact, we can see that there is a tendency of loosening role of Party in 
LPCs over the last more than twenty years. To the Party, as long as the views and 
opinions of the deputies do not directly challenge its ideology and leadership, they would 
be generally tolerated.5  Therefore, the continuing decentralization of Party control has 
provided the opportunity for the rising power of LPCs.6 
On the other hand, in response to the perceived shortcomings of legislative 
participation, there is growing interest amongst LPCs across China to develop innovative 
institutional mechanism for deputies’ legislative involvement. For example, the LPCs 
have initiated some institutional innovations which can provide resources and 
opportunities for the active deputies. However, these institutions can only provide the 
possibility or opportunity for the deputies who have motivations to be active in legislative 
                                                 
3 Lowell Dittmer, “The Current Status and Future Outlook for Chinese Political Reform,” 
www.inpr.org.tw/attachment/Dittmer.pdf (accessed November 19, 2004). 
4 Murray Scot Tanner, “The Erosion of Communist Party Control over Lawmaking in China,” 
The China Quarterly 138 (June 1994): 381-403. 
5 My own interview in Guangzhou city, Guangdong province, March 2004. 
6 The rising power of the LPCs, however, has involved more than augmenting and streamlining 
their organizations; more importantly, it has involved the LPC’s enhancing status versus Party 
and government. More details can be found in Young Nam Cho, “From ‘Rubber Stamps’ to ‘Iron 
Stamps’: The Emergence of Chinese Local People’s Congresses as Supervisory Powerhouses,” 
The China Quarterly 171 (September 2002): 724-740. 
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participation. Clearly, these institutions are useless to those deputies who don’t have any 
interest or motivations to actively engage in legislative participation. In the following, I 
just list these institutions created by some LPCs.  
Deputy straight-through express train  
In 1998, the Standing Committee of Guangdong provincial People’s Congress, 
together with the general offices of Guangdong provincial Party committee, and 
provincial government released one suggestion to rapidly process deputies’ motions and 
formally opened “deputy straight-through express train.” Under this institution, the 
deputies can directly reflect their own opinions and suggestions to the heads of Party 
committee and government. Meanwhile, the deputies can directly make an appointment 
with the leaders of province and city when they have important issues to discuss.7 
Deputy professional group 
In 2003, the Standing Committee of Shenzhen city People’s Congress organized 
their maiden “science and sanitation” professional group for the deputies. Other nine 
different professional groups for deputies were also organized gradually. Based on the 
deputies’ profession and their strong interest, Shenzhen People’s Congress broke primary 
model of electoral unit, organized the deputy professional group, and afforded 
institutional and outlay support. Clearly, this innovation is beneficial to the active 
deputies to conduct a series of supervision and inspection activities.8 
Contact institution among the deputies 
The Standing Committee of Shenyang city People’s Congress created this 
institution. They established the fixed contact web among four-level of deputies (national, 
                                                 
7 My interview in Guangzhou city, Guangdong province, December 2003. 
8 My interview in Shenzhen city, Guangdong province, January 2004. 
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provincial, city and district) in Shenyang city. There are 16 national deputies in Shenyang 
city and every one is able to gain access to 7-8 provincial deputies. Meanwhile, every city 
deputy is connected with 4 -5 county or district deputies. Therefore, through this contact 
web, these deputies coming from the different levels can learn from each other and 
support each other in their legislative participation activities.9 
Meanwhile, the LPCs have established some institutional mechanisms to 
supervise the deputies, which only provide pressure on active deputies but no or partial 
sanctions on the inactive deputies because of limitations of these institutional 
mechanisms. 
United deputy activity day 
No one denies that there are many problems in the deputies’ legislative 
participation in LPCs. One of these problems is: some deputies coming from the 
leadership position within Party or government departments seldom participate in the 
legislative activities because they have heavy responsibilities and lots of work to do. To 
deal with this problem, the Standing Committee of Daxing county People’s Congress in 
Beijing city stipulates that all the deputies should attend the “united deputy activity day” 
and this event is held three times a year. During the “united deputy activity day”, the 
county Party committee, Standing Committee of People’s Congress and government 
cannot arrange for the conferences and other affairs. All deputies must attend this kind of 
                                                 
9 Shenyangshi renda changweihui (The Standing Committee of Shenyang city People’s Congress), 
ed., Difang renda daibiao gongzuo shijian yu tansuo (The Experience and Exploration of 
Representative Work in Local People’s Congresses) (Beijing: Zhongguo minzhu yu fazhi 
chubanshe, 2002): 93-115. 
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activity. So this institution has become one hard sanction to the deputies.10 However, this 
institution cannot solve the problem fundamentally because the “united deputy activity 
day” is only held three times (or days) in a year. 
Deputy reporting to constituents or electorates 
There are only ambiguous but no concrete stipulations on how the constituents or 
electorates should supervise their deputies. However, some LPCs have embarked on a 
new form of supervision: the deputies should report to their constituents or electorates. 
This kind of supervision has become popular in many LPCs. For example, in November 
2000, the Party secretary of Dongcheng district of Beijing reported his performance as a 
deputy to his constituents in Zugan electorate, Zhaoyangmen street, including his 
activities of submitting motions and visiting constituents.11 Clearly, regular reporting to 
the constituents is an effective way for the deputies to be accountable to the public. So 
this method can strengthen the contact between deputies and their constituents.  
However, the stipulation of this institution is not ideal. According to my fieldwork 
in Shenzhen city People’s Congress, not all deputies have to report to their constituents 
and if the deputy does not report, there is no stipulation on how to punish him or her. In 
addition, it was reported that nearly half of the more than 300 Guangdong deputies to the 
provincial and national People’s Congresses were against the proposal to regularly report 
                                                 
10 Han Ke, “Dangqian difang renda daibiao gongzuo de xin jinzhang he xuyao yajiu de yixie 
wenti (New Progress on Local Deputies’ Work and Questions to be Studied),” Renda yanjiu 
(People’s Congress Studies) (online) 117, no. 9 (2001). 
11 Fu Xu, “Goujian renmin quanli dasha (Constructing People’s Authority Building),” Renmin 
ribao (People’s Daily), February 26, 2003. 
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their work to their constituents. The members who opposed this idea said that it was just 
another formality and would put an unnecessary burden on them.12 
Deputy’s legislative participation record 
The Standing Committee of Wuchang district People’s Congress in Wuhan city 
established the “deputy legislative participation record” and made it open to the public. 
Thus, the constituents can know their deputies’ legislative performance. At the same time, 
the inactive deputies would feel the pressure to boost their representation and 
responsibility.13  
Although these institutional innovations are incomplete in the long run, they have 
played important roles in the short run. It is very clear that the institutionalization of LPC 
system has strengthened its autonomy versus the local party and government and 
provided some important opportunities for the deputies to “begin rethinking their old 
attitudes on who constitutes their true ‘constituency.’ In other words, when the party 
center is giving legislator fewer, more ambiguous signals about its wishes, and has, in 
any case, substantially lowered the penalties for disobeying those wishes, the legislators 
will feel much freer to ask themselves, ‘who is it I am trying to please by serving as a 
legislator?’”14  
                                                 
12 According to the Xinxi shibao (Information Times) in Guangzhou city, the Guangdong People’s 
Congress Standing Committee sent out more than 900 questionnaires to members of the 
Guangdong People’s Congress and Guangdong’s representatives to the National People’s 
Congress. Only 53.8 percent of the more than 300 representatives who replied said that they 
supported regular reports to constituents, saying it would help members do their jobs better and 
take their positions seriously. But the Guangdong People’s Congress Standing Committee denied 
this report in my telephone interview and said they did not know anything about this survey. 
13 Tu Xuedong, Yanjie and Xia Jiaxin, “Gongkai lvzhi jilu, qianghua daibiao zeren (Opening 
Legislative Participation Record to Public, Strengthening Deputies’ Responsibility),” Renmin 
ribao (People’s Daily), August 20, 2003. 
14 Tanner, op.cit., 403. 
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In fact, with the rising power of LPCs, more and more ordinary people have 
begun to realize their importance and visited deputies when they encountered problems. 
For example, Tianjian Shi’s survey showed that the percentage of urban public in Beijing 
in 1988 and 1996 that complained through deputies increased from 8.6 to 14.1 percent.15 
A poll in the Zhongguo qingnian bao (China Youth Daily) in 2004 found similar results. 
23 percent of respondents said that they had approached deputies to lodge a complaint.16 
Meanwhile, the volume of public letters and visits to People’s Congresses increased 
sharply. For example, in Quanzhou city, Fujian Province, the number of letters and visits 
to People’s Congresses at various levels has been growing in recent years. (See below 
Table 2.1) 
Table 2.1: The Number of Letters and Visits to People Congresses in Quanzhou City 
City/county/district Qianzhou Jinjiang  Nan’ an Luojiang Dehua 
 Letter/visit Letter/visit Letter/visit Letter/visit Letter/visit 
1995  266/138 126/84  130/350 
1996 826/674 413/172 137/86  175/420 
1997 947/787 425/290 264/390  197/380 
1998 1493/1126 468/265 312/426 63/20 275/441 
1999 1747/1227 530/214 328/451 45/16 162/300 
2000 1281/1938 582/600 419/520 56/38 196/241 
 
Note: Qianzhou is a regional-level city; Jinjiang and Nan’an are county-level cities; 
Luojiang is a new district in Quanzhou city established in 1997; Dehua is a county in 
Quanzhou city. 
Source: He Junzhi and Wang Yijing, Renda xinfangzhidu de xianzhuang yu gaige (The 
Present Situation and Reform of People's Congress’ Letter and Visit Institution), 




                                                 
15 Tianjian Shi, “Mass Political Behavior in Beijing,” in The Paradox of China’s Post-Mao 
Reforms, ed. Merle Goldman and Roderick MacFaquhar (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1999), 155. 
16 Fang Yihan, “Nin shenbian de renda daibiao hao bu hao zhao? (Is it Easy to Find Your 
Deputy?),” Zhongguo qingnian bao (China Youth Daily), April 25, 2004.  
 40 
The Rising Power of LPCs: “Guangdong Phenomena” and “Haidian Phenomena” 
 
The developments of Guangdong provincial People’s Congress and Haidian 
district People’s Congress in Beijing are two striking and good examples of LPC’s rising 
power. They have been called the “Guangdong phenomena” and “Haidian phenomena” 
respectively by the Chinese media for their active legislative development. 
 “Guangdong Phenomena”  
Over the past ten years, Guangdong provincial People’s Congress has conducted 
lots of influential supervisory cases on the government. Because of all these, Guangdong 
People’s Congress is very famous for its tight supervision of the government.  
A series of interpellation cases against the government marked the appearance 
and formation of “Guangdong Phenomena.” This process started during the period of 8th 
Guangdong provincial People’s Congress (1993-1997). For example, in 1994, twenty-one 
deputies signed jointly and submitted the interpellation case on Guangdong provincial 
Territorial Bureau (Guotuting) for its misconduct. In 2000, twenty-three deputies from 
Foshan delegate conducted the interpellation on Guangdong provincial Environmental 
Protection Bureau (Huanbaoju).17 
More importantly, the deputies in Guangdong provincial People’s Congress pay 
particular attention on supervising the government budget draft. This is rather rare in 
other places in China. In 2004, the networks of Financial and Economical Committee of 
Guangdong provincial People’s Congress and provincial Financial Bureau became 
                                                 
17 My interview with one staff from research office of Standing Committee of Guangdong 
provincial People’s Congress, January 2004. 
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interconnected. So the former can directly check and supervise the latter’s records of all 
expenditure at any time.18 
“Guangdong Phenomena” has seized the minds and emotions of the populace, 
especially for some government officials. For example, one official from Guangzhou city 
said that he would be very nervous just before the People’s Congress plenary session 
every year. He would review all the work in his department because he did not know 
whether and when the deputies would query him.19 
Many Chinese scholars have conducted an analysis of “Guangdong Phenomena.” 
They ascribed it to Guangdong’s rapid economic development, high-level opening policy 
and vibrant culture and thinking. Meanwhile, when speaking of “Guangdong 
phenomena,” one point cannot be ignored: the power of the mass media. As is well 
known, Guangdong has very developed media. It not only has three newspapering groups 
(such as Southern, Yancheng and Guangzhou) but also has a set of news media of good 
reputation such as Nanfang ribao(Southern Daily), Nanfang zhoumo (Southern Weekend), 
Xin kuai bao (New Express), and Nanfeng chuang (Window on the Southern Wind). Their 
reportage further pushes the development of Guangdong People’s Congress.20 
 “Haidian Phenomena”  
Similarly, “Haidian phenomena” in Beijing city also developed and matured 
gradually. In the 1990s, deputies of the Haidian district People’s Congress took full 
advantage of rights endowed by the law, and developed all kinds of legislative 
participation: deputies’ free speech in the plenary session, topical symposium, deputies’ 
                                                 
18 This paragraph is based on the internal document from the Standing Committee of Guangdong 
Provincial People’s Congress (unpublished). 
19 My interview in Guangzhou city, Guangdong province, March 2004. 
20 This paragraph is based on my talk with one researcher from research office of the Standing 
Committee of Guangdong Provincial People’s Congress, March 2004. 
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dialogue with mayor, inquiry conference, symposium between city deputies and district 
deputies. More importantly, the deputies of the Haidian district have also played an 
important role in the Beijing city People’s Congress. For example, the deputies of the 
Haidian district have submitted more than 25 percent of all motions in Beijing city 
People’s Congress. Meanwhile, there is a high percent of motions listed on the agenda 
from the deputies of the Haidian district.21 (See Table 2.2) 
Table 2.2: Motions Submitted and Motions Listed on Agenda by Deputies from 
Haidian District in Beijing City People’s Congress 
 
 Motions  
(Haidian ) 
Motions    













 9th ps* 
52 215 24% 4 14 28% 
1st  
meeting  
11th  ps 








137 363 38% 18 28 64% 
4th 
meeting 
11th  ps 




126 404 31% 18 37 49% 
1st 
meeting  
12th h ps 
96 392 24% 18 35 51% 
2nd 99 392 25% 19 65 29% 
                                                 
21 This paragraph is based on the book: Renmin daibiao dahui zhidu yanjiusuo and Beijing shi 
haidianqu renda changweihui(The Institute of People’s Congress System Studies and Standing 
Committee of Beijing Haidian District People’s Congress), ed., Haidian renda xianxiang 
(Haidian People’s Congress Phenomena) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2005). 
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meeting 




87 353 25% 18 75 24% 
 
Note: PS=the plenary session of Beijing city People’s Congress 
Source: Renmin daibiao dahui zhidu yanjiusuo and Beijing shi haidianqu renda 
changweihui (The Institute of People’s Congress System Studies and Standing 
Committee of Beijing Haidian District People’s Congress), ed., Haidian renda xianxiang 
(Haidian People’s Congress Phenomena) (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 2005), 12-13. 
 
Because of its performance, Haidian district People’s Congress has attracted the 
concern and attention of the Standing Committee of Beijing People’s Congress and the 
mass media. In fact, deputy activists have played a dominant role in the development of 
Haidian People’s Congress. Deputies’ activism is interconnected with the institutional 
environment of the Haidian People’s Congress. There are lots of central and city 
government agencies, universities and colleges in Haidian district. Many deputies come 
from these work units. It is not so important whether the deputies coming from these 
units have higher political quality and democratic consciousness or not; more importantly, 
they are of higher rank than officials from the district government and related state organs. 
So they would face less risk and have more courage when they conduct supervision on 
these government agencies and their officials.22 
 
III. The Forms of Deputies’ Legislative Participation in LPCs 
 
Therefore, the loosening of Party’s control and increasing institutionalization of 
LPCs has created some opportunities for the deputies to take advantage of in their 
                                                 
22 My own interview in Beijing city, January 2005. 
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legislative participation. In fact, deputies as a whole in LPCs are becoming more and 
more active in their legislative participation than before. It is important to acknowledge 
that the field of deputies’ legislative participation comprises a wide and diverse kind of 
activities in LPCs.23 However, deputies’ main legislative participations in LPCs during 
the plenary session are as follows: 
1. Submitting proposals (Ti’an) or motions (Yi’an)) and suggestions or opinions, 
criticisms (Jianyi) 
Submitting motions and suggestions are two basic forms of deputies’ legislative 
participation activities in LPCs.24  In recent years, there have been an increase in the 
numbers and content of the motions submitted by the deputies in People’s Congresses at 
all levels. For example, from 2001 to 2005, the motions deputies submitted to Guangzhou 
city People’s Congress increased nearly 50%. (See the Table 2.3 below) 
 
                                                 
23 Cai Dingjian, Zhongguo renda zhidu (The Institution of the Chinese People’s Congress) 
(Beijing: Falü chubanshe, 2003), 194-198. 
24 However, there are some major differences between motions and suggestions: (1) suggestions 
(Jianyi) include suggestions, criticism and opinions in all directions the deputies submit to 
People’s Congress or its standing committee. Motions are the proposals the deputies refer to the 
plenary session according to statutory procedure, and the plenary session will deliberate and make 
a decision; (2) suggestion can be put forward by the deputy individually or collectively. But 
motions must be put forward by deputies signed jointly following the statutory number and 
procedure; (3) suggestions can focus on all kinds of issues, but motion must fall into the scopes of 
People’s Congress’s function and power at the same level; (4) there is no statutory requirement  
in written form for the suggestions. The motions must have “reason, basis and scheme” in written 
form. Furthermore, the motion on law must be accompanied by the legislative bill; (5) the 
working body of People’s Congress standing committee or township People’s Congress 
presidium will leave the suggestions to related departments. The related departments will study, 
handle these suggestions and reply to deputies. The handling procedure of the motions is different 
from suggestions’. The presidium will decide whether the motion is put on the agenda or the 
presidium leaves the motions to related special committee. The related special committee will 
deliberate and put forward opinion, then the presidium will decide whether the motion be put on 
the agenda or not. The above explanation is based on internal document from Guangzhou 
People’s Congress. 
 45 
Table 2.3: Motions Submitted by Deputies to Guangzhou City People’s Congress 
(2001-2005) 
 
  year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
motions 93 144 113 146 178 
 
Source: author’s collection from Guangzhou People’s Congress’ internal document and 
its website. 
 
In the same way, the deputies to Guangdong provincial People’s Congress have 
also submitted more and more motions in recent years and the contents cover a broad 
range of issues. (See Table 2.4 and 2.5 below) 
Table 2.4:  Motions and Suggestions Submitted by Deputies to Guangdong 
Provincial People’s Congress (2001-2005) 
 
           Year  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Motions  213 231 276 388 265 
Suggestions  102 133 247 102 375 
 
Source: author’s collection from Guangdong provincial People’s Congress’ internal 
document and its website 
 
Table 2.5: The Contents of Motions Submitted by Deputies to Guangdong People’s 
Congress (2001-2005) 
 
                    
Year 
content 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Finance and 
Economy 
60 NA 103 156 101 
Agriculture 82 NA 86 84 58 
Politics and 
law 


















9 NA 2 8 5 
Motions in 
all 
213 NA 276 388 265 
 
Source: author’s collection from Guangdong provincial People’s Congress’ internal 
document and its website 
 
Similarly, the deputies to Haidian district People’s Congress in Beijing city have 
also submitted all kinds of motions concerning constituents’ ordinary life. (See Table 2.6 
below) 
Table 2.6: The Contents of Motions Submitted by Deputies to Second Plenary 
Session of 13
th
 Haidian District People’s Congress, Beijing City 
 
Content of motions  number percent 
Urban construction 25 34.2% 
Social affair  13 17.8% 
Government management  13 17.8% 
Community construct and 
management 
10 13.7% 




In all 73 100% 
 
Source: Renmin daibiao dahui zhidu yanjiusuo and Beijing shi haidianqu renda 
changweihui (The Institute of People’s Congress System Studies and Standing 
Committee of Beijing Haidian District People’s Congress), ed., op.cit., 201. 
 
Although the total number of motions that all deputies submitted is increasing, the 
percentage of deputies submitting the motions is still very low. One reporter from Xin 
kuai bao (New Express) in Guangzhou conducted some analysis on the number of 
motions submitted by the deputies at national, provincial and city levels. According to his 
statistics, 2983 national deputies submitted 1050 motions, averaging 2.84 persons 
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submitting one motion during the first plenary session of 10th NPC in 2003.25  During the 
second plenary session of 10th Guangdong People’s Congress in 2004, 787 provincial 
deputies submitted 388 motions, averaging two deputies submitting one. During the first 
plenary session of 12th Guangzhou People’s Congress, 497 city deputies submitted 115 
motions, averaging 4.3 persons submitting one. Considering some deputies would submit 
more than one motion, this means that the ratio of deputies who have never submitted any 
motion per year is about 2/3 at national level, ½ in Guangdong and ¾ in Guangzhou.26  
It is well known that the performance of People’s Congresses in Guangdong 
province is better than other provinces in China. Therefore, we can imagine the situation 
of deputies’ submitting motions in other People’s Congresses. For example, one staff 
member from Zhanhuang county People Congress in Hebei province conducted some 
simple analysis on the two terms of deputies’ legislative activities. According to his 
analysis, from 1995 to 1997, the deputies in Zhanhuang county submitted 121 motions 
(including 22 suggestions during the closing of plenary session) and every deputy only 
submitted 0.25 motion per year on average. From 1998 to 2000, the deputies submitted 
86 motions (including 12 suggestions during the closing of plenary session) and every 
deputy only submitted 0.18 motion per year on average. He also conducted some analysis 
on the deputies’ legislative activities in Shijiazhuang city (the capital of Hebei province) 
People’s Congress. From 1996 to 1999, deputies submitted 930 motions, suggestions and 
criticisms (including suggestions during the closing of plenary session). So every deputy 
                                                 
25 In general, 90% of motions were submitted by the deputies during the plenary session at 
different levels. 
26 Zhou Qiong, “Renda daibiao, ni zai nali? (Where are You, Deputy?),” Xin kuai bao (New 
Express) (Guangzhou), March 3, 2003. 
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submitted only 0.35 motions on average.27 This means that there are so many deputies 
who did not submit any motions. Therefore, based on the above analysis, we can know 
that not only the number of motion submitted by every deputy but the percentage of 
deputies who submitted the motions is also very low.  
Although the numbers and content of motions have increased over years, the 
quality of motions is still not so good.28  For example, some motions, considered the most 
acclaimed work by the deputies, though, are essentially self-contradictory. To top it all, a 
few deputies did not even conduct the fieldwork when they prepared for the motions, but 
just copied from legal experts’ articles in academic journals.29 As said above, the 
presidium or related special committee would decide whether the motion can be put on 
the agenda (i.e. formal motions). In fact, few motions could be listed on the agenda. Most 
of motions have been changed into suggestions. Even in Guangdong provincial People’s 
Congress, the percentage of motions listed on the agenda is very low. (See Table 2.7 
below)   
Table 2.7: The Comparison of Motions Submitted and Listed on Agenda in 
Guangdong Provincial People’s Congress (1998-2005) 
 
    year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Motions 
submitted 




6 17 26 27  NA NA 4 25 
                                                 
27 At the same time, according to his investigation, the number of individuals who are active in 
the legislative participation generally is no higher than 10 to 15 percent. Zhang Guimin, “Jiaqiang 
dui daibiao lvxing zhize de jiandu keburonghuan (Urgent to Strengthen the Supervision of 
Deputies’Fulfilling the Responsibility),” Zhongguo renda xinwen (Chinese People’s Congress 
News), November 11, 2001. 
28 During my fieldwork, I even heard that some delegates employed some researchers from local 
Social Science Academy to write insignificant motions for them to “compete” (Panbi) with other 
delegates.  
29 My own interview in Guangzhou city, Guangdong province, January 2004. 
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Source: author’s collection from Guangdong provincial People’s Congress’ internal 
document and its website 
 
During the 9th, 10th and 11th Haidian district People’s Congress in Beijing city, the 
deputies submitted 511 pieces of motions, but there were only 79 motions on the agenda 
(15%). (See Table 2.8 below) 
Table 2.8:  The Comparison of Motions Submitted and Put on Agenda in Haidian 








               9th               10th         11th  In 
all  
 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5  
Motions 
submitted 




3 1 3 5 3 6 1 7 1 5 12 5 9 5 13 79 
 
Source: Li Buyun, Difang renda daibiao zhidu yanjiu (A Study of Local People’s 
Congress System) (Changsha: Hunan daxue chubanshe, 2002), 221. 
 
In the second plenary session 13th Haidian district People’s Congress, compared 
with the total number of motions submitted by all the deputies (73), the percentage of 
motions on the agenda (17) is only 3.3.30  During the 8th, Hunan province People’s 
Congress, the deputies submitted 1106 pieces of motions, but there were only 48 motions 
on agenda (4.34%). (See Table 2.9 below). From this, we can know that the quality of 





                                                 
30 Renmin daibiao dahui zhidu yanjiusuo and Beijing shi haidianqu renda changweihui (The 
Institute of People’s Congress System Studies and Standing Committee of Beijing Haidian 
District People’s Congress), op.cit., 201. 
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Table 2.9: The Comparison of Motions Submitted and Put on Agenda during the 8
th
 





1 2 3 4 5 In all 
Motions 
submitted 
251 216 211 229 197 1106 
Motions 
on agenda 
4 3 8 15 18 48 
 
Source: Li, op.cit., 38. 
 
How the People’s Congress or government departments deal with these motions 
in turn affects the deputies’ attitude and behavior in future. Then, what should they do if 
the government departments do not take notice of their motions? As one deputy said “…I 
am the representative of the constituents. If they don’t take notice of my motions, I will 
submit them again. And I will work together with other deputies to submit. If they cannot 
deal with them during the current term, I will submit them again during the next term.”31 
What he said really reflects some deputies’ quandary.  
2. Appraising of government or officials (pingyi)  
There are two kinds of appraisals for the deputies to conduct: work appraisal and 
personnel appraisal. The work appraisal involves deputies and/or members of the 
Standing Committee evaluating and discussing the work of government agencies, court 
and procuratorate. The personnel appraisal involves deputies or/and members of the 
Standing Committee evaluating and discussing the work of government officials.  
It is said that the appraisal of government and officials is one of the supervisory 
forms explored by the LPCs gradually and has been conducted for more than ten years. 
Initially, this supervision was only conducted in Hangzhou city, Zhejiang province in 
                                                 
31 My interview in Guangzhou city, Guangdong province, January 2004. 
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1988. Before 1992, only a few provinces conducted the appraisal of government agencies 
and their officials. This appraisal began to expand to the whole country since 1994.32  In 
general, this kind of supervision is superficial and always becomes a mere formality. 
3. Inquiries (Xunwen) and interpellations (Zhixun) 
Inquiry refers to one kind of supervision that the deputies or members of Standing 
Committee can ask the related government departments at the same level to answer their 
questions when they have doubts on the motions or working reports at the plenary session 
(or the Standing Committee Conference). The article 29 of Local Organic Law stipulates: 
“when deliberating the proposal during the plenary session of Local People’s Congresses 
at various levels, deputies can put forth any inquiry to the related government 
departments. The related government department must send some officials and give an 
explanation.” The article 13 of Deputy’s Law also stipulates: “when deputies deliberate 
the proposal and reports, they can inquiry the relevant government departments. The 
relevant government departments normally request to responsible heads of departments to 
answer any questions asked by deputies.”33 In general, inquiries can produce heated 
debates between the government officials and the deputies. Therefore, inquiring of 
officials periodically can help rectify some administrative abuses. However, inquiry is a 
supervisory tool that is a little weaker than the interpellation form of supervision which is 
mandatory.  
                                                 
32 Cui Li, “Muqian gedi renda shuzi pingyi shangwei jinru shizhi xing falv cengmian (Appraisals 
in LPCs have not yet Entered a Substantive Legal Aspects),” (Zhongguo qingnian bao (China 
Youth Daily), June 8, 2004. 
33 More details on Local Organic Law can be found here: 
http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=82606; More details on Deputy’s Law can 
be found here: http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=13973 (accessed January 
10, 2005). 
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There were many instances of inquiries in recent years, especially in Guangzhou 
city People’s Congress. Furthermore, there are some characteristics of deputies’ inquiries 
on government agencies and their officials in Guangzhou city. Firstly, compared with the 
other LPCs, the number of inquires launched by the deputies in Guangzhou city is 
extremely high. For example, in April 2000, at the 3rd plenary session of 11th Guangzhou 
city People’s Congress, deputies inquired 8 times on the work related to the various 
government departments in 7 days, and the questions were more incisive one by one. In 
2001, the deputies inquired 11 times on the related departments of Guangzhou city 
government.34 
Secondly, the contents of the inquiries are broad. These contents include 
environmental pollution, landscaping, city planning and management, market 
management, road and bridge charges, pipeline fuel gas monopoly, the development of 
car industry, educational fund investment, and judicatory justice and so on. All these 
issues are related to ordinary people’s daily life. One of the most influential of inquiries 
was the inquiry on Guangzhou city Construction Committee submitted by Wang Zechu 
and other deputies.35 
                                                 
34
 Zhou Qiong, “Guangzhou shiyi jie renda wunian huigu (Reflections on Five Years’ Experience 
of 11th Guangzhou People's Congress),” Xin kuai bao (New Express) (Guangzhou), November 25, 
2002. 
35 Deputy Wang Zechu was born in Wenzhou city, Zhejiang province. Later he worked at 
Guangzhou city and was nominated and elected as the deputy in 1998. He works very hard as a 
deputy and dares to speak for the ordinary people and so is one of the most famous deputies in 
Guangzhou. Citizens in Guangzhou had lots of complains on the fee of road and bridge in the 
downtown area. So Wang and other deputies inquired the Construction Committee of Guangzhou 
city “when will you stop collecting the fees from the three old bridges (Haizhu, Renmin and 
Zhujiang)?”  After they inquired, the related departments conducted the hearing and stopped 
collecting the fee. Zhou Qiong, “Guangzhou shiyi jie renda wunian huigu (Reflections on Five 
Years’ Experience of 11th Guangzhou People's Congress),” Xin kuai bao (New Express) 
(Guangzhou), November 25, 2002. 
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Thirdly, the subjects of inquiries are broader than in the past, including not only 
government departments but also courts and procuratorates. Fourthly, the impressive and 
in-depth reporting by the media has produced a great influence on the whole society. In 
fact, the media reporting of inquiries by deputies in Guangzhou city is second to none in 
China, not only in quantity and scope but also in quality and depth. One official from 
Guangzhou city government said “I am very nervous before the opening of the city 
People’s Congress. I will tidy up all work in our department because I don’t know when 
the deputies will question me.”36  Therefore, deputies in Guangzhou city have played 
some important role in scrutinizing and performing checks on the government to weed 
out recalcitrant officials. However, inquiries are still not an effective instrument for 
supervising the government and its official. Largely because of the lack of competent 
deputies and their limited knowledge on government affairs, questions asked by deputies 
frequently tend to be insignificant. Most importantly, some government officials may 
refuse to answer any question by offering some excuse.37 
Interpellation, according to the procedure stipulated by law, means that the 
deputies or members of Standing Committee of People’s Congress at every level can 
submit any cross-questions against the government. The government officials must 
answer the interpellation at a set time in a set format. During the interpellation, heads of 
government will contest and argue with the deputies face to face, so the content and form 
of interpellation are very intrusive. Therefore, interpellation is one of the most important 
and effective forms of supervising the government by deputies.  
                                                 
36 My own interview in Guangzhou city, Guangdong province, January 2004. 
37 My own interview with one researcher at the Guangdong People’s Congress, January 2004. 
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However, this mandatory form of supervision has not been used widely and 
sometimes interpellation can be left on the shelf automatically by some LPCs. There are 
some reasons to explain this phenomenon. Firstly, most of the deputies know little about 
the details of this supervisory form; some even know next to nothing about what 
interpellation is about and how to conduct it. To them, supervision involves just listening 
to the proposal, submitting the suggestion and taking a vote.  
Secondly, restricted by the procedure, some deputies do not want to submit any 
interpellation. According to the stipulations of Constitution and Local Organic Law, 
during the plenary session of People’s Congress and Standing Committee’s meeting, 
deputy or delegate, member of Standing Committee must sign jointly and submit the 
interpellation on government, court, procuratorate or their members. Then, the presidium 
or Standing Committee director meeting will convene to decide whether the interpellators 
answer in written form or orally. Even though the presidium and director meeting do not 
exert any influence before the deputies submit the interpellation, in actual fact, some 
influences or restrictions are still there because most of the members of presidium are 
local leaders of the government and Party. Even though there are some serious problems 
in some departments, however, these departments are always administrated by one 
member of presidium. So other members will cancel the interpellation to avoid offending 
this member and “save his face.” Meanwhile, some members from the Standing 
Committee director meeting have just retired and transferred to this position from the 
Party and government position, so they have to consider the “face” of some old 
colleagues.38 
                                                 
38 My own interview in Shandong province, March 2004. 
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Another important reason for this is the tight schedule for meetings. The time 
allocated for the plenary session of LPC is so tight that the deputies have no time to 
submit any interpellation even when they have some interest in doing this. For example, 
the plenary session only lasts 3-8 days at the county level and only one day at township 
level People’s Congresses. No matter how long the plenary session is, the staffs of 
People’s Congress always make detailed arrangements; procedures and contents have 
been decided before the commencement of any plenary sessions. If one case of the 
interpellation comes out suddenly, this certainly will throw the original plan into disarray 
and all plenary session procedures have to be readjusted. This would increase the 
organizational difficulty of any plenary session. In view of this situation, the presidium 
generally rejects the submission of interpellation on the grounds of unclear content and 
frivolity. At present time, there is no concrete and operational procedure for the deputies 
to submit the interpellation during the closing of plenary session. Therefore, the deputies 
can only submit the interpellation and ask for a reasonable reply from the related 
government department during the plenary session.39 
Last but not least, in theory, the deputies can initiate interpellations, but they have 
no right to decide how to punish the related officials if they can not fulfill their promise 
of rectifying the administrative abuses after the interpellation. The deputies in Guangzhou 
had similar experience on this problem. Some fiery interpellation cases disappeared from 
the people’s memories because the related government departments or officials delayed 
the promise again and again. The deputies had no alternative but to initiate the inquiries 
and interpellations again and again.40 
                                                 
39 Ibid. 
40 My own interview in Guangzhou city, Guangdong province, February 2004. 
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Despite all these obstacles, the deputies have begun to use this supervisory tool in 
recent years. A well-known case of interpellation occurred when deputies in Guangdong 
provincial People’s Congress initiated interpellation against provincial Environment 
Protection Bureau.41 After this interpellation case, many cases happened in other 
locations. For example, the first case of interpellation happened in Guizhou province in 
January 2001. Xia Wenxiang and other 49 deputies submitted the interpellation on the 
repeal of Huaxi toll station by law. The first case of interpellation happened in Anhui 
province in January 2001. In Ma’anshan city, Zhong Aiqin and other deputies submitted 
the interpellation to investigate and deal with the illegal construction and asked “three 
whys”: “why is the developer permitted to construct illegally again and again? Why can 
the public interest be impinged repeatedly? Why does the government consider the 
developer’s interest but ignore the public interest?”  In January 2003, Liu Xianqiu 
interpellated Beijing High Court “why has my suggestion been delayed for 8 months?”  
This is the first case of interpellation in Beijing city.42 
4. Voting 
Voting is one of important rights held by deputies in the LPCs. Recently available 
data show a steady increase in dissenting votes or abstentions by local deputies on draft 
laws, budget reports, and personnel appointments. In particular, the veto of personnel 
                                                 
41 In 2000, at 3rd plenary session 9th Guangdong People’s Congress, Zhong Xincai, Tan Jianxiong 
and other 22 deputies from Foshan city conducted a crossfire interpellation against Provincial 
Environment Protection Bureau and demanded to dismiss and replace its vice director-Wang 
Zikui. Talking about the significance of  this interpellation, Tan Jianxiong said “ the significance 
of this case lies in: it let ordinary people and officials at all levels see that with the progress of our 
democratic construction,  more and more deputies have realized the power and responsibility in 
their hands and say good bye to the era of only showing hands.” My interview in Foshan city, 
Guangdong province, February 2004. 
42 Su Jinxi, “Renda jiandu de kunhuo ji lujin yilai (Confusion and Path Dependence of People's 
Congress’ Supervision),” http://www.baoan.gov.cn/sites/organization/bdkt/XXYD-020.HTM 
(accessed January 20, 2005). 
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appointments can better portray the deputies’ assertiveness because the personnel 
appointments must first be approved by the local Party committee. Today more and more 
deputies to LPCs have begun to understand the logic and power of their votes: if the local 
Party committee allows secret ballots and no longer tries to track down who votes in what 
way, they will no longer hesitate to cast opposing votes.43 Under this circumstance, if a 
candidate is unpopular, even if favored by the Party, he may receive many opposing votes. 
 In fact, the veto of “official candidates” by the deputies occurred frequently 
during the local elections in China recently. For example, in 2003, four candidates (two 
for vice mayor position and another two for vice director of People’s Congress) 
nominated by Organization Department of Liaoning province’s Communist Party were 
rejected by the deputies in Fuxun city. Instead, three candidates nominated by the 
deputies were elected as vice directors.44 
Similar situations happened in other places in Liaoning province in the same year. 
The candidate for mayor of Beining in Jinzhou city did not get more than 50% votes. The 
                                                 
43 Zheng Shiping, Party vs. State in Post-1949 China: The Institutional Dilemma (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), 189. 
44 At the plenary session of Fushun city People’s Congress in January 2003, one mayor, six vice 
mayors, one director and six vice directors of People’ Congress must be elected. According to the 
accustomed modus operandi, these empty positions would be recommended and nominated by 
the Organization Department of provincial Communist Party. However, deputies of Fuxun city 
changed the accustomed “obedient” attitude, and nominated other 5 vice director candidates of 
People’s Congress in the 4th day of the plenary session suddenly. These candidates attended the 
pre-election despite provincial organization department’s unwillingness. In the formal election, 
three candidates nominated by the deputies were elected as the vice directors. The similar 
situation happened during the vice mayor election. Besides six candidates nominated by the 
provincial Organization Department, the deputies also nominated two other candidates. It is 
reported that deputies have always been unhappy with the method of “recommending” the 
candidate by the provincial Organization Department. The deputies thought that “I am the city 
deputy, so electing who is my own business.” It is noteworthy that the candidates nominated by 
the deputies still did not move back uncompromisingly even after the leader of provincial Party 
committee talked to them. Chen Ke, “Zhongguo difang xuanju, rendaibiao gan ‘fanshang’ 
(Deputies dared to ‘Rebel’ in Local Chinese Election),”Lianhe zaobao, February 28, 2003. More 
details could be found in http://www.zaobao.com/special/npc/pages2/npc280203a.html (accessed 
February 5, 2005). 
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Guta district Head’s dream of continuing to hold a title didn’t come true. Instead, the 
deputies elected the original vice head as head. The only candidate for head of Yi county 
lost the election, and the vice secretary of county Party committee was elected as head by 
the deputies directly. At the end of 2003, the mayor candidate for Yueyang city in Hunan 
province was rejected by the deputies but finally elected in the second round. But in the 
cases of Liaoning province, those rejected by the deputies had no second chance.45 It is 
not unusual for the deputies to veto vice head candidates nominated by the Party 
committee. Therefore, the veto of a head candidate by the deputies has great significance 
because this may represent a change in the deputies’ legislative participation in LPCs.46 
                                                 
45 Chen Ke, “Zhongguo difang xuanju, rendaibiao gan ‘fanshang’ (Deputies dared to ‘Rebel’ in 
Local Chinese Election),” Lianhe zaobao, February 28, 2003. More details can be found in 
http://www.zaobao.com/special/npc/pages2/npc280203a.html (accessed February 5, 2005). 
46 However, sometimes the veto of official candidate and election of candidate nominated by the 
deputies reflect the bureaucratic and factional politics in some local places. For example, in 
February 2004, Sichuan provincial People’s Congress needed to conduct a by-election of vice 
governor because of the government election at expiration of official terms. Li Dachang was not 
on the name list of primary candidates. However, when the deputies deliberated the formal 
candidate, some delegates nominated Li Dachang as the candidate for vice governor suddenly. Li 
was chief of provincial Commission of Finance at that time. As a result, because of the 
unanimous nomination of deputies from basic level counties and cities, Li was elected by a 
handsome majority and won the official candidate (assistant governor). He became the “first vice 
provincial governor” nominated and elected by the deputies. On the surface, deputies nominated 
Li because of his performance on the finance. And this also reflected deputies’ activism. However, 
this does not constitute the full picture. Li’s election as vice governor had something to do with 
his position as chief of provincial Commission of Finance. Li was good at developing relations 
with other officials. When he was chief of provincial Commission of Finance, he knitted up 
friendship with many directors of Finance Bureau, head or Party secretary from basic –level 
county and city. Because of his financial power, he could satisfy the demand of financial 
allotment from these officials. Moreover, most of these officials were provincial deputies. Just 
because of this relationship web among them, it is understandable that they nominated and 
elected Li as vice provincial governor. But Li was arrested for embezzlement of public funds, 
afterwards. More details can be found in http://www.boxun.com/hero/zyx/31_1.shtml (accessed 
February 10, 2005) 
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Besides the above activities during the plenary session in LPCs, meanwhile, 
deputy’s main legislative participations during the closing of the plenary session are as 
follows:47 
5. Visiting the constituents 
In a democracy, government must respond to the needs and desires of its citizens. 
The electoral link between legislators and constituents makes legislators crucial in 
promoting the government’s responsiveness. Visiting constituents is thus considered a 
means for legislators to learn about the constituents’ needs and articulate their interests. 
Similarly, the deputies in China must keep regular contact with their constituents 
according to the Law of Deputy. 
However, the deputies in China do not have strong relations with their 
constituents. For example, Renmin zhengquan bao and urban social and economical 
investigating team in Zhejiang province conducted some survey on constituents’ opinion 
on their deputies. When they asked the constituents “do you know the deputy in your 
district?”, only 6.5% answered “very familiar;” 52.6% answered “partially know;” 40.9% 
answered “never know.”48  In a similar survey conducted by Zhongguo qingnian bao 
(China Youth Daily), when asked “is it easy to find the deputy for you?”, 10% of 
constituents chose the answer “easy” and 24% answered “that’s OK.” But 52% answered 
definitely “very tough.”49 This shows that the electoral link between legislators (deputies) 
and constituents in China is very weak. 
                                                 
47 Cai, op.cit., 195-199. 
48 Du Fangwen, Mao Jiangqing and Jin Juxiang, “Laobaixing xinmu zhong de renda zhidu-
guanyu renmindaibiao dahui zhidu de diaocha (People's Congress in Ordinary People’s Heart- 
Investigation on People's Congress System),” Renmin zhengquan bao (Zhejiang), April 15, 2000. 
49 Fang Yihan, “Nin shenbian de renda daibiao hao bu hao zhao? (Is it Easy to Find Your 
Deputy?),” Zhongguo qingnian bao (China Youth Daily), April 25, 2004. 
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6. Inspections (examination or investigation)  
Inspection (examination or investigation) is one of the basic supervisory tools for 
the deputies and the Standing Committees of LPCs. However, some LPCs just pay more 
attention to the formalities than the effectiveness when they organize these activities. In 
general, they would notify the inspected unit to “prepare” before the inspection, debrief 
the head of unit, inspect a few “high lights” in the field, and then give some suggestions. 
Each time, the inspection result is “good.” So this legislative form has not played a 
significant role at all.50 
 
IV. The Extent of Deputies’ Legislative Participation 
 
As noted above, the deputies as a whole have become more and more active than 
before when they pursue legislative participation in LPCs. However, there is a big 
individual difference among the degree of deputy’s legislative participation. Even today, 
there is no shortage of examples of deputies who have rarely, if ever, attended and 
spoken in the LPCs. The percentage of such deputies might be thought to be very high in 
the past, but deputies who rarely speak in the plenary session could still be found, 
although they are far fewer in numbers. In fact, some deputies have never even submitted 
one motion, yet other deputies submitted tens of motions per year.  
For example, one Chinese scholar cited an newspaper article entitled “deputy said 
nothing for 3 years,” describing that one deputy has never said anything or submitted any 
                                                 
50 My own interview in Shandong province, April 2004. 
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suggestions and motions during the plenary session for three years.51 One deputy from 
Guangdong province told me during my fieldwork that “I find that there are 30-40 
percent of deputies who have never said anything even for five years, especially female 
deputies. Some deputies have ideas and can talk a lot during the intermission. However, 
at the plenary session, they are afraid and do not dare to speak. This is understandable 
because they have no such opportunity to practice.”52 Yet, Yao Lifa, one deputy coming 
from Hubei province, submitted 187 motions during his five-year term, accounting for 
38% of all motions in Qianjiang city People’s Congress.53 However, it should be noted 
that this is a rather extreme example. 
However, measuring the extent of deputies’ legislative participation is not an easy 
task. In fact, some deputy activities in the legislative participation are not easy to measure 
by statistics and not appropriate to measure deputy’s activism. The biggest challenge for 
measuring the deputies’ activism is the unavailability of statistical data in China. For 
example, a strong indicator of deputy’s activism is the increase in dissenting votes on 
government policy reports and personnel appointments. However, there is no record for 
the deputies’ voting in China. In Western democratic polity, voting is a public act while 
in China it is an anonymous one. The absence of easily collectable and quantifiable 
voting data has made empirical research more difficult and less precise. So it is very 
difficult to measure individual deputy’s activism by this factor.54 
                                                 
51 Chen Daohong, “Bahao renda daibiao rukou guan, tigao renda daibiao zhengti sushi (Doing a 
Good Job on Election, Improving Deputies’ overall Quality),” Zhongguo renda xinwen (Chinese 
People's Congress New), September 24, 2001. 
52 My interview in Guangzhou city, Guangdong province, February 2004. 
53 Li Fan, Zhongguo jiceng minzhu fazhan baogao: 2003(Grassroots Democracy in China: 2003) 
(Beijing: Falü chubanshe, 2004), 146-154. 
54 However, Murray Scot Tanner cites a number of NPC voting data to show the increasing 
institutional capacity and power of the whole NPC, but not the individual deputy. Murray Scot 
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This study will use three dependent variables to measure the deputies’ activism. 
The first is measured by the total numbers of motions made by a deputy per year. In 
general, motions are one of the principal ways deputies actively engaging in the 
legislative process. In fact, some scholars have used this factor to measure the deputies’ 
assertiveness or activism. For example, Murray Scot Tanner used the number of motions 
NPC deputies submitted at the annual plenary sessions to measure deputy’s 
assertiveness.55 To submit one motion, the deputy has to spend a lot of time and effort on 
collecting data and writing. Therefore, the number of motions that a deputy submitted 
annually is a very valuable indicator of activism, though they are not without flaws. 
However, this study does not distinguish content of the motions, for example, whether the 
motion is constructive or confrontational to the government. 
The second dependent variable is whether deputies are involved in appraisal, 
inquiries or interrogation of government. Compared with the large number of 
undifferentiated motions studied above, participation in appraisal, inquiries and 
interrogation of government is a much more powerful indicator of activism. Actively 
participating in these activities can truly reflect a deputy’s courage and activism. To put it 
simply, supervising the government and helping constituents are the deputies’ main 
responsibilities. But supervising the government will incur lots of risks because in 
general the Party is always behind the government.  
Meanwhile, visiting constituents is another important variable to measure 
deputy’s activism. Because they were nominated and elected by the constituents, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Tanner, “The National People's Congress,” in The Paradox of China’s Post-Mao Reforms, ed. 
Merle Goldman and Roderick MacFarquhar (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 
121-4. 
55 Murray Scot Tanner, The Politics of Lawmaking in China: Institutions, Processes, and 
Democratic Prospects (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 75-80. 
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deputies should maintain the close connection with constituents and help constituents 
resolve their problems. Visiting constituents probably takes up more of a deputy’s time 
and energy than any other tasks. So I feel that a large amount of time devoted to visiting 
constituents is a good indicator of a deputy’s willingness to devote resources and time to 
constituency service. To address this question, the survey asked the deputy to describe 
how often they carried out their duties towards their constituents. 
Therefore, based on above analysis, I will measure deputy’s activism by 
examining the activity of each member in these three key areas: tabling or signing 
motions, participation in appraisal, inquiries and interrogation of government and visiting 
the constituents. In my survey, I asked the following questions to measure them, 
respectively. 
1. Tabling or signing motions: How many Ti’an (such as motions, suggestions and 
criticisms) do you submit per year?      (1)0; (2)1-5; (3) 6-10; (4) more than 10 
                        Table 2.10: Motions Submitted by the Deputy per year 
 
The Number of Motions Per 
Year 
The Number of Deputy Percent (%) 
0 50 41.7 
1-5 62 51.7 
6-10 7 5.8 
More than 10 1 .8 
Total N=120 100 
 
2. Participation in appraisal, inquiries and interrogation of government:  
In my questionnaire, I asked the deputies the following question: How often do 
you participate in appraisal, inquiries and interrogation of government in the plenary 
session?   (1) never, (2) seldom, (3) often 
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Table 2.11: The Frequency of Appraisal, Inquiries and Interrogation of Government 
by the Deputies 
 
Frequency The Number of Deputy Percent (%) 
Never 76 63.3 
Seldom 27 22.5 
Often 17 14.2 
Total N=120 100 
 
3. Visiting the constituents: How often do you visit your constituents per year?  (1) never, 
(2) seldom, (3) often 
                Table 2.12: The Frequency of Visiting Constituents by the Deputies 
 
Frequency The Number of Deputy  Percent (%) 
Never(0)   52 43.3 
Seldom (1-5)   40 33.3 
Often (more than 5)   28 23.3 
Total N=120 100 
 
By the analysis of the statistical indicators, we can get a more systematic 
examination of whether these deputies are active or not in some legislative participation 
activities: (1) 41.7 percent of deputies have never submitted any motions, suggestions and 
criticisms. Only 6.6 percent submitted more than 5 pieces per year. (2) At least 63.3 
percent of deputies have never participated in appraisal, inquiries and interrogation of 
government in the session. Only about 14.2 percent have often done so. (3) 43.3 percent 
of deputies have never visited their constituents. Only 23.3 percent of them have often 
visited their constituents. 
 We should admit that these legislative activities are not equally important. Survey 
question 1 and 3 involve the time the deputies spend and survey question 2 mainly 
involves the deputies’ courage. Some deputies may be active in some legislative activities 
but not others, so I tried to combine these separate indictors together to formulate an 
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overall composite scale of legislative activism.  I coded “never” answer as 1, “seldom” as 
2, “often” as 3 in survey question 2 and 3, and a four-point item (e.g. 0, 1-5, 6-10, more 
than 10) would be coded as 1. 2. 3 .4 in survey question 1. Deputies’ scores on these three 
questions were added to give a score between 3 and 10, a score of implying the extent of 
deputies’ legislative activism (Table 2.13). 
              Table 2.13: The Composite Scale Scores of Deputies’ Legislative Activism 
Scores The number of Deputies （N） Percent (%) 
3 28 23.3 
4 25 20.8 
5 24 20.0 
6 26 21.7 
7 4 3.3 
8 9 7.5 
9 4 3.3 
Total N=120 100 
 
When examining the extent of deputies’ legislative participation by these 
indications, the weakness of each indicator should be addressed frankly. These numerical 
measures of deputy’s activities may not fully reflect the degree of legislative activism of 
a deputy. Indeed, one might pose the question of what exactly is meant by the concept of 
“activism” even if we have enough data. In fact, it is difficult to use mere statistics to 
compare the relative levels of activism. Therefore, measuring the deputy’s activities 
according to these methods does not accurately portray a deputy’s degree of legislative 
activism and assertiveness.  
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For the time being, practical reasons (political sensitiveness and the limitations of 
time and money for fieldtrip) prohibit extensive fieldwork on this topic in China. 
Fortunately, the staffs from different People’s Congresses in China have conducted some 
similar surveys on deputies’ legislative activities. To investigate the deputies’ legislative 
activities, the Standing Committees of People’s Congress in Anhui province56, Huaihua 
city (Hunan province) 57 and Yantai city (Shandong Province) 58, respectively sent 
                                                 
56 The Standing Committee of Anhui province People’s Congress sent 660 questionnaires to the 
deputies and collected 438. It showed that 82 percent of deputies have never attended the 
interpellations, 95 percent have never submitted the recall case. At the same time, 40 percent of 
deputies have never conducted the inspection. As far as the connection between the deputies and 
constituents is concerned, 17 percent of deputies showed that they cannot keep regular contact 
with the constituents. 39 percent of constituents have never reported their problems, opinions and 
suggestion to the deputies. Jiang Tingsheng, “Renda daibiao fahui zuoyong wenti de diaocha yu 
sikao (An Investigation and Reflection of Deputies’ Role in People Congress),” Renda yanjiu 
(People’s Congress Studies) no.12 (2001): 21-23. 
57 In July 2001, the Standing Committee of People’s Congress in Huaihua city, Hunan province 
conducted the investigation on deputies’ activities. Only 35 percent of deputies kept regular 
contact with the constituents or electoral units. Most of deputies only attended the plenary session 
and deputy group, few attended inspection, examination of law enforcement and appraising the 
government or officials. During the closing of meeting, only 23.9 percent of deputies actively 
conducted the activities individually. 80 percent of deputies thought that they cannot perform 
their responsibilities because of time, energy, opposition from work unit (or family or 
government department supervised) and information asymmetry. Only 17.7 percent of deputies 
submitted the cases of inquiries and recalling, 93 percent “thought of, but not submitted because 
they cannot offend the inquired department and recalled objective who have the real power, or 
attend to ‘the relation and face’ ”, and “never thought of and submitted.” Zhang Keqiang, 
“Daibiao danqi ni de zeren lai (Deputies should Assume your Responsibilities),” Renmin ribao 
(People’s Daily), October 31, 2001. 
58 During the 3rd plenary session of 13th Yantai People’s Congress, Shandong province, the 
standing committee conducted the investigation on the deputies’ activities. They sent out 426 
pieces of questionnaires and collected 217. They found that: (1) during this plenary session, 
45.3% of deputies gave the deliberation speaking and put forward material suggestion. 49.6 % of 
deputies just gave the deliberation speak but not put forward any suggestions. 5.1 % of deputies 
did not give the deliberation speech. But at the last plenary session, the above ratio respectively 
was 51%, 38.2% and 10.8%. During this plenary session, 5.7% of deputies headed the list to 
submit the motions. 8.5% of deputies submitted the motions individually. 21.3% of deputies 
submitted the motions collectively.  In the first session, they were 16.6%, 18% and 30.8%, 
respectively. There was a big difference in submitting the motions among the deputies. The 
interpellation and recall were completely in the state of rest. (2) In 1999, 80.6% of deputies 
attended the activities organized by the People’s Congress and its Standing Committee and 3 
times per person. 42.2 % of deputies put forward the suggestion, criticism and opinion during 
these activities. (3) 70.3% of deputies thought they had played “good” role in legislative 
participation, 29.1% “average,” 0.6% “no.” The main factors influencing the deputies’ role: 
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questionnaires to their deputies. So we can make a comparison between their results and 
mine to remedy my limitation. Based on their survey results, I conduct the following 
comparative analysis on the deputies’ activism in the legislative participation. (See Table 
2.14 below) 
       Table 2.14:   A Comparison of the Results of My Survey and Others in China 
 
              Motions Interpellation and 
others 
Visiting constituents 
 No  Yes No  Yes No  Yes 
My survey 41.70% 58.3% 63.3% 36.7% 43.3% 56.7% 
Anhui    82% 18% 39% 61% 
Huaihua    82.3% 17.7% 65% 35% 
Yantai 65.5% 34.5%     
 
If we define the deputies who have never submitted motions, interpellations 
(inquiries) and never visited constituents as “inactives”, we can see that the figures are 
quite striking. According to these survey results, more than half of the deputies can be 
considered to be “inactive” in the sense that they fail to take part in legislative life beyond 
the basic act of voting and attending the conference. Therefore, for the vast majority of 
the deputies, participation in the legislative process remains limited to voting and just 
turning up to attend plenary sessions.  
If we further define the deputies who submitted more than 5 motions per year, 
have conducted the interpellation against government and visited constituents more than 
                                                                                                                                                 
53.6% of deputies considered that “there was no specific aim and evaluation requirement.” 31% 
thought that “law guarantee is not so forceful.” 12.7% of deputies thought “supervised object 
cannot understand and support them,” 2.8 % thought “home unit cannot understand and support 
them.” From deputies themselves, 51.3% “unfamiliar with the situation,” 40.3% “limited by time, 
energy and ability”, 4% “unwilling to offend somebody”, 4% “have no strong responsibility.”  
Yantai renda changweihui daibiao gongzuoshi (Deputy working office of standing committee of 
Yantai People’s Congress), “Renda daibiao zenyang kandai daibiao gongzuo-dui yantaishi renda 
daibiao wenjuan de fenxi (How the Deputies Look at Their Job-An Analysis of Questionnaire on 
Deputies in Yantai),” Renmin ribao (People’s Daily), August 30, 2000. 
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five times every year as the “activists”, then the number of individuals who are activists 




It cannot be denied that the rising power of LPCs over the past more than twenty-
five years has  provided tremendous opportunities for the deputies,  which may enhance 
the potential for their active legislative participation, despite the inhibiting nature of the 
Chinese political system. However, institutional opportunity is only one possibility, not 
sufficiently strong or compelling to cause most deputies to participate. However, some 
deputies have taken up these opportunities and devoted themselves, at least in some 
degree, to keep tabs on the governments.   
Although deputies as a whole are becoming more and more active in legislative 
participation in recent years, there are some individual differences among them. Three 
key areas of legislative activities can best reflect the deputies’ activism: tabling or signing 
motions, participation in appraisal, making inquiries and interrogating government, as 
well as visiting the constituents. Although the evidence is far from comprehensive by 
analyzing existing survey result based on research, it is possible to make a number of 
observations regarding the deputies’ legislative participation activities. A sizable minority 
of the deputies choose to become involved in legislative participation on a regular basis. 
In short, deputies’ involvement in legislative participation remains limited. Some Chinese 
researchers’ surveys and mine have affirmed this.  
                                                 
59 It is also estimated by many deputies that there is about 10-15 percent of true deputy activists at 
various levels during my fieldwork.  
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Although existing analysis tells us a great deal about deputies’ legislative 
participation in LPCs, the question of individual difference remains somewhat ambiguous. 
So, in the next few chapters, I will explain the reasons for the difference of legislative 
activism among the deputies.
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Chapter Three      Institutional Constraints on Active Legislative Participation in 
LPCs 
 
I. Introduction  
 
In recent years, the deputies as a whole have become more active than before 
when they pursue their legislative participation in LPCs. However, activism in legislative 
participation does not fit into the mainstream of the deputies’ life in China. As I have 
described in Chapter 2, not so many deputies are active in the legislative participation. In 
fact, the formal and informal institutional constraints in the electoral system and LPC 
system prevent more deputies from actively participating in the legislative activities. 
The formal and informal institutional constraints (mainly Party control) in the 
electoral system have produced most of the obedient deputies. In China, the Party still 
controls the electoral process and voters have very limited choices on who can be a 
deputy. In fact, the Party has a great deal of control over a deputy’s access to the LPCs, 
although the control has been weakened. Meanwhile, a series of institutional 
arrangements in the process of election of deputy to LPCs have made the open 
competitiveness weak. Under this situation, most of deputies are “cadres” and CCP 
members the Party favors. Clearly, most of these “official” deputies have no interest and 
motivations to be active in the legislative participation. 
More importantly, the institutional characteristics of LPC system further prevent 
the deputies from actively participating in the legislature. This is not only because the 
deputies are not in a position where they have to do so, but also because there are not 
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enough resources for them in LPCs. Although the People’s Congresses at all levels are 
becoming more and more powerful, it is well known that the institution of People’s 
Congress does not provide enough resources and incentives for the active deputies’ 
legislative participation. Therefore, if the deputies would like to actively participate in the 
legislative participation, they have to spend their own resources. The active deputies can 
get almost nothing, but have to bear a lot of costs including time, effort and even money. 
Moreover, the LPC is still under the Party’s institutional control. Therefore, in some 
cases, active deputies even have to face a series of risks such as bodily harm, illegal 
detention and even the possibility of being incarcerated. Because of these formal and 
informal institutional constraints, it is understandable that most deputies are not active.  
 
II. Institutional Constraints (Party Control) in the Election of Deputies to LPCs 
 
According to the electoral law and other related law stipulations, the Standing 
Committee of People’s Congresses at all levels are responsible for the electoral work. 
However, Party and government at all levels not only occupy dominant place in the 
electoral organization and leadership establishments, but also intervene intrusively in 
electoral affairs, making the People’s Congress’ role attenuate gradually. At the same 
time, the electoral work is not completely transparent, providing tremendous possibility 
for “black box operation” to guarantee that some candidates the local Party and 
government favor could be elected as the deputies. Despite the reform and innovation in 
the electoral system, the Party still maintains its control, yet the control is weakened. So 
we can say with certainty that the local Party and government still basically control the 
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whole process of election from the beginning to the end.1 Now, let us see how the local 
Party and government control the election by exploring the whole electoral process. 
 
1.  Controlling the Electoral Organization and Propaganda Establishments 
Strengthening the Party’s leadership in the election of the deputies to LPCs is not 
merely perfunctory, but it must be put into practice. In fact, Party committees at all levels 
play a dominant role in organizing electoral work. Firstly, Electoral Work Plan 
Suggestions set down by the Standing Committee of People’s Congress must be approved 
by the Party committee at the same level, then passed and issued by the Standing 
Committee. But sometimes, they were even issued directly by the Party committee. 
Although there are electoral laws, local organization laws and provincial electoral rules, 
the Party committee at every province still enacts the Electoral Work Suggestion or 
Electoral Executive Plan during the process of election.2  
Secondly, the establishment of electoral leadership group or electoral committee 
must be approved by the Party committee and its head must also be appointed by the 
Party committee. According to the NPC’s electoral notice, every province should 
establish the electoral working committee (or office), which must be authorized by 
provincial Party committee. And its director, vice director and members must be 
                                                 
1 The electoral process generally includes: establishing the election leadership committee, 
determining the total number of deputies, allotting the quota of deputy, zoning election districts, 
mobilization, voter registration, nomination of candidates, voting, and declaring results, 
confirming the qualification of deputy. 
2 The electoral rules are the electoral stipulation in the province according to the electoral law and 
local organization law. The Electoral Executive Plans answer how to concretely implant these 
rules in the province. Thus, these Electoral Executive Plans comprise some contents not well 
explained in the electoral law and rules: election’s scheduling program, guiding ideology, 
educational propaganda, and organizational leadership (not referring to such organizational 
institution as electoral committee, but emphasizing the leadership role of Party organization at all 
levels in the whole election work).   
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appointed by the provincial Party committee. And so is its office director. At the city 
level, to strengthen the leadership of Party in the electoral work, the Standing Committee 
of city People’s Congress follows similar rules. In general, the Standing Committee of 
city People’s Congress suggests to the city Party committee to confirm that one of its vice 
secretary can administer the whole electoral work. After getting the approval from the 
city Party committee, the city electoral leadership group can be established. The next 
lower level follows similar stipulations. 
Thirdly, the responsible cadres from the Propaganda, Organization and United 
Front Departments of the Party committee must be members of the electoral leadership 
and organization establishments. Sometimes, even the head of the electoral leadership 
establishment must be one of vice Party secretary. For example, in 1998, most directors 
of county (district)-level electoral committees in Beijing city were concurrently the 
secretaries of Party committees at the same level (except Yanqing county).3 
Despite all these, some provinces still think that it is not enough and establish a 
separate electoral leadership system: either Party committees at all levels establish 
electoral coordination (or leadership) group, or Party committees dispatch the working 
committee to establish the same organization where the Party secretary or vice Party 
secretary is the head and where responsible cadres from Party and government are the 
members of this group. This temporary establishment can be found in most provinces in 
China during the election process. However, this electoral coordination or leadership 
                                                 
3 Shi Weimin and Lei Jingxuan, Zhijie xuanju: zhidu yu guocheng (Direct Election: Institution 
and Process) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1999), 342. 
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group has no actual work to do, but exists to show that the Party has a high regard for the 
electoral work.4  
Meanwhile, the strength of Party leadership can be seen by observing how the 
electoral establishment works and also how it propagates its electoral work. During the 
electoral process, Party propaganda departments at all levels issue the electoral 
propaganda outline. At the central level, the propaganda department of central Party 
committee works out the propaganda outline together with the working office of Standing 
Committee of NPC. In the same way, at the provincial, city or county level, the 
propaganda department of Party committee also works out the electoral propaganda 
outline together with the standing committee of LPC. Meanwhile, in the name list of 
electoral committee at these three levels, we can see the names of responsible cadre from 
the Propaganda Department of Party committee. This is to say that Propaganda 
Departments at all levels not only fix the political orientation and propaganda caliber for 
the electoral work, but also concretely control the entire propaganda work.  
For example, in Shandong province, during the process of election, the provincial 
Party committee would issue “With Regard to the Suggestion on Electoral Propaganda 
Work Arrangement.” It shows that the Propaganda Department must play a leading role 
in organizing the media units, setting down the propaganda plan as soon as possible, and 
carrying out all propaganda requirements.5  This is a good example to demonstrate 
vividly the Party’s role in disseminating propaganda in election.  
In some places, the electoral document even specifies that the election should 
seriously keep to a few principles:  “…firstly, righteously strengthening the Party’s 
                                                 
4 Shi & Lei, op.cit., 70-71 
5 My interview in Shandong province, March 2004. 
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leadership. During this election of district People’s Congress, we must be under the 
Party’s direct leadership from beginning to end. Especially during the process of 
nomination, discussion, recommendation of candidates and election of deputies, we must 
absolutely strengthen Party’s leadership…Party groups in all electorates can put forward 
the candidate in Party’s name, and especially guarantee that ‘the preferred candidate’ can 
be nominated and elected. Thus, this will be propitious to realization of Party’s 
intention…” 6 
 
2. Infiltrating the Process of Election 
Under China’s political situation, it may be understandable that the Party 
committee should lead the election on the whole through organization and propaganda 
work. However, the Party has infiltrated the actual operation of election. In fact, Party 
leadership has partially or entirely replaced the LPCs’ role in the election. 
 
A. Allotting the Quota of Deputy 
Before the election, the electoral committee controlled by the Party would set 
down all kinds of prerequisites for deputies in the first place, then “thinning” these 
requirements in all electorates. These requirements include the percentage of minority 
candidates, gender, CCP membership, identity (the percentage of workers, peasants, 
intellectuals and cadres among the deputies), age structure and knowledge structure 
(mainly the educational background). The objective is to show the Chinese election’s 
“Breadth” (Guangfanxing) and “Representativeness” (Daibiaoxing) and “Progressiveness 
(Xianjingxing). At the same time, they have to consider the “unfilled quota” (Yuliu 
                                                 
6 Shi & Lei, op.cit., 262. 
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ming’e) and “participating deputy” (Canxuan daibiao). Under the existing system, the 
constituents must accept this fact unconditionally. So the more stringent the criteria for 
selection, the more limitations the constituents will face, and the fewer choices they will 
have.  
“Unfilled Quota” (Yuliu ming’e) 
This situation (unfilled quota) is very common in the process of election of 
deputies. For example, at the county level, in general, there are 3 to 5 “unfilled quotas” 
left for the cadres in the future. The explanation from the local official is: they have to 
adapt to China’ present situation because the time of election of deputy is out of pace 
with the adjustment of cadres in the government. When the election is conducted, the 
adjustment of cadres has not been finished. Without the “unfilled quota”, new cadres 
dispatched to the position cannot work.7 So the main objective of this method for the 
local officials is to work out the difficulty in the actual work of Party and government, 
reducing the unnecessary contradiction between them. Maybe it is somewhat rational for 
local officials. But it is unfair for the constituents. 
“Participating Deputy” (Canxuan daibiao)  
There are two levels of “participating deputy” in the direct election: one from 
higher level, the other from the same level. Let us use the election of deputies to county 
People’s Congress at the township level as an example. Firstly, the county electoral 
committee will arrange for some county leader cadres or someone who needs special care 
to participate in the electorates and expressly allot deputy quota to the electorates at 
township level. This is called “capped deputy” (Daimao daibiao) from the higher level. 
These “capped deputies” do not always go to their work units or residential districts but 
                                                 
7 Shi & Lei, op.cit., 90-1. 
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other electorates to participate in the election. To guarantee that these cadres could be 
elected successfully, the electoral committee must allot quotas to the electorates. For 
example, according to the electoral requirement of Shandong province, “5-7 leader cadres 
from government and Party can be recommended as the candidates at the same level. 
According to the work requirement, the responsible heads of Party and government can 
be recommended as candidates.” 8 In reality, there are more “capped deputies” than 
stipulated. For example, in Chengyang district in Qingdao city, there were 30 “capped 
deputies” quotas in 1998 election, accounting for 14.9% of all deputies.9 
Secondly, the leaders of Party and government at the township level will also 
participate in the election as candidates. In general, they must be elected. This should also 
be called as the “participating deputy,” although they come from the same level. 
However, if township Party committee secretary and head of government must be elected 
as the deputies of county People’s Congress, this will definitely exceed the quota of 
“participating deputy,” affecting other deputies’ arrangement. In fact, because the 
electorate committee has to solve the “cadre” problem during the election, there are so 
many “participating deputies” (it is estimated that there is about 40% -50% in general). 10 
However, there are no definite stipulations or rules in the electoral law that the 
responsible cadre of Party and government must be elected as deputies.11  
                                                 
8 Shi & Lei, op.cit., 91-2. 
9 Ibid, 92. 
10 This paragraph is based on my fieldwork in Guangdong and Shandong provinces, January-
March, 2004. 
11 In fact, in August 1997, after the election of deputy to NPC, the director of organization 
department of central Party committee put forward his suggestion that local heads of Party 
committee and government should be (the author’s emphasis)the deputy of higher level People’s 
Congress. According to this suggestion, the township and county Party committee secretary, head 
of township and county governments, chairman of township and county People’s Congresses 
should be(not must be) deputies of county People’s Congress. The suggestion of director of 
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Including a proportion of “participating (or capped) deputy” in deputies’ name list 
allotted to the electorate is very common at all levels in China and has become part and 
parcel of China’s electoral system. For example, in 1998, Nanhai city People Congress 
should elect 332 deputies according to the number of the deputies confirmed by the 
Standing Committee of Guangdong People’s Congress. In fact, Nanhai city electoral 
committee left 11 as the “unfilled quota” and dispatched 21 candidates as “participating 
deputies” including 2 city Party secretaries, 1 Party disciplinary and examination 
secretary, 7 mayors  and vice mayors, 1 chairman of city Political and Consultative 
Conference, 2 vice directors of People Congress, and 8 members of Standing Committee 
of People’s Congress.12   
Under China’s circumstance, some “cadres” must be elected as deputies because 
of some informal and “tacit” rules. Therefore, to eliminate the “participating (or capped) 
deputy” is almost impossible and impractical. However, to restrict and reduce its 
percentage in the deputy name list is feasible.   
 
B. Zoning the Electorate Unreasonably  
To guarantee that some special leaders could be elected as deputy successfully, 
electoral committees in a lot of places would zone the district unreasonably. According to 
article 24 of electoral law, the electorate can be zoned by residential district, work unit 
                                                                                                                                                 
central Party committee organization department was only an address. Strictly speaking, it 
belongs to the range of policy, not the law. However, the local Party and government replaced the 
law with the policy. In some places, the electoral document even stipulates that “… Although the 
law only makes some stipulations in principle, according to the higher-up’s related spirit and 
better work, chairman of township People’s Congress, head of township, director of street 
People’s Congress working committee, and director of street must be elected as the deputies…” 
Shi & Lei, op.cit., 420 and 262. 
12 Shi & Lei, op.cit., 305-328. 
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and production unit. However, in the urban areas, it is very easy for the leaders to be 
elected as the deputy in the work unit electorate. It is very straightforward that if someone 
nominates the leader as the candidate, it is very difficult for other people to oppose.  
For example, in 1998, there was unreasonable zoning of electorate during the 
election of deputies to Nanhai city People’s Congress, Guangdong province. There were 
only 148 constituents in one electorate the city Party committee belongs to, but they 
could elect 3 deputies. Rather, in another electorate comprising constituents mainly from 
enterprises, there were 2168 constituents, but they could only elect one deputy. Shi 
Weimin analyzes the electoral result of two electorates in Nanhai city and finds that this 
method of zoning the electorate district can make leaders become deputy easily.13  This is 
one way of ensuring that leaders can be elected as deputy by zoning the electorate 
unreasonably.  
 
C. Nominating and Confirming Candidate  
Whether the process of nominating and confirming the candidates is open and fair 
or not is an important yardstick for measuring the degree of democracy in the election. At 
the same time, whether the nomination is broadly supported or not can measure the 
degree of constituents’ interest in the election and whether the election is really 
competitive or not. So nomination is a very important step for the election, and also an 
                                                 
13 For example, the city Party committee office, disciplinary and inspection committee, dossier 
bureau, supervisory bureau belong to one electorate and they can elect three deputies. The 
electoral result was that city Party committee secretary, vice secretary and city discipline and 
inspection committee secretary were elected as the deputies. In another electorate that included 
the constituents from city government office and seven companies, the mayor and vice mayor 
were elected as the deputies. Although seven companies had 80% constituents, they had no 
deputy. Shi & Lei, op.cit., 305-28. 
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indicator of how democratic the process is. It is also important for choosing a good 
deputy, improving the deputy’s quality and capacity of legislative participation. 
Nominating the candidate 
According to the electoral law, all parties or social organizations can jointly or 
separately nominate the candidates. Ten or more than ten voters freely associated can also 
nominate candidates. Therefore, besides the “unfilled quota” and “participating (or 
capped) deputy,” the Party committee and mass organizations such as Youth League and 
Women Associations would nominate other candidates.14  
Although some provinces stipulate that the percentage of candidates nominated by 
Party and social organizations cannot be more than 15% or 20%, most provinces only 
take notice of the necessity of expanding the proportion of voter nomination and have not 
done anything to restrict the proportion of “organizational nomination.” It is reported by 
the media that the percent of voter nomination is rising and has begun to account for the 
high percentage of all the nominations. However, the reality is not the same as that 
reported.  
In fact, the Party or individual CCP member always likes to mobilize the voter 
(CCP member) to nominate the candidate with other voters. In general, the Party hands 
the candidate name list it favors to the electorate and lets the constituents (generally CCP 
members) nominate these candidates. By “doing some groundwork,” the Party can turn 
its intention into the constituents’ intention indirectly. In this way, these candidates are 
nominated by the ordinary constituents. This method, formally, cuts down the proportion 
of nomination by the Party and social organizations, but in fact it does not expand the 
                                                 
14 These candidates nominated by parties or social organizations can be called “organizational 
nomination.” Those candidates nominated by voters can be called “mass nomination.” 
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proportion of nomination by voters. Because it “hides” the candidates nominated by the 
parties and social organizations into the constituents’ “intention,” mixing up the boundary 
between two nominations. The constituents can not tell the difference between candidates 
nominated by “organization” or candidates nominated by individual voters.15 
Confirming the formal candidate 
 It is no doubt that confirming the formal candidate is the key to the election. Who 
can confirm the formal candidate and use what kind of method will affect the result of the 
election. In general, after the preparatory candidate name list is publicized, the 
constituent groups in all electorates will be in full discussion, and then report the formal 
candidate name list to the electoral committee. The electoral committee will audit and 
confirm the formal candidates. However, there is no standard operation procedure and 
transparent rule in the process of confirming the formal candidate.  
Article 29 of electoral law stipulates: “all parties and mass organizations can 
jointly or separately nominate the candidate, constituents or deputies more than ten can 
also nominate the candidate.” Clearly this stipulation endows the constituent with the 
right to nominate.  But there is no concrete procedure in the law on how to confirm the 
formal candidate from the preliminary candidate. Article 31 of electoral law stipulates: 
“the candidates of People’s Congress elected directly by the constituents, are nominated 
and recommended by the constituents, all parties and mass organizations in all electorates. 
The electoral committee gathers and discloses the name list 15 days before election, and 
then electoral groups at all electorates should conduct ‘repeated deliberation, discussion 
and consultation.’ According to the opinion of most of the constituents, the electoral 
                                                 
15 My interview in Shandong province, March 2004. 
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committee confirms the formal candidate and declares the name list 5 days before 
election.”16 
Not only the electoral law but also local electoral rules are very ambiguous and 
abstract on how the formal candidates are confirmed. For example, article 25 of Electoral 
Executive Detailed Rules of People’s Congresses at all Levels in Guangdong Province 
stipulates: “candidates nominated by the constituents, parties and mass organization by 
law, should be listed in the name list. The electoral committee cannot transpose and 
increase or decrease the number of candidates on the name list, and should deliver it to all 
electorates and let them declare and discuss among the constituents 15 days before the 
election day. If there are too many candidates, the electoral committee can use the 
method of raising one’s hand or voting to express their opinion. According to the 
opinions of most of the constituents, the electoral committee confirms the formal 
candidate. The number of formal candidates should be one third or one time more than 
the number of deputies elected, and be declared 5 days before the election day.”17 
Guangdong Electoral Working Manual also gives some further ambiguous guidelines on 
confirming the formal candidates. This includes only two steps: firstly, all parties, mass 
organizations and constituents can nominate the candidates by law, and then the electoral 
committee gathers and declares the name list of preliminary candidates. This process can 
be operationalized. Secondly, the constituent groups conduct “repeated deliberation, 
                                                 
16 Tang Juan and Zou Shubin, 2003 nian Shenzhen jingxuan shilu (The Recording of the Election 
in Shenzhen in 2003) (Xi’an: Xibei daxue chubanshe, 2004), 232. 
17 Li Fan, Zhongguo jiceng minzhu fazhan baogao: 2003 (Grassroots Democracy in China: 2003) 
(Beijing: Falü chubanshe, 2004), 60. 
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discussion and consultation” on the preliminary candidates, and then confirm the formal 
candidate according to the opinions of most of the constituents.18  
All these electoral rules and stipulations in Guangdong province are ambiguous 
on confirming the formal constituents. As one Chinese scholar argues, firstly, how to 
define what the “repeated deliberation, discussion and consultation” are. Speaking strictly, 
the “repeated deliberation, discussion and consultation” cannot become the legal 
language. Secondly, how many constituents must participate in “repeated deliberation, 
discussion and consultation?” Thirdly, how many times of “repeated deliberation, 
discussion and consultation” must be done so as to harness the opinions of most 
constituents?19 
Because of these ambiguous rules, there are lots of “black box operations” left for 
the Party to maneuver during this process. The Party can take advantage of this ambiguity 
to remove unpopular candidates. In fact, the electoral committee controlled by the Party 
decides the result of the formal candidates. Especially in the work unit electorate, the 
leaders would be in the place of constituents to confirm the formal candidates. For 
example, in 1998, the Hexi district People’s Congress in Tianjing should elect 257 
deputies. At the beginning, there were 2104 preliminary candidates. Among them, 2065 
candidates were nominated by the constituents, accounting for 98.15%. 39 candidates 
were nominated by parties and mass organizations, accounting for 1.85%. However, after 
the “repeated deliberation, discussion and consultation,” 39 candidates nominated by 
                                                 
18 Tang & Zou, op.cit., 232. 
19 Li, op.cit., 60-61. 
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parties and mass organizations were all confirmed as the formal candidates. The 
unsuccessful candidates were all nominated by the constituents.20 
Introducing the formal candidates to the constituents 
Letting the constituents know the candidates’ credentials is important. By 
comparing the credentials of different candidates, constituents can choose someone who 
can really represent their interest and can be trusted to serve them well, thus building one 
kind of interest-connecting mechanism between constituents and candidate. Therefore, 
the formal candidate should be introduced to the constituents, but the electoral law limits 
the range of introduction by constituents.  
For example, article 33 of electoral law stipulates that: “the electoral committee or 
presidium of People’s Congress should introduce the candidate’s credentials to the voters 
or deputies. The parties, mass organizations and constituents can introduce the candidates 
at the constituent group or deputy group meeting.” Article 26 of Electoral Executive 
Detailing Rules in Guangdong also stipulates: “the electoral committee should introduce 
the candidate’s bio-data to the constituents. The parties, mass organizations and 
constituents can introduce their candidates at the constituent group. But this must stop on 
the election day. When the name list of candidates is declared, the electoral committee 
can arrange for the candidates to meet and introduce themselves to constituents according 
to the constituents’ demand.”21 
According to these laws and rules, the constituents can only “introduce” the 
candidates to the electoral committee and only at the constituent group. Only the electoral 
committee can introduce the candidates to all constituents at the electoral meeting or by 
                                                 
20 Shi & Lei, op.cit., 184-5. 
21 Tang & Zou, op.cit., 235. 
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using other methods. However, this stipulation cannot satisfy the constituent’s demand of 
knowing more about the candidates. In fact, during the process of election, most 
electorates only publicly disclose the candidate’s CV. In general, the electoral committee 
would put a candidate’s CV on the information board, and let the constituents view 
voluntarily. The CV includes age, gender, work unit, nationality, political affiliation, 
educational and working experience. In some electorates, the electoral committee or 
electoral leadership group would organize a constituent group meeting. At the meeting, 
the candidates can introduce themselves and answer the constituents’ question. However, 
most of the constituents were uninformed about this and few attended this kind of 
meeting. Meanwhile, some candidates, especially the “official” candidates, would not 
attend this kind of meeting. Basically, only some representatives of constituent groups 
attended and most of them are retired old men and women. Under this situation, the 
constituents can not know the candidate’s true capacity, and whether or not he can 
represent the constituent’s interest.22   
Some scholars in China conducted some survey on this issue. In their survey, they 
asked the constituents the following question: “how much do you know about the 
candidate when you participate in the election of deputy to People’s Congresses?” Only 
10 percent answered “know very well,” 18 percent “basically know,” 12 percent 
“partially know,” 28% “know a little,” 40% “know nothing.”23 So the constituents cannot 
make the right choice under this situation. 
 
D. Manipulating the Voting 
                                                 
22 Tang & Zou, op.cit., 236. 
23 Li Fan, op.cit., 64. 
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To guarantee the election of some state and Party “cadres” successfully, the Party 
would use all kinds of methods (legal and illegal)24 to control the voting. In fact, to some 
electoral establishments such as electoral committees, guaranteeing that some “special 
men” are elected as deputies is a key preoccupation. For example, the responsible cadres 
of electoral establishment have to emphasize again and again before the voting 
commences and get the constituents’ understanding, but they must take care not to talk 
too much. Under extreme situations, the Party has to come out and “do some work.”25  
In general, they would carry out the minimal difference standard in the voting to 
satisfy minimum requirements stipulated by the electoral law. For example, if electing 3 
deputies, they would only confirm four people as the formal candidates. If 2 deputies, 
only 3 candidates. Meanwhile, the Party can adopt another approach to guarantee some 
“cadres” and “special person” to be elected. This method is to properly collocate the 
“accompanying election” (Ruanchai or Peixuan). In the “difference voting” (Cha’e 
xuanju), pairing the candidate that is easiest to lose together with the easiest to win is 
called as “Ruanchai” in China. The common method is to collocate one weaker candidate 
to compete with the candidate the Party favors. Of course, the person accompanying the 
election (Ruanchai) is not without benefit.26 For example, in one electorate, there are 
three formal candidates: one is the cadre of “participating deputy,” one is the head of 
village, and another is head of construction team. It is very clear that the head of 
construction team is very weak and possibility of winning the election is thin. This 
collocation is to guarantee the successful election of other two candidates.  
                                                 
24 There are so many illegal operation of election in China. More details could be found in Cai 
Dingjian, Zhongguo xuanju zhuangkuang de baogao (The Report on the Election Situation in 
China) (Beijing: Falü chubanshe, 2002), 57-9. 




3. Outcome of Party Control 
In a word, the existing election system’s openness and competitiveness are 
restricted by the Party to such an extent, that there is almost no choice for constituents 
and candidates. The result of the Party control is that most of deputies are still CCP 
members, Party and state “cadres” at all levels. In general, there are 60-80 percent of 
CCP member deputies at various levels. In fact, during the 1990s, the percentage of CCP 
members increased at all levels, although there was a fall between 1981 and 1988. (See 
Table 3.1 below) 





         year 
level 
1954 1981 1988 1993 1998 
national 54.49 72.78 66.87 68.40 71.50 
provincial 58.31  68.46 70.31 72.37 
city 51.23  66.59 70.28 75.22 
county 47.18 66.53 69.24 70.40 72.16 
CCP 
member 
township   59.16 60.20 61.63 
national 22.35 14.15 18.18 19.21 15.44 
provincial 8.38  7.22 7.84 8.64 
city 12.22  4.53 4.32 4.06 
county  0.50 0.94 0.95 0.80 
Democratic 
party  
township   0.09   
national 23.16 13.07 14.95 12.39 13.06 
provincial 33.31  24.32 21.85 18.99 
city 36.55  28.88 25.40 20.72 
county 52.82 32.97 29.82 28.65 27.04 
Non party 
township   40.75 39.80 38.37 
 
Source: Liu Zhi, Shuju xuanju: renda daibiao xuanju tongji yanjiu (Election Data: A 




In fact, the concept of “cadre” is so confusing. In today’s Chinese society, there are three 
kinds of methods to differentiate the “cadre.”27  If we calculate the percentage of “cadre” 
among the deputies according to the third method, we can find that the percentage of 
“cadre” is so high. For example, in the 3 rd Anci district People’s Congress, Langfang city, 
Hebei province, and the percentage of “cadre” is 76.9. In its 4th People’s Congress, the 
percentage of “cadre” among the deputies is 85.6. (See Table 3.2 below). In 12th Nanhai 
city People’s Congress, Guangdong province, the percentage of “cadre” among the all 
deputies is 78.5. (See Table 3.2 below) 
 Table 3.2: Three-Level “Cadre” Deputy Structure in Anci District Langfang City, 
Hebei Province 
 




enterprise  In all 
district 7 14 13 3 26 63 
street  7 5   12 
resident 
organization 
2 2    4 
township 6 28 18  1 53 
village 
committee 
22 72    94 
In all 37 123 36 3 27 226 
Third 
percent 16.4% 54.4% 15.9% 1.4% 11.9% 100% 
district 6 19 12 4 28 69 
street  6 5   11 
resident 
organization 
2 1    3 
township 4 18 12  5 39 
village 44 48    92 
Fourth 
In all 56 92 29 4 33 214 
                                                 
27 Firstly, it is specifically for “leadership cadre,” that is, the responsible person from Party 
committee, government, People Congress, people’s political and consultative conference and 
discipline and inspection committee. Secondly, it is used to name the “national cadre,” including 
all responsible persons and working personnel from Party committee, government, People’s 
Congress, political and consultative conference, discipline and inspection committee, mass 
organization (Woman Association, Trade Union, and Youth league), police, court and their 
branches at the county and township levels. Thirdly, it includes all “cadres” at province, city, 
county, township and village levels. Besides the “leadership cadre” and “national cadre,” there 
are cadres coming from enterprises, mass organizations. Shi & Lei, op.cit., 332-334. 
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 percent 26.2% 43% 13.6% 1.8% 15.4% 100% 
 
Source: Shi & Lei, op.cit., 293. 
 
Table 3.3: Three-Level “Cadre” Deputies at 12
th
 Nanhai City People’s Congress, 
Guangdong Province 
 




Enterprise  In all 




8 36 6 3 17 70 
Resident  2 3    5 
Village 35 80    115 
In all 49 144 16 8 35 252 
percent 19.4% 57.1% 6.4% 3.2% 13.9% 100% 
 
Source: Shi & Lei, op.cit., 334. 
 
Therefore, most of the local deputies are still CCP members, Party and state 
“cadres.” We can imagine that in general, these “cadre” deputies would not be active in 
their legislative participation because the government agencies are objects of supervision 
by the People’s Congresses. So it is understandable that “cadre” deputies are considered 
to be less active than any other deputies because of role conflict.28 On the one hand, it is 
not appropriate for them to supervise their superiors or colleagues because of traditional 
Chinese “face” issue. The objects of supervision may be their superiors or colleagues, so 
they know each other very well in their daily life and on their job. On the other hand, it is 
clear that these deputies have countless ties of interest relations with the local Party 
committee and government. In today’s China, most of them pursue political career 
                                                 
28 There are, of course, exceptions. Some official deputies have conducted supervision on fellow 
officials and superiors for the organizational (or department) interest. Young Nam Cho, “Pubic 
Supervisors and Reflectors: Role Fulfillment of the Chinese People’s Congress Deputies in the 
Market Socialism Era,” Development and Society 32, no. 2 (December 2003): 219-220. 
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pathways that are strongly linked to the Party. If they are active in legislative 
participation and offend somebody’s interest, especially their superior, they will be in 
jeopardy because it is very easy for the related people to “retaliate” against them. 
 It should be noted that we can not judge one’s political preferences by merely 
identifying his Party membership in China, although a Party member has to face lots of 
constraints that a non-party member normally does not have to deal with. However, these 
deputies were nominated and supported by the Party and they do not know whose interest 
they should represent, or to whom they should be responsible. In general, they have no 
motivation and interest in participating in People’s Congress’ affairs and they even have 
no time to attend the plenary session. So it is not surprising that these “cadres” and Party 
deputies are less likely to devote enough attention, time and effort to the legislative 
participation.  
 
II. Institutional Constraints on the Active Legislative Participation in LPC System 
  
Besides the institutional constraints during the election process, the formal 
institutional arrangement of LPC system further provides some constraints for the 
deputies’ active legislative participation. Firstly, the institutional characteristics of LPC 
could not provide enough resources but bring some costs for the active deputies’ 
legislative participation. Secondly, the growth of importance of People’s Congresses 
from the late 1980s is, of course, an important feature of institutional development in 
China. However, this development has yet been beyond Party’s control area. Thirdly, 
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some informal institutional constraints have brought some risks on the deputies’ active 
legislative participation in LPCs.  
 
1. The Institutional Characteristics of LPC and the Cost for the Active Legislative 
Participation 
 
In the Western democratic countries, the legislators are professionals. They have 
their offices and equipment and even assistants. For example, in America, representatives 
have their own offices and are each provided with a personal full-time staff of twenty-two, 
a third of whom are usually deployed in electorate district offices to deal with the 
constituency service. These assistants help the legislators handle the day-to-day affairs in 
the electorate and constituents’ visiting. At the same time, all the expenditure comes from 
the Congress’ allocation of fund.29 
However, in China, most deputies work on a part-time basis. Therefore, most of 
the deputies are not professionals, although some members of the Standing Committee of 
People’s Congress are professionals. So many deputies to the People’s Congress look 
upon their membership as a sideline except some members of the Standing Committee of 
People’s Congress, who fulfill the legislative work during the closing of the plenary 
session. 
In China, the deputies have outside occupations to pursue to make a living. 
Conducting the deputies’ work, they have no fixed pay, but only a small amount of 
conference subsidy and travel expenditure. Consequently, they must spend most of time 
                                                 
29 Ezra N. Suleiman, Parliaments and Parliamentarians in Democratic Politics (New York: 
Holmes & Meier, 1986),  223. 
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and energy on their outside occupations, trying to make a living. To them, working as a 
deputy is only in the second place. When there are some conflicts between one’s own 
work and working as a deputy, the latter will be sacrificed. After all, working as a deputy 
is temporary, not a means for him to make a living. Especially, as the “models” from all 
walks of life, a lot of the deputies have an important operating post in their regular work, 
such as technical heads or leaders in the work unit. So they have not enough time to give 
much attention to the legislative work except attend the plenary session of People’s 
Congress.30 
Therefore, if the deputies would like to be active in the legislative participation, 
they would incur lots of costs such as time, energy and money because of the institutional 
characteristics of LPC. 
 The matter of time and energy 
In the chapter 2 of this dissertation, I have measured the deputies’ legislative 
activism by examining the activities of each member in these three key areas: tabling or 
signing motions, visiting the constituents and participating in appraisal, inquiries and 
interrogation of government. In fact, in China, if the deputies would like to be active in 
participating in any of these kinds of legislative activities, they have to spend a lot of time 
and energy.  
                                                 
30 Furthermore, they have to keep continuity in their regular job, so it is inevitable that they will 
encounter some embarrassment during the plenary session of People’s Congress: on the one hand, 
they must attend the plenary session; on the other hand, they cannot pull away from their work 
units. So if they drop their job and attend the plenary session, their work units’ interest would be 
hurt. China now is advancing from the planned economy to the market economy. Almost every 
work unit uses the appointment system. Under this circumstance, people are facing more and 
more competitive pressure. If the work unit thinks that the deputy “put the cart before the horse,” 
it is possible that they will not employ the deputy. When the deputies have this apprehension, it is 
very difficult for them to spend necessary time and energy on the legislative activities. So 
everyone has to consider the economic interest and the deputy is no exception. My interview in 
Shandong province, March 2004. 
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Tabling motions is time-consuming. Before submitting a piece of good and high-
quality motion, the deputies have to do a lot of preparatory work. Firstly, they must spend 
a lot of time to collect related information for writing the motions. Actively attending all 
kinds of activities organized by the LPC or its Standing Committee could provide some 
important information for the deputies. However, most of these activities are superficial 
in nature, so the deputies can not rely only on them to collect the information. Therefore, 
the active deputies must do their own in-depth fieldwork and get first-hand data. 
Meanwhile, in their spare time, they have to pay much more attention to the “hot spots” 
of society, especially covered by the media. Based on these information sources, the 
deputies could work on writing the motions. It is very clear that all these activities take 
up a lot of time.31 
Visiting constituents and resolving their problems are also time-consuming 
activities. In Western democratic polity, the legislators always allocate some time for 
visiting constituents every year. Regularly visiting the constituents and learning their 
problems are also the deputies’ responsibilities in China. At the same time, amid this 
pivotal phase of the reform in China, various social contradiction and conflicts have 
cumulated and reflected in everyday life, such as unemployment and social injustice. In 
an authoritarian country like China, when ordinary citizens feel dissatisfied or unfairly 
treated, they would find channels to express their grievances. Most of the time, it is not 
useful to appeal to the relevant departments of the government. The citizens would, of 
their own accord, turn to the deputies for help. When one case is successful, it would 
produce the demonstration effect for other citizens. And the deputy who can help the 
                                                 
31 This paragraph is based on my talk with Mr. Wang Zehua in Zhanjiang city, Guangdong 
province, February 2004. 
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constituents would become famous gradually. So, more and more citizens would learn 
from each other and seek the help from this famous and active deputy. Under this 
circumstance, virtually, the deputies’ burden may increase, by leaps and bounds. On the 
one hand, the active deputies must learn the actual situation and communicate with their 
constituents. On the other hand, they must reflect the constituents’ suggestion and make 
appropriate representations to the relevant departments of the government, and monitor 
and hasten them. It is so tough for the active deputies to do all these things. So the 
deputies basically cannot allocate the time, to say the least of it.32 
If the deputies would like to actively participate in appraisal, inquiries and 
interrogation of government, they must not only have enough courage but also the related 
knowledge. The deputies have the rights to supervise the government as stipulated by the 
constitution and laws; nevertheless, how these rights are exercised is dependent on the 
deputies’ familiarity with state laws and rules, home area’s policy situations on politics, 
economy, science, culture and education. The more comprehensive this familiarity, the 
more pertinent the deputies’ speech and the better the supervision of the government. 
Without this familiarity, the deputies’ supervision of the government would be ineffective. 
However, most deputies are not familiar with these things. So the active deputies have to 
spend lots of time to acquire a certain level of proficiency. 
Besides some basic knowledge, the legal knowledge is especially important for 
the active deputies. If the deputies would like to actively fulfill their responsibilities, 
whether setting down the laws and stipulations, deliberating and deciding on important 
matters, electing the leaders of governments or conducting investigations and 
examinations, they must conduct these activities according to legal stipulations. So, the 
                                                 
32 Ibid. 
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deputies must have enough legal knowledge. They must have a basic knowledge of the 
laws and rules such as the Constitution, economic law, criminal law, civil law and 
administrative law, and so on. 
However, it is an admitted fact that the deputies have not enough legal knowledge. 
It is estimated that 90 percent of the deputies with high academic qualification have no 
formal training in law.33 However, compared with the deputies, government officials 
have more policy expertise and knowledge. Under this circumstance, it is very difficult 
for the deputies to supervise the government officials even if they have strong 
motivations to do that.34  
So if the deputies do not have enough knowledge and policy expertise to 
understand the government and its operation, then they would be unable to supervise and 
prevent them from doing wrong things. While the deputies may not be expert on many 
policy issues, they are capable of learning, especially for the new deputies. In fact, LPCs 
at various levels have conducted the systematic training for the deputies to improve their 
legal knowledge and policy expertise. However, the time and content of the training are 
not enough for the active deputies. So they still have much to learn by themselves. For 
example, they have to spend lots of time studying the Constitution, Election Law, and 
Deputies’ Law and so on. Therefore, time is absolutely necessary for these active 
deputies. 
                                                 
33 One staff from Shenzhen People’s Congress told me about this during my fieldwork in 
February 2004. 
34 In March 2004, when I conducted my fieldwork in Shandong, I discussed with one deputy on 
the local deputies’ legislative participation activities. He told me with emotion: “as a deputy 
coming from the grassroots, I know that legislative participation is one basic and major 
responsibility the law endows on the deputies, and I also want to do something. But I am not 
familiar with the law and policy expertise of the government. How can I actively participate in 
the legislative activities?” What he said reflects the thinking of a considerable number of deputies.  
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While time is essential for the deputies’ active legislative participation, the 
institutional characteristics of LPC in China further prevent them from actively 
participating in the legislative activities. In my interview, the deputies were asked what 
would discourage them from actively participating in the legislative activities in the 
People’s Congresses. Most of the deputies interviewed reported that time constraint was 
the major factor discouraging them.35 To most deputies, this is a harsh reality.  
Because of this, it is nearly always difficult for the deputies to pursue active 
legislative participation. Every year, some deputies only attend one or two times regular 
meeting and conduct two or three times of inspection activities during the closing of the 
plenary session. The Standing Committees of LPCs stipulate that the working unit of the 
deputies must guarantee that the deputies have twenty days for the legislative 
participation outside the plenary session, but the time is too little. Because there is not 
enough time for the deputies to learn the constituents’ needs, they just make some 
speeches and showing of hands in form. Some active deputies could reflect some 
constituents’ suggestion and help them handle a few concrete cases, but there is not 
enough time for them to consider the important issues. 
In some LPCs, the deputies’ activities fall into a state of dormancy during the 
closing of the plenary session because of time constraint. Some deputies actively submit 
the motions during the plenary session of LPC. But after the plenary session, they seldom 
contact the constituents and develop related activities, so they have no motions to submit. 
According to one investigation conducted by one city People’s Congress in one coastal 
                                                 
35 For example, Liao Dina, vice president of Guangzhou University, has been elected as deputy of 
Guangzhou People’s Congress for two times since 1998. She said to me that “there are some 
deputies who have never submitted any motions during their five-year term. Only a few deputies 
are excellent. Because everyone has his own job, it is impossible for us to invest much energy. 
This is one main reason.” 
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province, the deputies only carried on a few times of deputies’ closing-meeting activities 
in the light of the arrangement made by Standing Committee. The great majority of the 
deputy groups did not develop any activities on their own initiatives.36 
“Busy” deputies, especially those with many affairs, such as government officials 
and businessmen, may find it costly to devote much time to any one activity. It is 
reported that a lot of businessmen deputies were so busy on the production and business 
operation that they basically did not attend the collective activities. Similarly, those 
government officials seldom attended the deputy activity because of their heavy 
schedules. As noted above, there are lots of “official” deputies in the LPCs. Because they 
are always busy with government affairs, they seldom participate in the legislative 
activities. Certainly, some of the government officials do not realize the importance of 
the deputies, just considering it as one kind of “honor.” Such kinds of deputies just show 
their faces in the plenary session annually, some even do not attend the plenary session. 
As far as activities outside of the plenary session are concerned, they seldom attend citing 
the excuse of busy work. It is reported that most of the deputies who did not attend one 
investigation organized by the Standing Committee of People’s Congress were 
government officials. These government officials said they were too busy to attend the 
investigation activity.37 
For example, in the first plenary session of 13th Shenyang People’s Congress in 
Liaoning province, the deputies comprising government officials have the highest 
proportion of absenteeism in the group discussion. The plenary session lasted for six and 
                                                 
36 My interview in Guangdong province, July 2005. 
37 Hu Hongfu, “Weizhong bu wang qi ze (Deputies should not Forget Their Important 
Responsibilities),”Renmin ribao (People’s Daily), September 6, 2000 and more details could be 
also found here http://www.people.com.cn/zgrdxw/news/200009/06/90607.html (accessed June 3, 
2005). 
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a half days and the time for the deputy’s discussion was only four and a half days. 
However, many government officials did not come. It is reported that there were 18 
formal deputies in one group, but only 8 deputies attended. All the government official 
deputies did not come.38  In August 2003, the Standing Committee of Wuchang district 
People’s Congress of, Wuhan city, Hubei province, declared the statistical result of 298 
deputies’ legislative participation. They provided the full scale statistics on every 
deputy’s legislative participation during the closing of the plenary session in the first half 
year. Among them, three government officials’ records were zero.39 
However, to those truly active deputies, they would spend two or three months on 
the deputy activity every year. For example, Wang Zehua, one of the most famous 
deputies in Guangdong province, would spend four or five months on the legislative 
participation every year. In fact, half of them would occupy his working time. Another 
half would occupy his spare and resting time. Mr. Wang is a senior engineer in his 
enterprise and not responsible for the concrete job. Therefore he has not so much pressure 
and can easily coordinate his time.40 Certainly, most of the deputies cannot spend so 
much time on the legislative participation and they must consider the opinion from their 
work units. In fact, according to Yangguang xianzheng (The Open Constitution Initiative) 
seminar record, the majorities of the active deputies in Haidian district People’s Congress, 
Beijing are retired or almost retire old people because they have enough time.41 
                                                 
38 Gu Wei, “Shenyang: lingdao daibiao queshi shou zhiyi (Shenyang: Leader Deputies’ 
Absenteeism Questioned),” Gongren ribao (Worker’s Daily), January 16, 2003. 
39 Tu Xuedong, Yanjie and Xia Jiaxin, “Gongkai lvzhi jilu, qianghua daibiao zeren (Opening 
Legislative Participation Record to Public, Strengthening Deputies’ Responsibility),” Renmin 
ribao (People’s Daily), August 20, 2003. 
40 My interview in Zhanjiang city, Guangdong province, May 2004. 
41 Yangguang xianzheng (The Open Constitution Initiative), one of NGOs in Beijing, was 
established by Zhang Xingshui, Xu Zhiyong and other lawyers. Mr. Xu and two other legal 
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The suggestion of professionalization 
Clearly, there are a lot of problems with the institutional characteristics of LPC. 
Even if some deputies would like to be active in legislative participation; however, they 
have to do it in their spare time. Because of the limitation of their spare time, it is not 
easy for them to contact constituents and collect data for the motions. So under this 
circumstance, some Chinese professors suggest that the best method to resolve this 
problem is to implement the professionalization of deputies.  
According to these scholars’ suggestion, the deputies should become 
professionals gradually, “letting some deputies become professional firstly.” In fact, 
some members of Standing Committee of LPCs have been professional. Therefore, the 
implementation of the professionalizaton must begin from the full professionalization of 
members of Standing Committee and then half professionalization of ordinary deputies.42  
These scholars argue that the LPC must guarantee considerable numbers of 
professional deputies, and then let them drive the entire deputies to execute their duties. 
More importantly, the LPC must guarantee by legislation that the deputies have enough 
time and material provision. In so doing, the deputies would have enough resources to 
attend the legislative participation, accordingly, improving the quality of legislative 
                                                                                                                                                 
scholars petitioned the nation’s top legislature to review the constitutionality of the detention law, 
which was later abolished. One of their programmes is to invite some experienced and active 
deputies from Haidian district People’s Congress to tell their legislative experiences. 
Unfortunately, after six times’ seminar, they had to stop because of government pressure. I 
obtained all the written record for these seminars named “The open constitution initiative report” 
during my fieldwork in Beijing. 
42 Liu Zheng, “Xuezhe tan quanguo renda diaobiao zhuanzhihua, jianyi 1/5 daibiao zhuanzhi 
(Scholars Suggestion of 1/5 Deputies to be Professional),” 21 shiji huanqiu baodao (21st Century 
World Herald), February 25, 2003. 
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participation. Therefore, under China’s present situation, carrying out the 
professionalization of deputies is an effective approach to improve the quality of LPCs.43 
 “Brain Trust” (Zhi’nang tuan) 
The suggestion of professionalization may be unrealistic in today’s China. 
Therefore, to alleviate this limitation, some deputies have employed experts to collect 
information and formulate suggestions and motions. Facing the more and more 
complicated information society, even the professional deputies themselves cannot attain 
the constituents’ demand effectively and accurately. Therefore, employing experts and 
establishing private “brain trust” could help the deputies improve the ability and level of 
collecting information and submitting motions.44  
For example, in Zhejiang province, some entrepreneur deputies such as Hu Jirong 
(national deputy), Li Shunliang (Ningbo city deputy) and Zhou Dewen (Wenzhou city 
deputy) have invested money to invite experts and establish their “brain trust.” In general, 
the members of the “brain trust” are experts in the social science, retired leaders of party 
and government, “xiahai” officials. With the experts’ help, they have submitted lots of 
high-quality motions.45 
However, these deputies are basically affluent private entrepreneurs, so 
establishing the “brain trust” is not a problem for them. But some peasant and worker 
deputies would find this a heavy burden. Meanwhile, some Chinese scholars argue that 
establishing the “brain trust” does not accord with Deputy Law. The article 4 of the 
Deputy Law stipulates that the deputy himself should keep close contact with the 
                                                 
43 Ibid. 
44 “Sheli zhinongtuan youhe libi (Advantage and Disadvantage of Setting up Brain Trust),” 
Zhejiang renda (Zhejiang People’s Congress), no. 5 (2004). More details can be found in 
http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=37877(accessed June 20, 2005) 
45 Ibid. 
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constituents, hear and reflect their suggestions and demands. That is to say, besides 
having some basic qualities, the deputy must invest lots of time and energy in contacting 
and understanding the constituents’ demands. Depending on other people’s help, the 
deputy could not truly know what the constituents’ demand.46  
The matter of material resource (outlay) 
The shortage of the material resource (outlay) is another problem that the deputies 
have to face currently. We can even say without any exaggeration that the problem of 
outlay has become the “bottle-neck” restricting the deputies’ activism in some localities. 
More than ten years ago, some Chinese journalists made some investigations on the 
problem of outlay when the Standing Committee of NPC was drafting the Deputy’s Law. 
The result showed that the outlay was one of the problems that stood out above all the 
rest at that time. So, how to establish a support mechanism to provide necessary resource 
for the deputy had become the keystone of the legislature at that time.47 However, the 
well-intentioned expectation of the legislature has not transformed into reality. Today, the 
shortage of outlay is still a serious problem the deputies have to face. 
The article 33 of the Deputy Law clearly stipulates that deputy’s outlay for 
activities should be listed as government’s financial budget at the same level. However, 
the Deputy Law’s stipulation is only a matter of principle; there is no quantifiable 
standard for the percentage of deputy’s outlay of activities in the financial budget. So this 
could bring considerable randomness on the practical operation. Meanwhile, because 
there is no corresponding liability clause, this stipulation basically is not mandatory.  
                                                 
46 Ibid. 
47 Wang Tiemin, “Guanyu dangqian woguo daibiao gongzuo zhuyao wenti pingdian (A 
Discussion on the Deputies’ Work in Today’s China),”Zhongguo renda (Chinese People’s 
Congress), no. 9 (2004) and http://www.people.com.cn/GB/14576/14997/2641869.html (accessed 
July 2, 2005). 
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In fact, whether the deputy’s outlay of activities could be timely and sufficiently 
funded by the LPCs is affected by many uncertain factors. These factors include local 
economic strength, attitudes of leaders of Party and government on the People’s Congress, 
the relations between the major leaders of Standing Committee of People’s Congress. 
Indeed, the attitude of leading officials in the financial department of government and 
whether the strategies the People’s Congress adopts are feasible or not, could also play a 
very important role. Ironically, while the deputies are the members of organ of state 
power, they have to act on some government officials’ “faces” (Kan lianse). Even a small 
officer from the finance department could decide whether the deputies can unfold the 
work or not.48 
We must note that growth of economy is extremely uneven in China, therefore, 
the difference among the deputies’ outlay of activities is very significant. In some rich 
regions, the deputies have about one thousand Yuan (RMB) grants yearly, but in other 
poor regions only a few Yuan (RMB). Some places have not even allocated any grants 
for deputy’s activity. In some very poor regions, there is even no township finance 
system, so attempting to list the outlay of the deputies is a problem.  
Even if deputies in the rich regions have much more outlay than the poor region, 
but the money is still not enough for them to conduct the legislative participation. For 
example, Zhejiang province is a developed area in China. However, every national 
deputy in Zhejiang province has only 1200 Yuan (RMB) of stipend every year. This 
amount of money could only pay the deputy for three-day accommodation during their 
                                                 
48 My interview in Shandong province, March 2004. 
 103 
collective investigation.49  So, under this circumstance, to be active in the legislative 
participation, some deputies have to dig into their own pockets for some activities. For 
example, Yao Lifa, one famous deputy from Hubei province, had spent lots of his own 
money (20 thousand Yuan (RMB) every year) for the legislative activities.50 Because 
Hubei is not a rich province in China, this sizable sum of money is a heavy burden and 
pressure on him and his family. 
The Deputy Law stipulates that the deputies still enjoy their working unit’s salary 
and other remunerations when they attend the legislative activities organized by the 
People’s Congress or its Standing Committee during the closing of the plenary session. 
However, it is very difficult for the deputies from the private enterprise. Under the market 
economy, the enterprises have to pursue their own interest. If the deputies are not 
involved in the production, but the enterprises still pay them salary and other 
remunerations, this does not fit in with the principle of market economy. In fact, some 
deputies in the private enterprises had to use their own money to pay for the legislative 
activities such as collecting the constituents’ suggestion.51  No matter how much it costs, 





                                                 
49 Zhang Qizhi and Zhang Ran, “Dui Zhejiang renda daibiao tuokuan lianxi xuanmin qudao 
tansuo de diaocha (An Investigation on Zhejiang Deputies’ Exploration of Broadening Contact 
Channels with Constituents),”Renmin ribao:huadong xinwen( People’s Daily: Eastern China 
News), February 24, 2004. 
50 Hu Jie, “Weile baixing liyi, wo kending canjia xiajie xuanju (For the Interests of the Public, I 
am Sure in Participating in the Next Election),” Xin jing bao (Beijing News), January 13, 2004. 
51 My interview in Shandong province, March 2004. 
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2. Party Control in the LPCs and the Risk for the Active Legislative Participation 
 
In China, if a deputy would like to be active in legislative participation, he or she 
not only has to bear some costs (such as time or money) but also face some risks because 
the LPC is still under the Party’s institutional control. The primary control mechanism 
used by the Party is the power of Party committees at various levels (province, city, or 
county) to decide the appointments of the presidents, vice presidents and members of 
standing committee at the corresponding levels. As a general rule, the appointment of 
these leaders is decided (or needs to be approved) by the Organization Department of 
Party committee at higher level. Therefore, the selection of reliable people to these 
positions may prevent LPC from taking initiative and making independent decisions. 
Meanwhile, the Party control is realized through Party groups and Party members in 
LPCs. In fact, the most authoritative Party organization within LPC is the “Party group.” 
Before each plenary session, the “Party group” usually convenes a meeting of all Party 
heads from every delegation to transmit Party’s spirit such as the tone the meeting should 
take and how open the debate should be. Sometimes, the “Party group” even delivers the 
speech to the CCP members among the deputies before the plenary session and demand 
them to guarantee that the Party’s intention. Non-Party member cannot attend this kind of 
meeting.52  Meanwhile, the Party has kept a dominating presence over its members in the 
LPCs. In extreme situation, to get a majority vote on important personnel appointment, it 
even can issue orders to Party group and Party members and thus influence legislative 
behaviors.  
                                                 
52 My interview in Guangzhou city, Guangdong province, January 2004. 
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More importantly, besides the formal control mechanisms, some members of 
Party and government could inhibit active deputies by informal means such as inflicting 
bodily harm, illegal detention and threatening imprisonment. These informal means can 
bring some risks on the active deputies. Necessarily, all legislative activities must be 
involved in the vested interest of some local groups and individuals, especially the 
supervision of the local government and its officials. To put it simply, these legislative 
behaviors would unavoidably “offend” somebody’s interest and sometimes would bring 
severe “retaliation.”  
Law Immunities for the deputies 
In fact, Constitution (article 74 and 75) and Organic Law (Article 43 and 44) 
expressly stipulate that deputies cannot be arrested or tried without permission of the 
Standing Committee of People’s Congress and deputies’ any speeches or votes at plenary 
sessions also receive legal protection. To further protect the deputies’ interest, in 1992, 
the NPC, China’s highest legislative organ, promulgated a law which applied to deputies 
to the People’s Congress at all levels, stipulating the duties to be carried out by the 
deputies as well as safeguarding their lawful rights.53 This kind of “immunities” not only 
has a regard for the deputy’s right, but also encourages the deputies to actively participate 
in the legislative activities without fear of reprisals.  
However, China today is still an authoritarian political system and the concepts of 
democracy and legal system are still weak. Traditional thoughts of the rule of men are 
deep seated, especially in some local government departments. When deputies’ 
                                                 
53 More details on Local Organic Law can be found here: 
http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=82606; More details on Deputy’s Law can 
be found here: http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=13973 (accessed January 
10, 2005). 
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legislative activities encroach on some local government officials’ interest, they would 
resist, thwart, interfere and even take revenge on the deputies. More importantly, the LPC 
is still under Party’s institutional control. The Constitution stipulates that the Party’s 
leadership must mainly be “ideological, political and institutional” and the Party could 
not devote its main energy into some practical matters. However, in reality, some local 
Party committees still decide everything.  
Thus, it can be seen that the role of deputies of LPCs at various levels is still very 
limited. As a member of legislature in China, the privilege that a deputy is entitled to 
criticize the government is almost the same as the ordinary people. When they come 
cross some sensitive issues or offend some leaders’ interest, they even cannot safeguard 
their own safety. Therefore, despite an expansion of deputy’s immunities from law and 
institutional guarantee, the deputies still hesitate to be active because of these informal 
constraints.  
However, some leaders of local Party committee or government would not 
retaliate against the active deputies immediately but try to co-opt them firstly by 
providing all kinds of benefits such as material inducement. For example, one deputy 
who conducted a sharp interpellation on one government agency complained to the 
reporter: “my phone rang incessantly last night. People from all walks of life would like 
to invite me to drink tea and exchange ideas. They said we can communicate in private, 
instead of communicating in the inquiry.”54 When one deputy from Fujian province 
conducted the investigation on one corrupt government official, many people came to 
him and ask for leniency. One day, one of this deputy’s relative led the corrupt official’s 
                                                 
54 Yu Ying, “Xunwen yao bu yao huoyaowei? (Should Inquiry have the ‘Smell of 
Gunpowder’?),” Yangcheng wanbao (Canton Evening News) (Guangzhou), March 29, 2006. 
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wife to his home. She said while sobbing: “my husband is not easy, please let him off.” 
Then, she pulled out a big envelop and said: “this money is a small gift. We will re-thank 
you when my husband is all right.” One leader from city level even told this active 
deputy by telephone: “…drawing back a step, we all benefit.”55 
When co-optation fails, the retaliation would follow. In fact, sometimes, the 
active deputies were “retaliated” through some illegal and informal means for their 
speeches in the plenary session. When they infringe somebody’s interest because of their 
active legislative participations, they would incur all kinds of retaliations. If some 
deputies are retaliated by some leaders or small organizations, the negative impact cannot 
be underrated. This retaliation can not only cause the terrifying mental pain or uneasiness, 
but more seriously, it would emaciate the deputies’ enthusiasm and activism. In fact, for 
years, the retaliation of active deputies for their frankness and justice in legislative 
participation happened frequently. In the following, I will use some cases to explain the 
“retaliation” incurred by the active deputies.  
Making trouble at work  
The most common way of retaliation for the active deputies is that they will incur 
trouble in their work. When the active deputies conducted the legislative activities such 
as supervising the government, unavoidably, they would infringe on some officials’ 
interest. If the supervised object was the active deputies’ colleague, they would have an 
awkward relation in their work. But if the supervised object was the active deputies’ 
superior, in general, the superior would talk to them indirectly to express his 
                                                 
55 Zheng Guofeng, “Falu he daoyi de shouquan: renda daibiao He Wenyi de gushi (Legal and 
Moral Authorization: the Story of Deputy He Wenyi),”Renmin zhengtan (People’s Political 
Arena), no. 11 (2001). And http://www.66163.com/Fujian_w/news/rmzt/200111/7_1.html 
(accessed October 2, 2005). 
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dissatisfaction. Behind his back, he would embarrass the active deputies in their work 
such as deliberately finding fault. Mr. Han’s experience is a good example.  
Mr. Han is a middle school teacher in one county of Shandong province. He is 
hardworking and was a good teacher, so he was popular among the students and was 
chosen through public appraisal as the “national model teacher.” Perhaps, because of his 
teaching achievement, he had been elected as the county deputy for three times. Mr. Han 
is decisive, full of drive, and daring in thinking and action. In one plenary session of 
county People’s Congress, he criticized mercilessly on the middle school education fees 
and offended lots of people. He also submitted one piece of motion and suggested that the 
government should strengthen the management of the students paying the fees. This is a 
common problem for the middle school in today’s China. But the principal of Mr. Han’s 
middle school thought that he picked a hole in his coat. So he suspended Mr. Han’s class 
without any reason. Mr. Han’s wife has been demoted to work as a watcher of the 
school’s gate from the laboratory she originally worked in. This has been considered as 
the typical case of retaliation of the active deputy and the county People’s Congress has 
conducted the investigation. However, the ultimate result ended up with nothing definite. 
Finally, only after the intervention from the head of county, did the principal give in and 
resume Mr. Han’s class.56 
The case of Mr. Han is not infrequent. Even if the deputies have good and 
constructive motions, but once the motions come down to the interest of some officials or 
departments, it is extremely difficult for the deputies to submit. If the active deputies 
want to look for the others to sign together, the “official” deputies could find more people 
to oppose. The “official” deputies have good relations (Guanxi) among themselves. 
                                                 
56 My interview in Shandong province, March 2004. 
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What’s more, the number of “official” deputies is more than other deputies. So it is very 
easy for them to object. If the deputies persist in struggling with them and win, they 
surely get a chance to incur the trouble in their work in future. Even if the deputies are 
not under their jurisdiction, they can always easily locate deputies’ department and make 
their life difficult because the “latent rules” could be found widely in China’s political 
system.  
Losing the deputy position for inexplicable reasons   
As I explained before, the process of election of the deputy to LPCs is basically 
controlled by local Party and government in China. If the deputies’ activism offends 
some leaders’ interest, they will use all kinds of illegal and legal methods to punish the 
active deputies. One of these methods is to let the deputies lose their deputy position in 
the next election without any reasons.  
In general, the more active the deputies are in the legislative participation, the 
more trouble they will bring to the government and the higher the likelihood that they 
will lose their deputy position in the next election.57 However, another important reason 
is that the active deputies have set a good example for other deputies to follow. This is 
something the local government officials worry most. Legendary deputy Yao Lifa’s loss 
                                                 
57 For example, Zhou Changchun, head of Industrial and Commercial Association of Yinchuan 
district, Tieling City, Liaoning province, submitted 82 pieces of motions when he was a 
provincial deputy from 1998 to 2002. It is said that the motions he submitted during his term were 
more than the total sum of other deputies submitted in his delegation. Therefore, he was called 
“Star Deputy of Liaoning”. However, this active provincial deputy failed to be chosen as the 
deputy again in December 2002.  It is reported that some of his behavior offended the local 
government officials. Wang Haibo, “Mingxing renda daibiao heyi duanming? (Why Star 
Deputies ‘Short-lived’?),” http://www.people.com.cn/GB/14576/14997/2347879.html (accessed 
October 15, 2005). 
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in his new term election can explain this.58  In fact, the true reason for Yao’s loss is that 
he always criticized and supervised the local government, so it is clear that he has 
offended local officials. More importantly, under his influence, ordinary people’s legal 
knowledge and democratic awareness in Qianjiang city have become more and more 
vibrant. More and more people began to use the weapons of law to struggle with the 
government’s illegal behavior and illegitimate policies. To those government officials 
who have been accustomed to control the power directly and lay down the decree and 
policy arbitrarily, this is unbearable. So they would try their best to exclude these 
candidates including Yao Lifa by fair means or foul.  
Another legendary deputy Yao Xiurong suffered the same destiny as Mr. Yao in 
Hubei province; even as she was a NPC deputy. Yao Xiurong was widely known in 
China for her performance as a deputy.59  Surprisingly, on January 18, 2003, Yao lost her 
re-election to the NPC by receiving only 363 of 931 votes from the provincial People’s 
Congress. The reasons for her loss are unclear. Ironically, Yao is unaware of how she 
                                                 
58 Yao Lifa was elected as the deputy of Qianjiang city People’s Congress, Hubei province by his 
own campaign. He took on “common people’s leader” as his political ideal, actively reflected the 
constituents’ complaint to the government, supported alleviating the peasants’ burden, submitted 
suggestion and criticism on some polices of local government. During his five-year term, Yao 
submitted 187 pieces of motions, accounting for 38 percent of total sum of all deputies submitted. 
However, he and other 31 candidates lost the election of deputy for the new term in November 
2003. More details could be found in Zhejiang renda (Zhejiang People’s Congress), no. 7 (2004). 
and http://www.people.com.cn/GB/14576/14841/2578981.html (accessed October 15, 2005). 
59 Yao Xiurong, from Jiaozuo city, Henan province, served as the deputy of 8th and 9th of NPC for 
10 years. During her service, she created a reputation for herself as an outspoken woman fighting 
for justice and for her courage to speak for the ordinary people throughout China. Yao and six 
other LPC representatives in Jiaozuo city organized a “7-person work team.” Because of their 
investigations, one local police chief, five corrupted inspections bureau chiefs and two anti-
corruption bureau chiefs lost their jobs. The government was forced to shut down a factory that 
was polluting the local environment. Yao was the leader among the team, and took her job at the 
NPC very seriously. At the NPC, between 1996 and 2002, she submitted more proposals than any 
other deputies. More details can be found in Shi Po, “You zheyang yige rendadabiao: Yao 
Xiurong shinian chenfu (China has this Kind of NPC Representative: Yao Xiurong’s Ten-year 
Ups and Downs),” Nanfeng chuang (Window on the Southern Wind), no. 6 (2003). 
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became a deputy or how she lost.60  However, one local newspaper cited what one 
provincial deputy said that Yao Xiurong was too “crazy” to be a deputy. So the main 
reason for her loss is that her behavior has offended somebody’s interest and stirred up 
some troubles on the related department of government in Henan province. These people 
were unsatisfied with her behavior and did not elect her as the national deputy.61  
Intimidation or bodily harm 
To the active deputies, offending some people’s interest is unavoidable. If these 
offended people are not the active deputies’ superior or colleagues, they will use other 
means to retaliate against the deputies such as intimidation or bodily harm. Therefore, the 
active deputies not only receive a few sarcastic remarks but even suffered intimidation or 
bodily harm.  
Corruption has steadily increased, as China has overseen the 25-year shift from a 
planned economy to a market-oriented economy. In fact, corruption is an extremely 
serious problem for China, seeping through all levels of governments and in almost all 
sectors of the economy. It is difficult to estimate the scope of corruption in China, but one 
opinion poll after another show that corruption is a key complaint of the ordinary Chinese 
people. Currently, the legislature has gradually played a more important but still limited 
role, in its fight against corruption. However, if the deputies in the LPCs are active in 
conducting the supervision of the corrupt officials, it is likely that they will incur 
                                                 
60 During the interview, Yao Xiurong said to the reporter, “I can’t get over this! Why did I get so 
many votes and become a deputy when I had no idea what I was doing? Now that I know what 
I’m doing and have accomplished a lot…I lose? Is democratic reform in Henan happening 
quickly or slowly? How qualified are our representatives?” More details can be found in Shi Po, 
“Yao Xiurong daibiao shui (Whom Yao Xiurong Represents?),” Nanfeng Chuang (Window on 
the Southern Wind), no. 6 (2003) 
61 More details could be found in Zhongguo renda xinwen (Chinese People’s Congress News), 
July 9, 2003 and http://www.peopledaily.edu.cn/GB/14576/15217/1959504.html (accessed 
November 5, 2005). 
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retaliation. For example, one deputy in Zhejiang province was threatened by unidentified 
people after he reported that the local township officials received bribes in the 
construction of rural roads. So he had to lead a vagrant life as a fugitive for more than ten 
days during the Chinese Spring Festival.62 Another deputy in Shandong province actively 
implemented the Villager’s Committee Organic Law in her village and guaranteed the 
impartiality of election. Because of this, she offended some candidates who wanted to 
practice bribery at election and was abused and bashed up by some unidentified guys.63  
Sometimes, it is so terrible that the active deputes were actually abused by the 
law-enforcement officials of the government. For example, in Wuhan city, Hubei 
province, one active deputy was beaten up three times by Environment and Hygiene 
Agency officials for speaking up against their misbehavior of arbitrary collection of fees. 
                                                 
62 Zheng Zhichun is a “national model worker” and also the deputy of 7th, 8th and 9th of People’s 
Congress in Hangzhou city, Zhejiang province. As a deputy, in 1995, he began to reflect one 
main road’s quality to the related department, but there was no response. In October 2001, there 
was a landslide on one side of the road. So he wrote the letter to the related department and local 
media. In the next two months, the local media gave wide coverage to the landslide. This road is 
1500 meters long, but there was 300 meters of roadbed subside because of the bad construction 
quality. The poor quality of the road was related to corruption by the township leaders. So 
Zheng’s behavior offended the interest of some leaders of township. Soon afterwards, some 
unidentified people burst in and burgled his house. Meanwhile, his life security was threatened. 
More details can be found in Dong Bishui, “Yuandan, Hangzhou yi renda daibiao bugan huijia 
(One Hangzhou Deputy dared not Return Home in New Year),” Zhongguo qingnianbao (China 
Youth Daily), January 8, 2002. 
63 Yang Xinfen, deputy of Linxu county, Shandong province, is always active in the legislative 
participation. In 1998, she widely propagandized the Villagers’ Committee Organic Law to the 
villagers during the election. Her propaganda has guaranteed the impartiality of the election, but 
offended one candidate who failed in the election.  At the same year, when county court 
conducted forcible execution on some farmers for arrears of tax without any excuse, she extended 
her cooperation actively. However, this made some people concerned unhappy. One day, in the 
fall 1999, four or five people broke into her house, abused and attempted to blow her up. Apart 
from the injury to her face, she sustained the minor concussion of the brain and had to be in 
hospital for 5 days. After the accident, she notified the case to the local police immediately. But 
those people concerned refused to confess the fact and acted together secretly to commit perjury. 
So it was very difficult for the police to investigate and collect evidence. The case was laid on the 
table. Fortunately, under the supervision and urge of county People’ Congress standing 
committee, the case was handled fairly and the offenders were punished eventually. More details 
can be found in Shen Ruhu, “Mo rang daibiao zai liulei (Don’t Let Deputy in Tears again),” 
Zhongguo renda xinwen (Chinese People’s Congress News), September 6, 2000. 
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This case has attracted the serious concern from the NPC and some related departments 
of provincial, city and district governments. Finally, those concerned were punished 
accordingly.64 
Illegal detention  
To encourage the deputies to actively participate in the legislative activities, the 
Constitution and Organic Law forbids arrest or trial of deputies without permission from 
the Standing Committee of People’s Congress. However, sometimes, the deputies were 
held in custody illegally by some law enforcement officials. It is undesirable to believe 
that these law enforcement officials deliberately broke the law and illegally apprehended 
these deputies even if they did not offend their interest. From May to September 2001, 
court officials from Xiaodian district, Licheng county and Zhongyang county in Shanxi 
province successively detained the deputies illegally.65 The case of illegal detention of 
                                                 
64 Cai Yaozhang is the deputy of Xinzhou district, Wuhan, Hubei province. Since 1998, he has 
reflected the arbitrary collection of fees of Environment and Hygiene Agency of Sandian Street to 
the Legal Affair Office of Xinzhou district more than twenty times. The Legal Affair Office has 
prohibited by explicit order many times, but there was no positive outcome. On June 3, 2000, Cai 
again went to the district government to inform the misbehavior of Environment and Hygiene 
Agency of Sandian Street. But on his way, he was beaten up three times by Xiao Yanshong-head 
of Environment and Hygiene Agency-and other guys.  More details can be found in 
http://www.gsrdedu.com/content.asp?id=225&cate=1 (accessed November 30, 2005). 
65 Chen Yueming is the deputy of Xinghualing district, Taiyuan city and director of Shanxi Qiyi 
Precision Machinery Factory. On May 14, 2001, when he was walking to his office, there was a 
police car coming head-on. Six law-enforcement officials from Xiaodian district court got out of 
the car and expressed that they would execute the court’s adjudication and demand for the 
payment of a debt Qiyi Precision Machinery Factory owing to another. Initially, the law-
enforcement officials did not show any formalities. Under his question time after time, one 
official unexpectedly filled out “detention warrant” at site. Chen Yueming stated once and again 
that he was a deputy and showed his “representative certificate” to them, hoping that they can 
handle the case according to the legal procedures. However, one official tore up the 
“representative certificate” and Chen was handcuffed by force. Finally, the law-enforcement 
officials grasped Chen by the neck and bundled him into the police car.  
Three days later, when Hao Yuxiang, the deputy of Lucheng city, Shanxin province and 
legal representative of one company, and her husband were driving to their office, they were held 
back by  nine policemen from Lichen county court suddenly. These policemen yanked them out 
of the car and took them to the detention house of Licheng County.  In the car, they used the 
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deputy also occurred in Jinzhou city, Liaoning province.66 In fact, the deputies in the 
foregoing cases did not offend some government officials’ interest. They were illegally 
detained because they just had some economic conflict with the third party. But if they 
offended some government officials’ interest in the legislative participation, we can 
easily imagine the result. The case of Yan Yueming tells us how the local government 
officials can exact revenge on active deputies who infringe their interest.  
Yan Yueming was the deputy of Loudi city People’s Congress in Hunan province. 
On March 29, 1992, during the 3rd meeting of 4th plenary session of Loudi city People’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
electronic stick to pound Hao’s husband’s head.  Hao stated again and again that she was city 
deputy; however, the policemen still turned a deaf ear to his pleas. Because the policemen did not 
have the detention certificate, the detention house refused to accept them when Hao and husband 
were sent there. Until the following afternoon, Hao has been illegally detained for seventeen 
hours. But she was brought out of the detention house, handcuffed forcibly and sent under escort 
to Licheng Court.  
The Standing Committee of Shanxi people’s congress and Shanxi High court attached 
importance to these two cases and kept the whole province informed. However, only three 
months after Shanxi High Court’s dissemination, another case of illegal detention of deputy 
occurred. Gu Aimin, the deputy of Qingxu County, runs a coke oven plant and owed 270 
thousands Yuan to Suchun coalmine of Zhongyang County. On September 21, 2001, chief justice 
of Zhongyang county court and a few staff went to Taiyuan and demanded enforcement of 
judgment Gu Aimin owing to Suchun coalmine. They contacted Gu, and Gu said that he would 
go to other places on business negotiation. He would pay the money he owed after he came back 
in October. However, on September 24, on grounds of “refusal to enforce the judgment”, Gu was 
handcuffed forcibly, put into the police car and sent to Zhongyang County. More details can be 
found in http://www.booker.com.cn/gb/paper342/1/class034200005/hwz218246.htm (accessed 
November 30, 2005). 
66 On the morning of March 27, 2001, Li Chunbo, the deputy of Shaoxing city People’s Congress, 
Zhejiang province and director of Xinchang pharmaceutical factory, went back home to get some 
data and prepared for 3rd meeting of 4th plenary session of  Shaoxing People’s Congress. But as 
soon as he pulled up his car outside his house, a dozen people wearing police outfit and speaking 
with the Northern accent suddenly besieged him. Li Chunbo solemnly told them “I am the deputy. 
You must do it according to the convention. Don’t be absurd!” But these people did not listen to 
him, hit him, knocked him down, handcuffed him and proceeded to put him into the car. Because 
of taking whatever help was available in a hurry, they drove into a dead-end highway and they 
were frontally intercepted by 110 patrolmen coming at once as soon as they were called. 
Therefore, Li Chunbo was rescued. After event, it turned out that they are Wang Qi-vice president 
of Guta district, Jinzhou city, Liaoning province-, Guo Zhongxiang-vice director of Jinzhou 
Chemical Pharmaceutical Factory and other court staff.  More details can be found in 
http://www.booker.com.cn/gb/paper342/1/class034200005/hwz218246.htm (accessed November 
30, 2005). 
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Congress, Yan and other 22 deputies jointly signed and submitted one motion of “On the 
Suggestion of Recalling Mayor Zhao Bodong under the Authority of Law.” However, 
under the pretext of “keeping Yan Yueming from making a mistake,” some official 
deputies obstructed them in submitting it and the recall case failed to go through. 
However, after the plenary session, city government, police bureau, procuratorate 
and court formed a special group to continue to examine this case and illegally detained 
Yan Yueming on suspicion of economic criminal activities. They first investigated Yan’s 
economic background because he was director of city tannery factory and director 
general of industrial bureau. But they found nothing. Then, they investigated his private 
life and used torture to coerce a false statement, involving dozens of men and women. 
Seven media agencies conducted joint investigation and wrote “internal reference” 
(neican) to reflect this unfair issue. However, under the mayor’s manipulation, the 
reporting panel sent by Hunan provincial government concocted a false report and an 
anonymous letter, attempting to denigrate those reporters bringing this case into the open. 
Surprisingly, secretary and vice secretary of provincial Party committee, and head of 
propaganda department all collaborated in this scheme to concoct a false report. They 
even sent the official letter to the department of central propaganda and National 
Journalist Association. Fortunately, under the intervention of the Party Central 
Committee, Yan Yueming was set free after 214 days of illegal detention. After he was 
set free from illegal detention, Yan was elected as the city deputy by the greatest majority 
and later Yan became the provincial deputy. People involved in this case were brought to 
justice finally.67 
                                                 
67 Liu Guiming, Fazhi tianxia (The Legal World) (Beijing: Zhongguo minzhu fazhi chubanshe, 
2003), 226-243. Based on Yan Yueming’s story, one of the most famous investigative journalists 
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In general, if the active deputies offend ordinary officials’ interest, the retaliation 
is not so serious. But if they offend the important and powerful officials such as mayor in 
Yang’ case, the result is terrible. It is almost unbelievable that the important official 
would use the state departments including police bureau, procuratorate and court to 
retaliate against an ordinary deputy. Although he is a deputy, this position did not protect 
him from harm. Under this situation, the interference from the higher level, even from the 
central level, could not help the active deputy out because of the strong local 
protectionism and the complicated relation network. 
Thrown in jail 
Whether the active deputies are retaliated against or how they are retaliated 
against depends on the nature of their legislative activities. In general, the deputies’ 
legislative activities could be divided into constructive and confrontational. The former 
involves some conciliatory activities such as submitting motions to persuade government 
officials to make corrections. But the latter involves some confrontational activities such 
as interpellation of the government officials to put pressure on them to bring about 
desired changes. Therefore, it is easier for the deputies to incur the wrath of government 
officials when they engage in confrontational activities. For example , in Songci 
Municipality, Hubei province, Yang Changxin, a member of the LPC, was arrested in 
                                                                                                                                                 
in China-Lu Yuegang wrote two documentary literature articles and published in Dangdai 
(Contemporary). More details could be found in Lu Yuegang, “Yi renmin de mingyi: I (By 
People’s Name: I)”, Dangdai (Contemporary), no. 3 (1993) and “Yi renmin de mingyi: II (By 
People’s Name: II)”, Dangdai (Contemporary), no. 5 (1993). 
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July 2002  and sentenced to jail for three years for “disturbing the public order” in 
February 2003.68  
However, sometimes, even some constructive activities can incur retaliation as 
long as these activities involve some officials’ vested interest. The experience of Zeng 
Jianyu as a deputy has involved all kinds of retaliations the active deputies would incur in 
their legislative participation, even jailing. So in the following, I will give more details on 
his experience. 
Zeng Jianyu was the deputy of Luzhou city, Sichuan province and he was 
nominated and elected by his colleagues. During his term as deputy, he spoke up for his 
constituents and was not afraid to offend the government. For example, he reflected the 
local taxi drivers’ opinion and raised an objection against the government’s new 
regulation on the managerial authority of taxi. However, just because of his activism, a 
series of terrible things happened.  
In May 2001, Zeng lost his post as the deputy of Luzhou city People’s Congress 
without any explanation. In June, his work unit-Sichuan Tianhua group cancelled his 
labor contract, which meant that he was denied retirement pension in future. In July 2001, 
Zeng was arrested and put into jail for one year by local public security bureau. The 
charge that the government weaved was that Zeng accepted the bribes from the taxi 
drivers. On September 5, 2002, Zeng was set free from prison. Before his release, the 
related department of Luzhou city held a special conference and declared that Zeng was 
                                                 
68 More details can be found in Wang Yang, “Jizhe diaocha: nongmin zijian dangxuan renda 
daibiao (Reporter’s Investigation: Self-nominated Farmer Elected as Deputy),” Sanxia wanbao 
(Sanxia Evening News), February 7, 2004 and Deng Fei, “Hubei Zhijiang Bailizhou zheng 
nongmin Lu Banglie ‘tiaochu’ renda daibiao piaoxiang (Farmer Lu Banglie from Bailizhou 
township Zhijiang city Hubei province ‘Jumped’ from Poll Box),”Fenghuang zhoukan (Phoenix 
Weekly), January 15, 2004. 
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guilty and that any organization and individual cannot go to welcome him, otherwise, 
they would lose their jobs or incur severe punishment. Meanwhile, the related 
government department announced to the legal circle that no one was permitted to give 
Zeng legal aid.  
However, lots of people still welcomed Zeng’s release. Ordinary people’s trust in 
Zeng did not whither and every day an endless stream of people came to seek his help. 
Some people even donated money and materials for Zeng. In December 2002, Luzhou 
city staged another new election of deputy. Before the election day, some constituents 
even received the inexplicable telephone harassment: “Zeng Jianyu has political 
problem;” “electing Zeng Jianyu is invalid.” Tens of constituents in two electorates of 
Luzhou Tianhua group still nominated Zeng as the candidate, but this was declared as 
void by the authority.69 
The experience of Zeng shows that as long as the deputies’ legislative 
participation infringes on the interest of some officials or government departments, they 




As the main body of the LPCs at various levels, whether the deputies actively 
participate in the legislative activities or not will decide the role of LPC system in the 
national political life. However, because of the formal and informal institutional 
constraints (mainly Party control) in the electoral system, most of deputies are “cadres” 
                                                 
69 Cao Yong, “Zeng Jianyu: daizui er bei bamian de renda daibiao (Zeng jianyu: Guilty and 
Removed Deputy),” Nanfang zhoumo (Southern Weekend), December 26, 2002.  
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and CCP members the Party favors. Clearly, these deputies have no interest and 
motivations to be active in the legislative participation. 
The occupational settings of deputies’ legislative participation are not as good as 
we imagined, especially lack of necessary working condition. Firstly, almost all the 
deputies are not professionals and they can not take a lot of time off from work. 
Meanwhile, they have not enough spare time, so the lack of time has constrained the 
deputies’ activities such as contacting the constituents and investigation. Secondly, the 
deputies have not enough working resources. Some deputies have to spend their own 
money to pay travel expenses or office supplies fees. More importantly, the deputies need 
specialized knowledge to examine the government work reports and budget drafts, as 
well as sufficient time to investigate certain matters. But most of deputies lack knowledge 
and time because they are amateurs.  
Although the Constitution and laws have stipulated all kinds of deputies’ rights 
such as immunity of speech and body protection, these rights have not been properly put 
into effect. More importantly, the LPC is still under Party’s formal and informal control. 
So sometimes, the deputies have to face bodily harm, illegal detention and even the threat 
of imprisonment when they actively participate in the legislative activities, especially 
involving some important officials’ interest. Therefore, the formal and informal 
institutional constraints in LPC system further prevent the deputies from actively 
participating in the legislature activities
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Chapter Four     Institutional Reform, Innovation and Struggle in the Election of 




Undoubtedly, the key element in the strength of any legislature is the quality of its 
members and the quality of legislative members depends only on elections. Therefore, 
who and how legislative members are elected will directly affect their legislative 
participations in future. Although the election has been a hot topic in China in recent 
years, especially in the countryside,1  it does not play the same role as it does in 
democratic regimes, because it is not completely free, fair and competitive. As noted in 
chapter three, the local Party committee and government have basically controlled the 
election by informal and formal institutional mechanisms. Undemocratic election system 
directly determines the structure and quality of deputies. Most of the deputies are people 
whom the Party trusts: CCP members, Party and state “cadres.” Strictly speaking, to a 
large extent, most of the deputies in China are not elected by the constituents but 
“conscripted” by the Party. 
Despite all these, some electoral reforms and local innovations have occurred in 
the reform era. More importantly, more and more constituents (or deputies in indirect 
election) have begun to demand more choice in elections. Because of these tiny 
institutional changes and constituents’ (or deputies in indirect election) struggle in 
elections, some candidates nominated by the constituents (or deputies in indirect election) 
                                                 
1 There are many books and articles on the election of village committee in China. But this study 
only focuses on the reform, innovation and struggle in the election of deputy to LPCs.    
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and a few self-nominated candidates were elected as deputies and they are more likely to 
be active in the legislative participation in LPCs.  
 
II. The Evolving Reform and Innovations in the Electoral System 
 
Since 1949, China has promulgated two electoral laws and the second electoral 
law has been revised four times. Meanwhile, provinces, autonomous regions and 
municipalities have set down their own electoral rules. In this part, I will focus on the 
reforms in the electoral laws which have important influences on the election of deputies. 
At the same time, I will explore some local innovations on electoral rules.   
 
1. Election Laws: Changing the Rules of the Game 
The first electoral law was enacted in 1953, which provided the legal basis for the 
first universal suffrage in China. However, there were pitfalls in the electoral institution 
design at that time. Firstly, the nomination right was so concentrated on the 
“organization” that almost all candidates were nominated by the Party committees at all 
levels in the election. Secondly, the form of voting was open and putting up hands was 
used in most of the direct election.2 
                                                 
2 One of the Chinese leaders at that time gave some explanations on why the secret voting was 
not used: because Chinese people had no much electoral experiences and there were so many 
illiterates. If China used some seemingly perfect but impractical electoral forms, this would 
increase the electoral difficulties in reality and limited the constituents’ electoral right. Deng 
Xiaoping, “Dui zhonghua renmin gongheguo quanguo he difang renda  xuanju fangfa de jiesi 
(Explanation on the Draft of Electoral Method of National People’s Congress and Local People’s 
Congresses in People’s Republic of China)”, in Zhonghua renmin gongheguo renmin daibiao 
dahui wenjian ziliao huibian: 1949-1990 (People’s Congress’ Document and Data Compilation 
in China:1949-1990), ed. Quanguo renda changweihui bangongting yanjiushi (Research Centre 
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After the end of the Cultural Revolution, China enacted its second electoral law in 
1979. This law had some important reforms. Firstly, the election of deputy at all levels 
must be done by voting in secret, not by using the method of raising the hands. Secondly, 
it extended direct elections to the county level. Thirdly, besides the CCP, democratic 
parties and mass organizations can also nominate their candidates. More importantly, any 
three or more than three constituents (or deputies in the indirect election) can also 
nominate their own candidates. Fourthly, when confirming the formal candidates, if too 
many candidates have been nominated, a pre-election procedure can be conducted. At the 
same time, confirming the formal candidates must be in accordance with the opinions of 
most of constituents (or deputies). All parties, social organizations and constituents 
(deputies) can use all kinds of methods to “propaganda” their candidates. Fifthly, the 
election at all levels must utilize the “difference voting” (Cha’e xuanju). This means that 
the number of candidates must exceed the number of positions to be elected.3 
After surveying the results from the 1980-981 national election, NPC made the 
first change on the second electoral law in 1982. It stipulated that the electoral committee 
should introduce the candidates formally to the constituents. Meanwhile, all parties, mass 
organizations and constituents (or deputies) who nominated the candidates can 
“introduce” them at the constituent group meetings. The change of the word 
“propaganda” into “introduce” in the electoral law reflected the central leader’s worry 
that the word “propaganda” may have different interpretations among the candidates.4 In 
                                                                                                                                                 
of General Office of  Standing Committee of NPC) (Beijing: Zhongguo minzhu fazhi chubanshe, 
1991), 131-136. 
3 Cai Dingjian, Zhongguo renda zhidu (The Institution of the Chinese People’s Congress) 
(Beijing: Falü chubanshe, 2003), 45. 
4 Because of the stipulation of “propaganda” in the 1979 electoral Law, many university students 
in Beijing University, Hunan Normal University, Zhejiang University and Shandong Normal 
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1986, the sixth NPC made the second amendment to electoral law. It increased the 
number of constituents who nominated the candidates from three to ten or more than ten. 
Meanwhile, it abolished the stipulation on “pre-election,” without any explanation.5 
The third change in the electoral law happened in 1995. There were important 
changes at this time, especially in the indirect election of deputies. Firstly, it added the 
“pre-election” criteria to the indirect election of deputies to LPCs. Moreover, it must be 
conducted under the condition of “difference voting” (Cha’e xuanju). Thus the “pre-
election” procedure has become a legal procedure in confirming the formal candidates in 
the indirect election. Secondly, it stipulated that the time for nominating any candidate in 
the indirect election can not be less than 2 days. This stipulation is to prevent local Party 
committees from swooping and distributing the name list of candidates to deputies only 
one or two hours before the election, thus the deputies would not have enough time to 
nominate their own candidates and the nomination by the Party could be passed 
successfully. Thirdly, in the past, some local Party committees were afraid of joint 
nomination from different delegations and censured it as an “illegal organization” activity. 
To rectify this problem, the law stipulated that different electorates or units can jointly 
nominate the candidates.6 
In 2004, during the 12th plenary session of the 10th NPC Standing Committee, the 
fourth revision on the electoral law was implemented. According to the amendment of the 
electoral law, a pre-election procedure will select the formal candidates in the direct 
                                                                                                                                                 
University conducted the campaign activities in the election in 1980. So this stipulation was 
abolished in 1982. Cai Dingjian, Zhongguo xuanju zhuangkuang de baogao (The Report on the 
Election Situation in China) (Beijing: Falü chubanshe, 2002), 16-17. 
5 However, the official excuse was that pre-election could increase work burden and some local 
places had replaced formal election with pre-election. Cai, op.cit., 14. 
6 More details on NPC and LPC Election Law (third revision) can be found in 
http://www.bjrd.gov.cn/qlbjrd/bjrd/ruleLook.asp?ruleID=139 (accessed December 5, 2005). 
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election of the deputies. It also sets stricter conditions for removal of deputies and 
introduces tougher punishment on those cheating in the election. More importantly, it 
stipulates that “the electoral committee may require the candidates to meet their 
constituents and answer their questions.”7 
 
2. Electoral Rules: Local Innovations  
With the promulgation of the second electoral law, every province, autonomous 
region or municipality has enacted its own rules on the electoral details accordingly. 
Some important innovations took place in a few provinces. For example, Guangdong is 
the only province in China which stipulates that the post of county-level electoral 
committee director must be occupied by the director or vice director of Standing 
Committee of People’s Congress at the same level. Meanwhile, Guangdong is a province 
which does not establish another electoral leadership organization under the party 
committee. This is quite significant because this stipulation emphasizes the role of 
People’s Congress in the election of deputies.8 Beside these, there are some tiny 
institutional changes in the electoral rules and stipulations in some provinces in China. 
Nomination of candidate 
According to the electoral law, there are two kinds of nominations: the 
nomination from all parties and social organizations and nomination from the 
constituents seconded by ten individuals. However, the electoral law doesn’t stipulate the 
maximum number of candidates that can be nominated by all parties and social 
                                                 
7 More details can be found in http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2004-
10/27/content_2146217.htm (accessed December 10, 2005) 
8 Shi Weimin and Lei Jingxuan, Zhijie xuanju: zhidu yu guocheng (Direct Election: Institution 
and Process) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1999), 299. 
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organizations. In fact, most of the provinces’ electoral rules do not give clear stipulations 
on this. However, in Beijing, Tianjing, Shanghai and Guangdong, the percentage of 
candidate nominated by all parties and social organizations, in general, cannot exceed 15 
or 20.9 So, under these stipulations, the constituents have higher chance to nominate their 
own candidates. 
Confirming the formal candidate 
Although the stipulation of “pre-election” was abolished from the electoral law in 
1986, some provinces still practice “pre-election” or even added some contents of “pre-
election” in their electoral rules. For example, in Beijing, Hebei, Guangdong, Hainan and 
Ningxia, the electoral rules stipulate that it should conduct “pre-election” when it is 
necessary. But in Beijing, Hebei, Hainan and Ningxia, they use the word “pre-election” 
directly. Only Guangdong uses the word “pre-election” ambiguously: if there are too 
many nominated candidates, it can use the way of putting up hands or voting to express 
suggestions, and then confirm the formal candidates according to the majority of 
constituents’ opinions.10 At least, this kind of stipulation can guarantee some limited 
fairness. Although the “pre-election” criteria was added in the amendment of the electoral 
law in 2004, the stipulation is still fuzzy and difficulty to put into practice.  
Introducing formal candidates to the constituents 
With more and more electoral experiences, some electorates have created various 
methods to introduce the candidates. For example, 20 provinces in China have stipulated 
that the electoral committee can organize the meeting between the candidates and 
                                                 
9 Shi Weimin, Gongxuan yu zhixuan: xiangzhen renda xuanju zhidu yanjiu (Open Election and 
Direct Election: A Study of Electoral System of Township People’s Congress) (Beijing: Zhongguo 
shehui kexue chubanshe, 2000), 68. 
10 Ibid, 69. 
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constituents. In reality, there are two kinds of forms. One stipulates that electoral unit 
must organize the candidate to meet the constituents and listen to their opinions and 
suggestions. Another form stipulates that electoral units can arrange for the formal 
candidates to meet constituents according to the constituents’ suggestion or demands. For 
example, electoral committees in Shanghai and Tianjing have printed and distributed the 
candidates’ introduction materials, and used the mass media to disseminate information. 
Meanwhile, they have arranged for the candidate to meet the constituents and deliver a 
brief speech.11  In fact, in some places, some candidates themselves have distributed their 
curriculum vitae to the constituents and visited their homes. 
This model of introducing the candidates is not a genuine “campaign,” but it 
portrays some kind of competitiveness in nature. This competitiveness, conditioned by 
today’s electoral system, is not free, neither equal at all, but it can provide some kind of 
free and open model for the election. The utilization of this model is not only the 
important reform of existing electoral procedure, but also marks an important step in 
progressing from limited competitiveness to genuine “campaign” in future.   
 
III. Struggling for More Choices in Direct Elections  
 
1. Constituents’ Increasing Demand for More Choices 
China has conducted the local election for more than 20 years. It cannot be denied 
that it is not completely free, fair and competitive. However, during this process, the 
constituents have learned a lot and their independent senses and expectations on 
democracy are improving. In fact, more and more constituents have begun to demand the 
                                                 
11 Shi & Lei, op.cit., 190-4. 
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right to know the truth about the elections and request the candidate’s selection process to 
be transparent.   
For example, it is reported by one Chinese newspaper that there were some 
constituents who strongly demanded to meet the candidates in one province during the 
election of local deputies. During the process of election, the constituents (university 
students) demanded to meet all candidates before they voted. However, two candidates 
could not meet the students at that time because they were away on business. Although 
the electoral committee tried to explain this situation to the students, some students still 
refused to vote and they said “we are just above 18 years old and this is the first time we 
exert our voting right. We must be responsible for ourselves. We must defend the right 
endowed by law… Although there is a brief introduction to the candidate, but we do not 
know whether he is tall or short, fat or thin, whether he can speak for the constituents, 
and his level of legislative participation. How can we vote?” Finally, after the student 
representatives telephoned and talked with the candidates, they voted.12 Similarly, during 
the process of Beijing 1999/2000 township deputy election, some constituents clearly put 
forward “three reasons for not voting”: “we don’t vote for the candidate when we know 
nothing about him, we don’t vote for a candidate who is incompetent, and who will not 




                                                 
12 More details could be found in Cai, op.cit., 51. 
13 Ibid. 
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2. Recent Independent Candidates14 in Shenzhen, Beijing and Hubei 
In the 1980s, some university students nominated themselves as the candidates 
and “campaigned” for the district-level People’s Congress deputy position in Beijing. At 
that time, eight students became the deputies in Haidian and Xicheng districts.15 After 
that, some independent candidates were elected directly by their constituents as deputies 
at the township and county-level deputy election. These elected deputies were not 
nominated by the Party, but supported by the constituents. However, these cases 
happened a long time ago, so the mass media and pubic did not give enough attention to 
them.  
In 1998, Yao Lifa was elected by the way of “write-in candidate” (Lingxuan taren) 
as the deputy of Qianjiang city, Hubei province. After he disclosed the illegal 
impeachment of members from the village committee in his city, the public and mass 
media began to pay attention to the independent candidates’ role. However, such cases 
were still rare in China at that time.16 
But this similar phenomenon began to attract public’s attention in 2003. In April 
and May 2003, more than ten self-nominated candidates wanted to participate 
independently in the deputy election in Shenzhen city. Under the agreement or 
acquiescence of basic level People’s Congresses, these candidates put up campaign 
                                                 
14 Independent candidates in this study are the candidates who nominate themselves and seek 
other constituents’ support. 
15 An Chen, Restructuring Political Power in China: Alliance and Opposition, 1978-98 (Boulder 
& London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), 66-7. 
16 Li Fan, Zhongguo jiceng minzhu fazhan baogao: 2003(Grassroots Democracy in China: 2003) 
(Beijing: Falü chubanshe, 2004), 6-7. 
 129 
advertisements and visited the constituents. At last, four of them were elected as the 
deputies of district People’s Congress in Shenzhen city.17 
After the Shenzhen election, Beijing also conducted its district-level People’s 
Congress election, and more than twenty candidates participated in the election 
independently. These candidates clearly put forward demands for the reform of 
nomination procedure, of confirming the formal candidate procedure and campaign. 
Compared with Shenzhen case, there were some changes in the caliber of candidates in 
Beijing. Besides some homeowners in Shenzhen city, there were some lawyer and 
university student candidates in Beijing. Finally, three of them were elected as deputies. 
Their motives were very clear: to become a deputy, to expand their social influence and 
political power, as well as to protect their own group’s interest.18  
In November 2003, there were 32 candidates from villages independently 
participating in the election of deputies to LPCs in the Qianjiang city, Hubei province. It 
is reported that they were influenced by the Yao Lifa’s legislative activity. However, only 
two of them became formal candidates and both lost the election.19 But in another Hubei 
city, Zhijiang, one ordinary peasant-Lu Banglie, learning from Yao Lifa and supported by 
local peasants, was elected as the city deputy finally.20  
These cases are sporadic in the whole country; so we cannot exaggerate their 
significance. However, a strong desire to protect their interest and rights drove these 
                                                 
17 More details can be found in Tang Juan and Zou Shubin, 2003 nian Shenzhen jingxuan shilu 
( The Recording of the Election in Shenzhen in 2003) (Xi’an: Xibei daxue chubanshe, 2004). 
18 More detail can be found in Zou Shubin, 2003 nian Beijing shi quxian jingxuan shilu(The 
Recording of the Election in Beijing in 2003) (Xi’an: Xibei daxue chubanshe, 2004). 
19 In local government’s eye, only one Yao has disturbed the government affair. If there are so 
many Yaos, the government would not work. Therefore, a few officials manipulated this election. 
Li Fan, op.cit., 16. 
20 Ibid. 
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candidates to compete for the posts of deputies to LPCs. Most of these self-nominated 
candidates have started to defend their economic rights such as property rights before 
they participated in the election of deputy. They hoped to increase political status to 
protect and promote their economic interest. More importantly, during the process of 
Shenzhen and Beijing elections, there were new electoral campaigning methods including 
the use of campaign flyers, the Internet posters, and even public speeches. One candidate 
in Beijing even created a campaign office that was staffed with university students to 
attract mass media’s attention and win over potential voters.21 
With the development of the market economy and less constraint from the 
traditional Danwei system, more and more citizens would like to participate in the 
election of deputy and play an important role in LPCs. In fact, to satisfy the new demand 
of these candidates, the Standing Committees of People’s Congresses in Guangdong 
province and Shenzhen city have made the new stipulation in explicit terms that the 
constituent can use any methods that the law does not forbid in the election.22   
However, there is no written official record of the percentage of deputies 
nominated by the constituents. In general, there are some statistics on the percentage of 
the primary candidates and formal candidates nominated by the constituents. In fact, the 
percentage of primary candidates nominated by the constituents was very high. But after 
the “repeated deliberation, discussion and consultation”, the percentage of formal 
candidates nominated by the constituents would become very low. Some Chinese 
scholars have made some statistics on the percentage of deputies who were nominated by 
the constituents in the direct election. Their statistics show that there is a big difference 
                                                 
21 More details can be found in Zou, op.cit.  
22 My interview in Guangzhou city, Guangdong province, May 2004. 
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among the percentage of deputies nominated by constituents at the township or county 
level in some provinces. (See Table 4.1 and 4.2) So we cannot generalize definitively the 
whole situation in China. But my survey result shows that at the county level there were 
only 8.6 percent of deputies who were nominated by their constituents (direct election).  
T able 4.1: The Percentage of Deputies Nominated by Constituents, Party (Social 





Party nomination Write-in candidate 
Beijing(1996) 83.47% 16.24% 0.29% 
Shandong(1999) 27.47% 72.01% 0.52% 
Tianjing(2002) 85.03% 14.54% 0.43% 
Hebei(2002) 14.93% 84.75% 0.32% 
Guangdong(2002/3) 70.5% 29.5%  
National (2002) 52.65% 46.98% 0.37% 
 
Sources: Liu Zhi, Shuju xuanju: renda daibiao xuanju tongji yanjiu (Election Data: A 
Statistical Study of Election of Deputy) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 
2001), 181-182; Shi Weimin, Guifan xuanju: 2001-2002 xiangji renda daibiao xuanju 
yanjiu (Regulating Election: A Study of 2001-2 County- level People's Congress Deputy 
Election) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2003), 387-390; Tang Juan, 
Zhongguo zhengzhi xuanju fazhan de hongguan fenxi-cong wenben yu shjian liangge 
jiaodu kan (An Analysis of the Development of China Political Election) (unpublished 
Chinese paper). 
 
 Table 4.2: The Percentage of Deputies Nominated by Constituents, Party (Social 





Party nomination Write-in candidate 
Shandong (1997/1998) 28.13% 71.13% 0.14% 
Guangdong(1997/1998) 60.90% 38.74% 0.36% 
Yunnan (1997/1998) 74.55% 25.28% 0.17% 
Beijing(1997/1998) 84.17% 15.81% 0.02% 
Guangdong(2002/3) 62.2% 37.3%  
Anhui(2003) 20.42% 79.58%  
 
Source: Liu, op.cit., 181-182; Tang, op.cit.  
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IV. Deputies’ Struggle in Indirect Elections 
 
Direct election is only one part of China’s electoral system, not the most 
important one. Since the level of direct election is very low, only at the township and 
county levels, it cannot play a crucial role in national political life. On the contrary, 
indirect election is the most important part of China’s electoral system, but it is not open 
and still strictly controlled by the Party. In fact, indirect election is always conducted 
within a small range and especially within an indoor enclosure strictly controlled by the 
Party committee at different levels. In general, the ordinary people do not know much 
about this process. Therefore, “…the higher the level of congress, the more distant the 
election of its deputies from the ordinary people.”23 
Even in the electoral law, there are only a few stipulations on the indirect election. 
For example, article 29 of electoral law stipulates that a candidate in indirect election is 
produced by the nomination of electoral unit. Therefore, all parties, mass organizations 
can jointly or separately nominate candidates. Ten or more than ten deputies can also 
nominate the candidates. However, in reality, there is a lot of ambiguity and different 
versions of stories regarding the indirect election in China.24 In fact, most of the indirect 
elections are basically something of a formality. In general, deputies passively pass the 
“suggested” name list (even though they know nothing about the candidates25) from the 
                                                 
23 An Chen, op.cit., 76. 
24 J. Bruce Jacobs, “Elections in China,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 25 (January 
1991): 188-193; Roderick Macfarquhar, “Reports from the Field: Provincial People’s 
Congresses,” The China Quarterly 155 (September 1998): 664-5; An Chen, op.cit., 73-83.  
25 For example, it is ironical and absurd that Liang Feng was elected as the deputy of Guangzhou 
People’s Congress by Panyu People’s Congress during his “Two Regulations (Shuanggui)”-
intense questioning in a designated place at a designated time, an extrajudicial form of detention, 
used against CCP members who are deemed to have broken internal Party rules. More details can 
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presidium of Local People’s Congress nominated by the Party committee at the same 
level.  
To better understand the whole story behind the process of indirect election, let us 
use the election of the deputies to provincial People’s Congress as an example. Before 
every election, the Standing Committee of provincial People’s Congress distributes the 
quota of deputy and name list of “participating (or capped) deputies” to the Standing 
Committee of city-level People’s Congresses.26  Then, the Standing Committee of city 
People’s Congress reports the quota of deputy to the city Party committee. According to 
the quota, the Organization Department of city Party committee confirms the preliminary 
name list of candidates and introduces it to the presidium of city People’s Congress. Next, 
the presidium hears the introduction and takes a vote. The presidium generally passes the 
name list of candidates suggested by the Organization Department of city Party 
committee. Lastly, the presidium distributes this suggested name list to the deputies and 
organizes them to discuss and vote. Therefore, the local Party committee plays a leading 
role in nominating and confirming the candidates of deputies in indirect elections. 
According to electoral law, deputies can nominate their candidates. However, 
there are many obstacles preventing them from nominating candidates in indirect election. 
Firstly, they do not have enough time to nominate candidates. In general, the local Party 
committee can spend a lot of time on nominating candidates. However, only after the 
                                                                                                                                                 
be found in http://news.tom.com/Archive/1002/2003/5/9-50422.html (accessed December 25, 
2005). 
26 The “participating (or capped) deputies” include main responsible person from provincial Party 
committee, provincial government, democratic parties, and mass organizations and other people 
who must be considered for the post of deputy. If these people lose in the election (certainly, this 
kind of situation is nearly impossible), the city People’s Congress cannot occupy and elect other 
people as the deputy. The Standing Committee of provincial People’s Congress would take back 
the quota. 
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plenary session enters into the election process and the deputies know the name list 
nominated by the Party, can the deputies nominate their own candidates. Under this 
circumstance, deputies only have at most two days to nominate and so they do not have 
enough time to communicate with each other. In my fieldwork, some deputies’ reactions 
to this were very vehement. 
Secondly, in indirect elections, the biggest problem is that the deputies can not 
jointly nominate candidates independently. Even actively participating in the nomination, 
they were always prevented by the Party. For example, to guarantee realizing the Party’ s 
arrangement intention, some leaders from organization department of local Party 
committee and LPC would deliver the speech to the CCP members among the deputies 
before the plenary session and demand them to guarantee that the Party’s intention and 
CCP  members must follow the Party’s nomination. During the process of election, some 
Party committees even distributed flyers on the “the Notice of Strengthening the 
Organization’s Discipline during the Election of Deputies to People’s Congress.” 27  In all, 
they would do their best to prevent the CCP members from nominating the candidates 
independently.  
However, as noted above, when some candidates in direct election nominated by 
their constituents (and a few self-nominated candidates) were elected as the deputies and 
could enter into the basic level People’s Congress, they have begun to play a more active 
role in electing the higher-level deputies. In fact, the objections from these deputies have 
become stronger and stronger. In general, these deputies have strong participation sense, 
care and concern for their constituents Therefore, when they elect the higher level 
deputies, they are not so obedient to follow the name list nominated by the Party, but they 
                                                 
27 Cai, op.cit., 56. 
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would elect the candidates who truly represent constituent’s interest and nominated by 
themselves. 
Therefore, not all the deputies followed the recommendation of the Party. Some 
deputies persisted in nominating their own candidates and sometimes they strongly 
opposed the candidates nominated by the Party. At this time, the organization department 
of Party committee would come out and “do some work” and force the CCP members to 
drop out of their nomination. If the CCP member was nominated as the candidate, the 
Party would “do some work” and request the member to declare that he would give up 
the nomination as a candidate automatically, thus making the nomination by the deputies 
of no effect. Even worse, when the Party “lost control” in the election in some places and 
the candidate nominated independently by the deputies won the election, or someone 
“jumped from the voting box” unexpectedly, the Party committee had no choice but 
acknowledge the result. However, after this “failed” election, the Party committees in 
some places would stealthily investigate the responsibilities of the head of People’s 
Congress or the deputies who participated in the nomination. 
Facing the challenge from these active deputies, the Party has begun to adopt 
another measure to control the indirect election in LPCs. For example, when conducting 
the election of deputies to one district People’s Congress in Beijing, every delegation 
would receive the “suggested” name list from the presidium. However, the Party divided 
the “suggested” name list of candidates into three groups, and the name list nominated by 
the deputies was listed independently. So there were three groups in the name list:  the 
candidates in group A coming from the city level, must be elected. The candidates in 
Group B coming from the district level also must be elected. Group C, including some 
 136 
unimportant person, only accounted for about 20-30 percent. After the temporary Party 
group meeting, the secretary of delegation would tell the deputies which of the candidate 
belongs to group A or B or C. If the deputies wanted to make any amendments, they 
could only choose from group C, but not from group A and B. At the same time, the 
Party would “do some work” in the name of “organization”, and make some “marks” on 
the name list from Group A and B nominated by organization departments from city and 
district Party committees. The deputies must elect the candidates according to these 
“marks.” Without doubt, using this method of “organization control,” the Party could get 
all candidates it favored to be elected successfully. However, because of the active 
deputies’ objections, every time there were always some candidates nominated by 
deputies elected.28   
Like the direct election, there are almost no official statistics on the percentage of 
deputies nominated by “non-official” way in the indirect election. But the percentage 
should be very low. One scholar from Chinese Academy of Social Sciences conducted 
careful research in records and other related documents to see if provincial deputies ever 
nominated any deputy to the NPC. He finally found only one example. In 1997, Shanghai 
Municipal People’s Congress met to elect sixty-five deputies to the 9th NPC. The Party 
committee of Shanghai offered fifty-five candidates. National Party organization offered 
twelve candidates. The deputies nominated fifty-seven candidates. Eventually one of the 
fifty-seven candidates nominated by the deputies won the election.29  
However, there are still some sporadic official statistics on the percentage of 
deputies nominated by “non-official” way in the indirect election. For example, in 1988, 
                                                 
28 Yangguang xianzheng baogao (The Open Constitution Initiative Report), no. 2.  
29 Jiang Jinsong, The National People’s Congress of China (Beijing: Beijing Foreign Languages 
Press, 2002), 109-110. 
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2,970 deputies to the 7th NPC were elected by provincial congressional deputies. Only 
twenty-eight (0.94%) of the NPC deputies were originally nominated by provincial 
deputies.30 During the election of deputies to the 9th NPC, one candidate nominated by 
the deputies in Hubei province was elected.31  
According to Chinese scholars’ statistics, in the election of deputies to the 9th 
provincial People’s Congresses of Sichuan and Anhui, the percentage of deputies 
nominated by their constituents (deputies) was 2.15 (19/885) and 2.75 (20/728) 
respectively. In the election of deputies to 10th provincial People’s Congresses of 
Guangdong, Shanxi, and Hubei, the percentage of deputies nominated by the constituents 
(deputies) was 0.38(3/785), 6.19(34/549) and 0.27(1/372) respectively.32 During the 
election of deputies to 11th Beijing People’s Congress (1998), 94.9 percent of deputies 
were nominated by the Party and social organizations and only 5.1 percent were 
nominated by their constituents (deputies).33 In the election of deputies to city-level 
People Congresses in Guangdong province in 2002/2003, only 1.2 percent of deputies 
were nominated by their constituents.34 
In my survey (N=120), only 11.1 percent of provincial deputies and 9.5 percent of 
city deputies were nominated and elected by their constituents (or deputies in indirect 
                                                 
30 Quanguo renda changweihui bangongting yanjiushi (Research Centre of General Office of 
Standing Committee of NPC), Renmin daibiao dahui zhidu jianshe sishi nian (40 Years’ 
Construction of People's Congress System) (Beijing: Zhongguo minzhu fazhi chubanshe, 1991), 
200-201. 
31 Shi Weimin, Jianjie xuanju: I (Indirect Election: Vol I) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue 
chubanshe, 2004), 225. 
32 Ibid, 292-293. 
33 Li Buyun, Difang renda daibiao zhidu yanjiu (A Study of Local People’s Congress System) 
(Changsha: Hunan Daxue Chubanshe, 2002), 183. 
34 Tang Juan, Zhongguo zhengzhi xuanju fazhan de hongguan fenxi-cong wenben yu shjian 
liangge jiaodu kan(An Analysis of the Development of China Political Election) (unpublished 
Chinese paper). 
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election).At three levels, only 9.2% percent of deputies were nominated by their 
constituents. (See Table 4.3 below) 




Nomination  Total 
 Level of People’s 
congress Official  
Non- 
official   
 province 16 2 18 
    88.9% 11.1% 100.0% 
  city 19 2 21 
    90.5% 9.5% 100.0% 
  county 74 7 81 
    91.4% 8.6% 100.0% 
Total 109 11 120 
  90.8% 9.2% 100.0% 
Note: (1) Official nomination includes parties and social organizations. 
          (2) Non-official includes constituents (or deputies in indirect election) and self-
nomination. 
 
V. The Quality of Deputies and Legislative Participation 
 
Elections over the last more than two decades have altered the composition of 
deputies in LPCs, therefore, I will analyze these personal and social characteristics of 
deputies to see what changes have occurred, and discuss some factors that would affect 
the behavior of deputies’ legislative participation in LPCs. 
Age 
We can not deny that more and more younger deputies have entered into the 
People’s Congresses at all levels. For example, at the provincial level, the percentage of 
deputies above 56 years old decreased from 30.42 in 1988 to 22.50 in 1999. But the 
percentage of deputies above 56 still exceeded the percentage of deputies below 35. 
However, at the city, county and township levels, the percentage of deputies below 35 
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years old exceeded the percentage of deputies above 65. In all, the percentage of deputies 
at 35-55 at these four levels was more than or nearly 70 (See Table 4.4 below).  
Table 4.4: Structural Change on the Age at Four-level People’s Congress in China 
(in percent) 
 
Age  year province city county township 
1988 9.55 15.19 18.46 27.38 
1993 6.54 11.35 17.29 25.93 
1998 8.06 13.31 19.23 27.54 
Below 35 
1999 8.06 13.31 19.23 26.79 
1988 60.03 70.61 71.90 66.15 
1993 68.26 73.68 74.10 67.16 
1998 69.44 76.08 74.79 66.72 
36-55 
1999 69.44 76.08 74.79 67.65 
1988 30.42 14.20 9.64 6.47 
1993 25.20 14.97 8.61 6.91 
1998 22.50 10.61 5.98 5.74 
Above 56 
1999 22.50 10.61 5.98 5.56 
 
Source: Liu, op.cit., 289  
 
Regrettably, I omitted the factor of age in my survey questionnaire. Therefore, I 
do not have enough evidence to show whether the younger deputies are more active than 
the older ones or not. However, my survey clearly shows that the more times deputies are 
elected, the more active they are in visiting constituents and submitting motions. It should 
be noted that the percentage of members without any previous legislative experience is 
comparatively high among the LPCs. The turnover rate in the LPCs to date has exceeded 
60 percent. Such a large proportion of new members may have an adverse effect on the 
operation of LPCs.  
Education 
The education level of deputies has changed gradually during the recent years. 
However, the percentage of deputies who are university graduates at the county and 
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township level is still below the percentage of middle school graduates. Yet at the city 
and provincial levels, most members are well-educated and more than 60 percent of 
members are university graduates (See Table 4.5 below).  
 Table 4.5: The Education Level of Deputy at Four-level People’s Congress in China 
(in percent) 
 







1981 county                5.38 4.69 43.09 40.05 6.79 
province              44.48           49.54            5.98 
city              34.54           57.06            8.40 
county              17.18           64.53          18.29 
1988 
township              3.61           62.90          33.49 
province             56.68 13.90 25.95 3.43 0.04 
city             44.82 17.61 32.07 5.36 0.14 
county             22.19  18.87 46.13 12.42 0.39 
1993 
township              5.77  13.06 55.08 26.64 1.45 
province 38.97 34.08 17.80 7.65            1.50 
city 25.41 36.50 24.33 11.46             2.30 
county 9.79 26.58 32.45 25.72              5.46 
1998 
township                8.60 33.83                 57.57 
1999 township               13.09 34.84                 52.07 
 
Source: Liu, op.cit., 313. 
 
 But it should be noted that the above statistics can not reflect the true situation in 
China. In China, there are so many “fake diplomas.”  
Party Affiliation 
 As I argued in the Chapter 3, we can not judge one’s political preferences by 
merely identifying his Party membership in China, although a Party member has to face 
lots of constraints that a non-party member normally does not have to deal with. In fact, 
my survey result shows that the deputies who are described as intellectuals and are 
members of democratic party are more likely to be active in visiting constituents, 
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submitting the motions and appraising, inquiring and interrogating the government.35 
Maybe because most of them were nominated by their constituents, they have stronger 
motivation to be active in the legislative participation.  
Indeed, on the one hand, as the democratic party member, they have enough time 
and energy to conduct the legislative participation because of their occupations. In 
general, as the members of democratic party, they have relatively relaxed work. On the 
other hand, they face lower political risks because they do not have direct interest 
relations with the Party and government. In fact, most of democratic party members are 
professionals. By virtue of the favorable market position embodied in their specialized 
skills and knowledge, these deputies have more autonomy in their lives. They do not 
depend completely upon the state for all their goods and services. Compared with the 
ordinary citizens, these professionals have more choice when they face political 
interference, as one deputy activist-Wang Zeke said he did not worry about somebody’s 
“retaliation,” because “as a deputy, speaking for the constituents is my responsibility. I do 
not want to demand anything. I was afraid of ‘wearing the small shoes’ before. But today 
in the market economy, there are lots of ‘shoes’ I can wear.”36 
                                                 
35 In general, people always think that non-CCP deputies (most of them coming from the 
democratic party) are more active in the legislative participation because they have stronger 
democratic sense than other deputies. But we do not have enough evidence to testify whether they 
have stronger democratic sense. The following paragraph focusing on the deputies belong to 
democratic parties, is different from the Chapter 3 which focuses on the CCP–member deputies. 
36 Wang Zecu is one of the most famous deputies among the 500 members of Guangzhou city 
People's Congress. It is said that a lot of government department officials are “sensitive” to his 
name because he is good at supervising the government. Wang was elected as the deputy in 1998. 
At that time, he felt very free as a deputy and he thought that the ordinary people would have no 
complaint on the government because of Guangzhou’s good economic growth. However, only 
when somebody asked him: “the government has invested so huge money in the subway, 
however, did he consult you on this important event?”, did Wang begin to realize the importance 
as a deputy in Guangzhou. Wang has became a legislative activist gradually and interpelled 
against the government many times. Many government officials felt “headache” about Wang’s 
behavior. Zhou Qiong, “Guangzhou shiyi jie renda wunian huigu (Reflections on Five Years’ 
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Occupation  
When studying the deputy’s legislative participation, social or occupational 
background is another factor people always consider.37 Occupational background is a key 
indictor of socio-economic status. However, to examine the deputies’ occupational 
tendency in more detail, it should be noted that they have a variety of professional or 
occupational backgrounds. So, one major problem with occupational data is that 
occupational categories themselves are broad and imprecise. Especially, with the change 
in Chinese social structure, there are some outdated occupational categories in China.  
For example, in the official statistics, the percentage of peasant deputies is very 
high; however, in fact, the “cadre” deputies account for a large proportion of the peasant 
deputies. If we conduct analysis on the peasant deputies further, we can find that the 
members of peasant deputies are members of village party group (secretary, member), 
members of village committee (director, vice director, woman director and accountant) 
and head of village. In peasants’ view, they are all “cadres.” Under this structure of 
deputies, the plenary session of People’s Congress at the county level has almost become 
the condensed “three cadres meeting.”38 
There are similar situations in the group of “workers”. The group of “workers” 
should include enterprise management staff, technical personnel, and front line workers. 
However, there are very few real front line workers who can be elected as deputies. In 
                                                                                                                                                 
Experience of 11th Guangzhou People's Congress),”Xin kuai bao (New Express) (Guangzhou), 
November 25, 2002 and http://www.ycwb.com/gb/content/2002-11/25/content_456829.htm 
(accessed December 25, 2005). 
37 Young Nam Cho, “Pubic Supervisors and Reflectors: Role Fulfillment of the Chinese People’s 
Congress Deputies in the Market Socialism Era,” Development and Society 32, no. 2 (December 
2003): 197-227. 
38 In Chinese village, cadres from county (district), township (street) and village often together 
attend one meeting which is called the “three cadres meeting.” A lot of work in the countryside 
has been deployed and promoted by “three cadres meeting.” 
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fact, some of deputies classified under the group of “workers” are “cadres,” technical 
personnel, and management staff. Therefore, it is inappropriate to use this factor to 
measure the deputies’ legislative participation.  
Forms of nomination 
 It is no deny that the some factors have important influences on the deputies’ 
legislative activism. I use the multiple linear regression analysis to test these factors’ 
effect on the degree of deputies’ legislative activism. I recode the following factors into 
dummy variables: the variable (education level) into a dummy variable (=0, if a deputy 
don’t have a university or post graduate diploma, =1, if a deputy has a university or post 
graduate diploma), the variable (party affiliation) into a dummy variable (=0,  if a deputy 
is non-CCP member, =1, otherwise), the variable (legislative experience)into a dummy 
variable( =0, if a deputy is elected more than one time, =1, if a deputy is elected for the 
first time), the variable (the form of nomination) into a dummy variable(=0, if a deputy is 
not nominated by constituents, =1, if a deputy is nominated by constituents). The 
regression estimates are presented in Appendix 2. 
 As expected, the independent variable-the form of nomination has a significant 
(p=.000) and large effect on the degree of deputies’ legislative activism. Legislative 
experience also significantly affects the degree of deputies’ legislative activism. However, 
party affiliation and education level have no significant effect on the degree of deputies’ 
legislative activism.  
 In fact, these deputies nominated by their constituents (or the deputies in indirect 
election) are the most active in all delegations in the LPCs. They tend to put forward 
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sharp questions and make the government answerable to the people. Therefore, these 
deputies have played a substantial role in legislative participation in LPCs. 
 
VI. Conclusion  
 
According to the experience of other countries, the election competitiveness can 
attract constituents’ interest and increase the deputy’s sense of responsibility.39 Therefore, 
if the election is carried out with real choice, serious nomination procedures, multiple 
candidates, there should be significant changes in the structure and quality of deputies.  
Although the local Party committee and government have basically controlled the 
election by informal and formal institutional mechanisms, nevertheless, some reforms 
and institutional innovations in the electoral system of LPC are beneficial to the openness 
and competitiveness of election; two examples of the institutional innovation are the use 
of nomination by more than ten constituents and “difference voting” (Cha’e xuanju). 
Meanwhile, more and more constituents have begun to demand the right to know the 
truth on the election and more open procedures to be used. Some of them have begun to 
nominate themselves and were elected as deputies successfully. More importantly, in the 
indirect election, more and more deputies nominated by the constituents have begun to 
nominate their own constituents. Under this circumstance, some candidates nominated by 
the constituents were elected as deputies.  
 The CCP always emphasizes the importance of age, education level in selecting 
the deputies. This has created some misunderstandings among the common people on the 
                                                 
39 D. Altman and A. Pérez-Liñán, “Assessing the Quality of Democracy: Freedom, 
Competitiveness and Participation in Eighteen Latin American Countries,” Democratization 9, no. 
2 (Summer 2002): 85-100. 
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deputy’s quality in China. They always think that a “new breed” of deputies younger, 
better educated would be more active than their predecessors. However, the regression 
analysis suggestions that forms of nomination, community pressure, individual 
preference and legislative experience significantly affect the degree of deputies’ 
legislative activism and these factors can explain 53% of variation of legislative activism. 
Education level has no significant effect on the degree of deputies’ legislative activism.  
My survey finding has showed that the percentage of candidates nominated by the 
constituents (or deputies in the indirect election) and thereafter elected as deputies is very 
small, but once they are elected, they are more likely to be active in legislative 
participation in LPCs. And the multiple linear regressions can also test this.
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Chapter Five     Motivations, Preferences, Community Pressure and Deputies’ 
Active Legislative Participation in LPCs 
 
I. Introduction  
 
Because of the electoral reform on the nomination and “difference voting” (Cha’e 
xuanju), some candidates nominated by their constituents were elected as the deputies, 
although the percentage is still very small compared to the “official” candidates. 
However, my study shows that most of the legislative participation activists are these 
deputies nominated directly by their constituents. So we need to know the causal 
mechanism between the election and deputies’ legislative participation. In a democracy 
polity, re-election, career advancement and policy influence are three main goals 
motivating the legislators into legislative activism. Basically, getting re-elected is the 
legislators’ central goal because the legislators are professional in a democratic polity. 
Therefore, career (re-election) pressure forces the legislator to actively participate in the 
legislative activities. However, due to different institutional arrangement, this factor is 
not the main reason for the activism of deputies in China. Unlike the legislators in the 
democratic polity, the work of a deputy is basically amateurish, not professional in nature. 
The deputy does not need to worry about the career (re-election) pressure. 
Therefore, we need to know more about what compels these active deputies to 
devote their time and energy to the legislative participation, sometimes incurring 
unnecessary costs and risks. In attempting to explain the sustained sacrifices these active 
deputies make, it is necessary for us to explore the motivations behind their behavior. In 
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fact, a satisfactory understanding of deputy activists’ motivations could provide a 
powerful analytical tool for explaining why deputies behave differently in the legislative 
participation in China. Therefore, two questions must be answered in this chapter: (1) 
how are “motivations” to be defined? And (2) what “motivations” or “incentives” 
actually exist for these active deputies? Then, I will examine the preference ordering of 
the deputies and assess the effect of the community pressure on the deputies’ preferences 
in the legislative participation. 
 
II. The Definition of Motivation 
 
In the political participation literature, Peter B. Clark and James Q. Wilson’s 
typology of incentives has been widely cited. Clark and Wilson categorize the 
motivations as “material”, “solidary” or “purposive” in character. Material involves the 
tangible rewards that have a monetary value or which can easily be translated into the 
rewards that have such a value such as wages, reduced taxes and increased property 
values. Solidary involves the rewards that derive from social interaction, such as the 
opportunity to socialize, to gain social prestige, and to express a sense of organization 
identification. And purposive involves suprapersonal goals of the organization and 
includes bettering the community, doing one’s duty, and feeling a sense of 
responsibility.1  
However, the application of this framework to study the motivations of the 
deputies is problematic in the Chinese context. Clearly, “material” gains are less relevant 
                                                 
1 Clark Peter B. and James Q. Wilson, “Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organizations,” 
Administrative Science Quarterly 6, no. 2 (September 1961): 129-166. 
 148 
or basically irrelevant in the deputies’ active legislative participation in China. The 
“solidary” and “purposive” motivations mainly involve the non-material aspects. If we 
make further divisions, the “solidary” motivation could be self-interested and 
“purposive” could be altruistic in nature. Under this circumstance, the motivation can be 
defined as “the specific emotional needs which individuals seek to fill, or the satisfactions 
they get, through political participation.”2 As far as the deputy’s legislative participation 
in China is concerned, I will make simple distinction between personalized (or self-
interest) explanations of activism (e.g., a desire for recognition, personal political 
ambition) and altruistic motives (e. g., a sense of responsibility towards constituents). 
However, the motivations of deputies are more complex than any dichotomy between 
altruism and self-interest implies.  
 
III. Motivation Types among the Active Deputies in Legislative Participation  
 
One of the greatest weaknesses of China’s election system is that most candidates 
for the deputies were nominated by the Party. Meanwhile, the election is carried out 
without real choice and competition. Therefore, a large number of people without 
motivation to be deputies were passively nominated by the Party and elected as the 
deputies. Under this circumstance, undemocratic election system directly determines the 
attitudes and behaviors of deputies. In fact, most of the deputies nominated by the Party 
have no motivation to actively attend legislative participation in LPCs. As noted in 
Chapter 2, it is only a sizable minority of the deputies who choose to become actively 
                                                 
2 I borrow this definition of “motivation” from Payne and Woshinsky. James L. Payne and Oliver 
H. Woshinsky, “Incentives for Political Participation,” World Politics 24, no. 4 (July 1972): 519. 
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involved in legislative participation. Among these active deputies, most of them were 
nominated by their constituents as I have explained in Chapter 4. 
However, it is understandable that even if some deputies were nominated by the 
Party, they still may be active because they feel a deep sense of responsibility towards the 
public. Strictly speaking, some of these active deputies nominated by the Party are 
selfless in nature. As Kevin J. O’Brien explained that some of these active deputies may 
be “the public-spirited, good government promoters found in every society (the author’s 
emphasis)…” and …have a strong civic awareness and willingly accept public 
responsibilities.”3   
These deputies actively engage in legislative participation, not because of the 
calculation of personal interest or a sense of responsibility toward their constituents, but 
because they are interested in the legislative work and have the inner motivations to do so. 
With regards to legislative participation, they sense the public demand and naturally 
enjoy public recognition and approval as responses to their devotion to duty. Therefore, 
their motivations are more altruistic and less narrowly self- interested than are those of 
the majority of deputies. But the main impetus for them is the civic sense they carry 
within them in nature and not anything that impinges from the outside.   
For example, Mr. Zhang, a worker in one factory in Guangzhou city, was 
nominated as the candidate by the local Party committee and elected as a deputy to 
Yuexiu district People’s Congress in 1984. Because of his excellent performance in the 
legislative participation, he was elected as a “deputy activist’ by the Standing Committee 
of district People’s Congress in 2000. Mr. Zhang’s father came from northern China and 
                                                 
3 Kevin J. O’Brien, “Agents and Remonstrators: Role Accumulation by Chinese People’s 
Congress Deputies,” The China Quarterly 138 (June 1994): 359-80. 
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was the member of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. After The People’s Republic 
of China was founded in 1949, his family went down south to Guangzhou city with the 
armed forces. Mr. Zhang grew up in the army yard and was imbued a sense of justice 
from his childhood. He likes to be of help when any unfair thing happens. People in his 
community always liked to seek Mr. Zhang’s help when they were in “hot water” even 
before he became the deputy. After he became the district deputy, more and more 
constituents asked for his help. During my fieldwork, when I asked “what motivates you 
to actively engage in the legislative participation?”, he answered, “maybe because I have 
public responsibility in my nature (the author added). You know, I like to help other 
people ever since my childhood. When I see any unfairness, I would interfere and help. 
Even if I were not a deputy, if I encounter something unfair, I would help too. Even if 
people outside of community need help, I would also help them.”4 
In general, deputies like Mr. Zhang develop their inner selfless spirit from their 
family or education experience. Before they were nominated by the Party and elected as 
deputies, they were activists in their communities. However, it is reasonable to believe 
that personal interests and a desire to pursue those interests constitute a powerfully 
motivating force for most of these active deputies nominated by the Party.  
 
1. Self-interest Motivation 
Kevin J. O’Brien identifies five personal motivations for remonstrating: 
“obligation; community respect and notoriety; enhancing autonomy and status; involving 
policy-making and implementation; developing valuable connection and contact.”5  
                                                 
4 My interview in Guangzhou city, Guangdong, February 2004. 
5 O’Brien, op.cit., 359-80. 
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Strictly speaking, the motivation of “obligation” can be attributed to selfless in nature as 
noted above. The active deputy might have this kind of motivation regardless of whether 
he was nominated by Party or by his constituents. It is very rare for the deputies to be 
active in legislative participation such as “involving policy-making and 
implementation.”6 Therefore, the personal motivations of most of the active deputies, 
especially those nominated by the Party, could be re-classified into the other three kinds. 
In the following, I will give some illustrative examples. 
Self –satisfaction for prestige and respect 
For some deputies, actively attending the legislative participation can result in 
gaining the respect of some colleagues or friends, winning a reputation within special 
community, and gratifying one’s ego.  
For example, Mr. Yang, Professor of one university in Guangzhou city, returned 
to Guangdong province in 1960’s from another country. Because of his overseas Chinese 
identity, Mr. Yang was nominated by the Party and elected as the provincial deputy in 
1990’s. At the beginning, as a deputy, he knew nothing about the legislative participation. 
However, a few years ago, his colleagues in the provincial People’s Congress invited him 
to attend one interpellation case against one government department. The interpellation 
proved a great success for them. Guangdong TV stations and other newspapers 
interviewed them on this interpellation case. After that, Professor Yang began to realize 
the importance of the deputy’s role and actively attended all kinds of legislative 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
6 For example, in his article, Young Nam Cho argues that “intellectual legislators and some cadre 
deputies tend to focus on the policy-providing role,” not involving policy-making and 
implementation. Young Nam Cho, “Pubic Supervisors and Reflectors: Role Fulfillment of the 
Chinese People’s Congress Deputies in the Market Socialism Era,” Development and Society 32, 
no. 2 (December 2003): 197-227. 
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participation activities. Meanwhile, when mass media had some “hot issues,” they would 
seek Professor Yang’s opinion. Gradually, Professor Yang became a famous deputy in 
Guangdong province. As he said, “ten years ago, I could not imagine that I would 
become so famous and win the prestige and respect from people. When they (media) 
have some issues, they always interview me. So I must cherish this fame as a deputy, and 
prepare for everything and actively attend the legislative activities Meanwhile, I always 
express my opinion on the TV program or newspaper. So I have become very famous in 
our university and people here always seek my help when they have trouble. Anyway, I 
am very proud of that. Meanwhile, I enjoy this respect.”7 
Developing valuable connections and contacts  
For some of the deputies, active involvement in the legislative life offers a 
platform for establishing some kind of social links in China. In a sense, the position of a 
deputy provides them the opportunity to get to know a lot of people. This is especially 
true when private entrepreneurs and government officials are elected as deputies. 
Nothing illustrates China’s progress towards capitalism as tangibly as the rise of 
its rich, especially the private entrepreneurs. Private enterprises began to appear as early 
as 1980s in China, but at that time it was politically impossible for the Party leadership to 
acknowledge and legitimise them. Today, with the growing economic power, private 
entrepreneurs are becoming politically conscious and attempting to pursue their political 
inclinations, especially in local communities. Actually, China is beginning to provide 
opportunities for private entrepreneurs to participate politically. For example, the CCP is 
                                                 
7 My own interview in Guangzhou city, Guangdong province, May 2004. 
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making an effort to encourage the private entrepreneurs to join the CCP and would even 
consider nominating private entrepreneurs to serve on LPCs and even in the NPC.8 
Evidence also shows that there is an increasing interest for the private 
entrepreneurs to become deputies at all levels. One survey shows that more than 80 
percent of the sampled entrepreneurs “would like to” be a deputy. Only 12 percent of 
them have no interest.9  In fact, as Kristen Parris said, in China, “business owners in some 
counties have organized themselves informally to promote their own candidates for 
nomination and election as People’s Congress deputies.”10 
In fact, more and more private entrepreneurs are becoming members of People’s 
Congress at different levels. For example, “in 1993 over 5400 private entrepreneurs had 
been selected as representatives in the People’s Congresses at the county level or above, 
and 8 percent of representatives were selected to Eighth National People’ Congress.”11 
As Minxin Pei writes, “From 1997 to 2002, more than 9,000 private businessmen were 
selected to be delegates to local People’s Congresses at and above the county level.”12 
In 2002, 48 private entrepreneurs were elected as national deputies and 372 were 
elected as provincial deputies in Guangdong province. In 2004, one entrepreneur was 
                                                 
8 More details can be found in Bruce J. Dickson, Red Capitalists in China: The Party, Private 
Entrepreneurs, and Prospects for Political Change (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2003). 
9 Thomas Heberer, Private Entrepreneurs in China and Vietnam: Social and Political 
Functioning of Strategic Groups, translated by Timothy J. Gluckman (Lei den; Boston: Brill, 
2003), 299. 
10 Kristen Parris, “The Rise of Private Business Interests,” in The Paradox of China’s Post-Mao 
Reforms, ed. Merle Goldman and Roderick MacFarquhar (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1999), 274. 
11 Zhang Houyi, “Siying qiyezhu qunti zai woguo shehui jiegou zhong de diwei (The Social 
Position of Private Entrepreneurs as Group in Our Country),” in Zhongguo siying jingji nianjian 
(1996) (China’s Private Economy Yearbook (1996)) (Beijing: Zhonghua gongshang lianhe 
chubanshe, 1996), 95. 
12 Minxin Pei, China’s Trapped Transition: the Limits of Developmental Autocracy (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006), 93. 
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elected as the member of Standing Committee of Hunan Provincial People’s Congress 
and 111 entrepreneurs were elected as provincial deputies.13 The 5th national survey 
among private entrepreneurs shows that 17.4 % of the sampled entrepreneurs are deputies 
at all levels, 16.5% are deputies at the county and city levels.14  
The true motivations of most private entrepreneurs in the legislative participation 
are to develop valuable connections and make contact with government officials, which 
will in the future bring benefits to their business. The story of Mr. Zhang from Shandong 
province is a good example. Mr. Zhang is famous for his “rags to richness” story in one 
county in the Shandong province. He zoomed in on the architecture decoration industry, 
and became successful after many years of hard work. As a successful private 
entrepreneur, he has donated large sums of money to local projects such as building 
schools and roads, and provided jobs or free services to poor families. In China, very few 
private enterprises are able to grow to any significant size without making clear 
contributions to their community.15 
In 2000, Mr. Zhang was nominated by local Party committee and elected as a 
deputy of county People’s Congress. After becoming a deputy, he was active in 
legislative participation including submitting suggestions and motions. Because of his 
good performance in legislative participation, Mr. Zhang was elected as the “Star 
Deputy” in 2003. When I asked his motivation for active legislative participation in 
county People Congress, he told me: 
                                                 
13 Ao Daiya, “Siying qiyejia de zhengzhi canyu (Private Entrepreneurs’ Political Participation),” 
Lilun yu gaige (Theory and Reform), no. 5 (2002): 31-33. 
14 Zhang Houyi and Liu Pingqing, “Siqi canzheng (Political Participation of Private 
Entrepreneurs),” Jingji (Economy), no. 11 (2003): 35. 
15 Parris, op.cit., 274. 
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“Frankly speaking, I do not have enough time to attend these legislative activities, 
but I have to do that. I must confess that I have no such lofty ideals as servicing the 
constituents and supervising the government. As you know, the local media such as 
county newspaper, broadcast and TV stations will report all these legislative participation 
activities. Because I was active in these activities, I have become famous in our county 
and even county leaders know me.  As a peasant, who knew me before? By developing 
these connections and contacts with the county leaders, I can easily deal with some 
unexpected ‘distractions’ and get more business projects, so my business is doing better 
than before. Of course, I will not attend those activities which embarrass the government 
such as interpellation.”16 
It is understandable that not many deputies as Mr. Zhang would like to reveal 
their motivations to a stranger like me.  
Seeking higher political position and even political shelter  
In addition to developing connections and getting economic benefits, private 
entrepreneurs who serve as active deputies also seek higher political positions and even 
take political shelter from government officials. It is reported that some successful private 
entrepreneurs try their best to become the deputies at various levels. After becoming the 
deputies, they are also active in legislative participation and became “famous” in the local 
community. It cannot be denied that they would like to improve their social and political 
position by playing the role of deputy. However, some of deputies’ true objectives are: 
taking advantage of the holy aura of the deputy and obtaining political shelter. The 
articles 29-39 of Law of Deputy stipulate that the deputies enjoy “special” treatments. 
                                                 
16 My interview in Shandong province, April 2004 
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Therefore, to some degree, the position of a deputy could be the “amulet” for some 
deputies who have “impure motivations.”17 
For example, superficially, Liu Yong had his own successful business in 
Shenyang city, Liaoning province, but he actually was the biggest mafia boss (“big 
brother”) of the underground society. Yet, he became the deputy of Shenyang People’s 
Congress by bribing government officials and also actively attended legislative 
participation. In social settings, he paid the most attention to his title as deputy and 
printed the deputy title in a prominent position on his name card. Taking advantage of the 
title of deputy, he weaved all kinds of social networks to hide his illegal activities. For 
example, the former Shenyang City Mayor Mu Suixin was his “big brother” and the 
Chief Justice Liu Shi of Shenyang intermediate court was his nominal father. Under the 
protection of these officials, Liu Yong fought and killed to amass his riches.18 
After the arrest for his crime, he confessed in court: “I wanted to be a deputy just 
for political glamour and because I wanted to attain higher political position. I pretended 
to be active in legislative participation for social fame. When I became famous, I got to 
know more leaders and developed valuable connections. The leaders have power in their 
hand, so when I have trouble, I can seek their help.”19 
In today’s China, the market system is not so well-developed; therefore, the 
government controlled by the Party is the biggest distributor of all the resources in the 
political community. Given the CCP’s dominant influence over the economy and the 
                                                 
17 Shan Baohong and Yin Tianxi, “Shanxi yuncheng huixuan xu: youqian ren weihe mai renda 
daibiao (Buying Votes in Yuncheng, Shanxi: Why the Rich Buy ‘Deputy’),”Zhongguo renda 
xinwen (Chinese People’s Congress’ News), September 21, 2001. 
18 “Shenyang heilaoda zuixing leilei (Countless Crimes of Mafia Boss in Shenyang),” Jinghua 
shibao (Beijing Times), April 19, 2002. 
19 Ibid. 
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private entrepreneurs’ dependence on the government, it is rational for them to depend on 
the government for favors. In this context, close ties with the government can open up 
access to new business opportunities and capital. But the most important benefit for them 
is to enhance autonomy and social status or even to seek political shelter by developing 
valuable connections and contacts with the government officials.  
 
 2. Altruistic Motives:  the Sense of Responsibility  
However, in China, only a minority of deputies’ active legislative participation 
can be explained by a member’s raw calculation of self-interest. We can not deny that a 
few deputy activists actively participate in the legislative activities for their own interest, 
especially those deputies nominated by the Party, but most of the activists are not self-
interested, given the cost and risk for the activism. Therefore, we should also include 
assumptions about other factors motivating the active deputies. 
As I noted in Chapter 2, only about 10-15 percent of all the deputies are 
significantly more active than others. Among these activists, only a few were nominated 
as the candidates by the Party and their motivations for the legislative participation are 
mainly for the personal interests as I have explained above. However, most of these 
activists are deputies nominated by their constituents (or deputies in the indirect election). 
In fact, deputies nominated by the constituents are the most active in legislative 
participation in the LPCs. Some active deputies’ experiences can also support this 
argument. For example, according to Yangguang xianzheng (The Open Constitution 
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Initiative) seminar record, most of the active deputies in Haidian district, Beijing are 
those nominated by their constituents.20 
During my fieldwork, in one indirect form or another, the active deputies 
mentioned the sense of responsibility for their constituents. Almost every deputy 
described a relationship with his constituents that are remarkably similar in essence to the 
classic theory of representation in Western democracy. Therefore, it shows that these 
deputy activists are usually motivated by the sense of responsibility for their constituents’ 
interest. For these activists who were nominated by their constituents, to be elected as the 
deputy is not only glorious, but the most important reason is to represent their 
constituents, to be responsible for them. Therefore, this kind of sense of responsibility for 
their constituents motivates these deputies to be active in their legislative participation. 
In the following, I will analyze a few cases of deputies nominated by the 
constituents to show how the sense of responsibility for their constituents motivates them 
to be active in legislative participation. 
Case 1: 
Feng Youwei is a “famous deputy” in Shenyang city, Liaoning province and also 
professor at the Institute of Metal Research, Chinese Academy of Sciences. He has 
already spent 19 years as a deputy to the People’s Congresses at district, city and 
provincial levels. He is the first deputy setting up the “deputy reception day” in Liaoning 
province and spends every Saturday listening to people’s problems and their opinions on 
government affairs. When the reporter asked Feng “why did you always vote ‘veto’ in the 
legislative participation?”, he answered that “I am the only deputy nominated and elected 
directly by the constituents. I must respect these people and reflect their interest… They 
                                                 
20 Yangguang xianzheng baogao (The Open Constitution Initiative Report), no. 3. 
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report their opinions to me and I transfer them to the government. If the constituents 
don’t get the satisfactory answer, why must I vote ‘agree’?”(The author’s emphasis) 21  
In fact, Feng was not on the name list of candidate in the election of district 
deputy in 1986, but the constituents and other deputies spontaneously nominated and 
elected him as the deputy. He was also not a formal candidate but was eventually elected 
as the deputy in the election of city and provincial deputies in Liaoning province. When 
the reporter asked “… I heard that you were nominated as the candidate by the three level 
constituents. Did this influence your sense and behavior as a deputy, compared with the 
nomination by the party?” Feng answered that “I was elected as the deputy in Shenhe 
district in 1986. That was the first time for the Shenhe district to elect the deputy without 
the ‘cap’ from above after the ‘Cultural Revolution’. I was nominated and elected as the 
district deputy. Since then, I have been elected as the deputy four consecutive times. 
Because of my performance as the district deputy, I was nominated and elected as the city 
deputy by the district deputies in 1993. In 1998, Tiexi and Shenhe delegations nominated 
me as the candidate for the provincial deputy and finally I was elected. I am the only one 
deputy nominated by the city deputies in Shenyang’s 143 provincial deputies…because I 
was nominated by the constituents, my deputy sense is more compelling and the senses of 
right and responsibility are more compelling too… (The author’s emphasis) I still 
remember when I went to attend the plenary session and met the workers in our institute, 
they told me: ‘Deputy Feng, when you attend the plenary session, don’t just eat, listen, 
and put up your hand, you should speak and do something for us.’”22 
                                                 
21 Sha Lin, “Renmin daibiao Feng Youwei (Deputy Feng Youwei),” Zhongguo qingnian bao 
(China Youth Daily), October 30, 2002. 
22 Liu Tianshi, “Feng Youwei: geiquan buyong shi sizhi (Feng Youwei: Not Using Power is the 
Dereliction Duty),” Nanfang zhoumo (Southern Weekend), March 9, 2001.  
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Case 2: 
Deputy Wu Qing is a university professor with an independent mind in Beijing. 
Her mother was Bing Xin, a well-known writer during China’s revolution. Wu Qing was 
elected as the deputy of Haidian District People’s Congress consecutively for five times, 
four of which was nominated by the constituents directly. Meanwhile, she was elected as 
the deputy of Beijing People’s Congress consecutively for four times, and was nominated 
by the deputies for three times. In 1990, the university Party committee tried every 
possible way to prevent Wu Qing from being re-elected. The university Party committee 
warned all Party members that they should not nominate Wu Qing as one of the 
candidates, but a lot of people still nominated and elected her.  
Because Wu Qing embarrassed the government officials many times in her 
legislative participation, she was called “crazy” by some government officials. However, 
she said that “I must be serious. If not, how can I fulfill the responsibility for the 
constituents?  Without the support of constituents, I am nothing.” (The author’s emphasis) 
Just for this sense of responsibility, she voted the most “veto” ballots in the plenary 
sessions of Beijing People’s Congress. Wu Qing submitted the first interpellation case in 
Beijing People’s Congress, requesting the city leaders to explain the unwarranted 
interference on the Haidian district court that exceeded their authority.23   
Wu Qing is very proud of the nomination by her constituents. In return for that 
support, she works hard to help her community on bread-and-butter issues. Before she 
attended the plenary session of Beijing People’s Congress each time, she would firstly 
visit the district deputies and seek their opinions. She always reported to the district 
                                                 
23 Wu Jing, “Wu Qing: wo zhi shuo zhenhua (Wu Qing: I only Tell the Truth),” Renmin ribao 
(People’s Daily), September 8, 2004. 
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deputies what kind of motions and suggestion she had submitted to Beijing People’s 
Congress, as well as criticism and interpellation she had on the government agencies, 
veto ballot she had voted and why.  
If the deputies were nominated by their constituents, they would face the outside 
pressure from the constituents in their communities. But if constituents would like to be 
the deputies and nominate themselves, they would have stronger motivations and their 
motivations would come from their heart to protect and promote their constituents’ 
interest. Although a self-nominated candidate is a rather new phenomenon in China and 
their competency as well as effect could be seen in the near future, a few self-nominated 
deputies have shown their activism in legislative participation in LPCs.  
Case 3: 
Yao Lifa, coming from Qianjiang city, Hubei province, is the most famous self-
nominated deputy in China. He has nominated himself as the candidate for the deputy for 
four times since 1987. But he was never accepted as the formal candidate by the local 
election committee. After intensive campaigning through sending letters and visiting 
constituents, he was eventually elected successfully as the deputy in 1998. Yao voted the 
first “veto” ballot in Qianjiang city People’s Congress in 1999. During his five-year term, 
he submitted 187 pieces of suggestions, opinions and motions. He conducted independent 
investigations on alleged corruption, village elections and other issues in his area. He has 
been hailed as a “voice of the people” by the Chinese press. Yao told the reporter: 
“…everything I say and do must win the support and endorsement from the constituents. 
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Just because of constituents’ support, encouragement, help and trust, I can have courage 
to fulfill my responsibility.”24 (The author’s emphasis) 
Case 4: 
Another case comes from Sichuan Province. Mr. Zhang Zhonghao, the 38-year-
old lecturer at Chongqing Industrial College, was elected as the district deputy in March 
2003.  Although he was not a formal candidate, he nominated himself as the candidate 
and participated in the election as an independent candidate and successfully won against 
other candidates nominated by the Party. During the election campaign, Zhang sent out 
his propaganda materials and gave lectures to generate awareness of his constituents. He 
publicly declared that he could become a deputy who can truly represent his constituents 
and put forward his campaign slogan: “please choose (elect) one man who can speak for 
you, who dares to speak for you, and who knows how he can speak for you.” He made 
good promises to his constituents: recruiting the volunteers, opening the people’s 
representative hot line and setting up the people’s representative reception room.25 
After becoming deputy, Zhang began to actively carry out his promise. He 
recruited the volunteers, set up the “deputy’s reception room” and collected constituents’ 
opinions. Meanwhile, he actively participated in all kinds of activities in district People’s 
congress. In the last three years, he submitted 28 motions and suggestions (opinion, 
criticism), one recall case, made the appointment with and interpellation against head of 
the district government or related department for 21 times. Meanwhile, he accepted 
constituents’ visits, replied to constituents’ letters or telephone-calls for a total of 560 
                                                 
24 Liu Yingli, “Caogen minzhu (Grassroots Democracy),”Zhongguo xinwen zhoukan (China News 
Weekly), no. 17 (2001). 
25  “Jiulongpo qu yi putong jiaoshi dangxuan wei renda daibiao (One Ordinary Teacher Elected as 
Deputy in Jiulongpo District),” http://www.cq.xinhuanet.com/political/2003-
03/09/content_280996.htm (accessed January 10, 2006). 
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times. In 2005, Zhang was evaluated as the “outstanding people’s representative” because 
of his three years’ performance in the legislative participation. As he said in his report to 
the constituents, “Everything I do is to reflect constituents’ interest because I was elected 
by the constituents. If the government cannot accept the suggestions I submit for the 
constituents, or cannot give some compelling explanation, I must vote dissenting or 
abstention on the motions.”26 (The author’s emphasis) 
 
IV. Preferences of Deputies in Legislative Participation 
 
 As noted above, the active deputies have a lot of motivations in the legislative 
participation. However, motivations are “only statements of tendencies or 
probabilities.”27 When they act within specific, given constraints, they must make choice 
in term of their preferences. So individual behaviors are determined by the preferences of 
the individual and the opportunities or constraints the individual faces. But how to 
measure the preference is a formidable task. As Epstein and Mershon argue, “perhaps the 
most fundamental challenge is to locate sources of data that are independent of the 
behavior of the political actors under scrutiny.”28 
  The data of measuring individual deputies’ preference is more difficult to attain 
in China. In this study, I try to measure deputies’ preferences by using the survey 
information of their positions on the legislative job. In survey, I asked the following 
questions: which of various job of being a deputy do they think the most important? 
                                                 
26 More details can be found in Mr. Zhong Zhonghao’s personal Blog: 
http://zzhlaw.fyfz.cn/blog/zzhlaw/index.aspx (accessed January 15, 2006). 
27 Payne and Woshinsky, op.cit., 546. 
28 Lee Epstein and Carol Mershon, “Measuring Political Preferences,” American Journal of 
Political Science 40, no. 1 (February 1996): 262.  
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 In the legislative studies in Western countries, the scholars generally locate the 
legislators’ preferences on left-right scales by analyzing their ideological beliefs on all 
kinds of policy issues. So, by recoding the data, the variable (deputies’ attitude on the 
legislative job) has three categories: constituent-centered, median, party-centered.29 I 
further recode this variable into a dummy variable (=0, if the deputy’s preference is not 
constituent-centered; =1, otherwise). The regression estimates in Appendix 2 suggests 
that the deputy’s preference significantly affects the degree of deputy’s legislative 
activism. 
 
V. Community (Constituent) Pressure, Deputies’ Altruistic Motives and Legislative 
Activism 
 
 The incentives are essential to understanding the actors’ behavior because the 
incentive can direct a person’s behavior towards a particular goal. However, we should 
take into account the situation faced by actors in a given context because individual 
behaviors are determined by the preferences of the individual and the opportunities or 
constraints the individual faces. 
 From the analysis of the above case studies, we can see that the deputies 
nominated by the constituents generally attribute the motivations of their activism to the 
                                                 
29 There are five answers to this survey question: (1) Scrutiny or keeping a check on the 
government and the civil service; (2) Supporting Party and helping it achieve its policy objective; 
(3) Influencing or changing Party’s policy; (4) Helping constituents with their problems/ dealing 
with constituency issues; (5) Others. Based on the survey data, there are 6 categories of answers 
to this question: (1), (2), (4), (1) + (2), (1) + (4), (2) + (4). By recoding, I transform the value of 
variable into 3 categories: constituent-centered, median, party-centered. If the deputies chose the 
answer (4), or (1) + (4), their preference is constituent-centered. If the deputies chose the answer 
(1), or (1) + (2), or (2) + (4), their preference is median. If the deputies chose the answer (2), their 
preference is party-centered. 
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sense of responsibility to represent their constituents’ interest. However, this sense of 
responsibility is a little different from Western democracies. In a democracy polity, the 
legislators also have the sense of responsibility for their constituents (“electoral-
connection”).30 However, the overriding incentive behind the “electoral-connection” is to 
get re-election, and finally, for her own interest. As noted in Chapter 1, the legislators in 
Western democracies are professional and the career (re-election) pressure forces them to 
actively participate in the legislative activities. However, things are different in China’ 
legislative system. Most of the deputies do not care about their re-election because they 
are not professionals. Therefore, the sense of responsibility of active deputies basically 
comes from the constituents’ (or community) pressure through the election (especially 
constituents’ nomination and “difference voting”), not the career (or re-election) pressure 
in Western democracies. 
In fact, a large extent, constituents’ pressure in China is tantamount to the 
traditional community pressure in Chinese society. In China, the electorate for the deputy 
is zoned generally by residential district, work unit and production unit. However, the 
most of time, the work unit or production unit and residential district combine together to 
form an electorate. With economic reform and development, especially the housing 
privatization, the emergence of the private owner-occupied house has increased 
residential mobility. This is because these better off households can resort to the market 
method to get their houses, rather than rely on the allocation of public house by their 
work units. However, the majority of Chinese urban residents still live in older 
neighborhoods where their houses were distributed by or purchased from their work units.  
                                                 
30 David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Election Connection (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1974). 
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Therefore, for most of urban Chinese residents, long–term face–to– face 
interactions among older neighborhoods remain an important context of social life. The 
frequent interaction and close familiarity among residents in such areas mean that people 
often come in to contact with each other and know each other very well. And such 
frequent interaction has created bonds of trust and a sense of community. In general, the 
constituents would like to nominate the candidates they are very familiar with, especially 
friends and colleagues. In fact, many candidates are community enthusiasts, who actively 
participate in community affairs. Indeed, their enthusiasm and commitment in community 
affairs may have led to their selection as the candidates by the constituents.  
However, the electorates vary in their size. And this variation has consequence for 
the candidates because it affects the extent to which the constituents are familiar with 
them. If the candidates nominated by the constituents come from the fairly large and 
heterogeneous (for example, the constituents come from different work units or 
production units) electorate, the other constituents are often unfamiliar with them, 
especially as the electoral campaign is officially proscribed. But if the electorate is 
relatively small and homogeneous (for example, the constituents come from the same 
work unit or production unit), the constituents typically know the candidates well. This 
allows constituents easily to express preferences with votes in elections.  
Because prevailing social values in China stress the importance of “saving face” 
among acquaintances and friends, once the candidates are nominated and elected as the 
deputies, they do not want to lose “face”-their dignity as the deputy and trust from their 
constituents. Once elected, this community (constituent) pressure will spur deputies to 
actively engage in legislative participation. 
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 One factor that can measure the community (constituent) pressure the deputies 
have to face is: the frequency of the deputies’ being approached and visited by their 
constituents to reflect problems and ask for help. The more times the deputies are visited 
and approached by his or her constituents, the more pressure they will feel and more 
likely to be active in the legislative participation. I recode this variable (community 
pressure) into a dummy variable (=0, if the deputies have never been visited or 
approached by constituents, =1, otherwise). The regression estimates in the Appendix 2 
suggest that the community pressure has a highly significant effect on the degree of 
deputies’ legislative activism. 
One active deputy in Haidian district People’s Congress in Beijing described how 
community pressure forced her to become active in the legislative participation, “…When 
I was just elected as deputy, I was at a loss. At that time I really did not know what a 
deputy should do. Moreover, deputies on our campus before me were all famous 
professors and celebrities. I am an ordinary person and knew nobody at that time. But 
unexpectedly, I was elected as the deputy and got very high votes. We elected three 
deputies in this university and I was the first one and got more 2000 votes than the 
second one. However, firstly, I didn’t know what the deputy should do and I only knew 
that they just raised hand and ‘rubber stamp’; secondly, I had no social experiences. I 
have never even been a student cadre. But I am a very serious person. After my election 
as a deputy, I began to think what I should do. I gradually understood that the 
constituents had placed hope in my disposition. I am such person that I may not speak, 
but I cannot say something contrary to the conscience. Therefore, the constituents knew 
this and hoped that I can reflect some problems. I also felt that I should do something in 
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order not to disappoint the constituents. Of course, there were many constituents who 
came to me on a number of cases…So I started to struggle. In our university, the more 
you do, the more the constituent will vote for you.”31 
The famous deputy Wu Qing in Beijing also expressed a similar experience on the 
community pressure. As she said, “…first, receiving the constituents’ visiting is the 
foundation of my fulfilling the electoral-connection. The constituents are familiar with 
the law of my life. They will wait for me near the campus playground when I am 
exercising in the morning. They know my mailbox and my family’s telephone has 
become a ‘hotline’. Sometimes, they leave notes for me in the reception room. This is the 
way for me to contact the constituents. So, I can know the constituents’ information 
promptly and sufficiently. Second, I can feel the constituents’ pressure at times because I 
was nominated and elected by them. I should be responsible for them and be supervised 
by them. Once they discover that I am unqualified, they should dismiss me through legal 
procedure. I also report to the constituents non-periodically and tell them what I have 
done… Third, I must let the constituents believe that I can represent them when I deal 
with their affairs and make speeches…” 32 
During my fieldwork in Shenzhen city, one active deputy dwelled on his electoral 
experiences which reflected the importance of community pressure: a nomination which 
the constituents forced upon him and an election victory clearly demonstrating his 
popularity among the community. When answering my question “who nominated you as 
a candidate in the election?”, he said that “before the election, some of my friends visited 
my home and said to me ‘we have nominated  you as a candidate for the deputy of our 
                                                 
31 Yangguang xianzheng baogao (The Open Constitution Initiative Report), no. 2 
32 Yang Zhiyong, “Yu Wu Qing duihua (Dialogue with Wu Qing),”Nanfeng chuang (Window on 
the Southern Wind)
 169 
district.’ In fact, I didn’t want to be a deputy at that time. So I told them, ‘No, I really 
don’t want to be a deputy because I do not have enough time, as you know. Why don’t 
you nominate Mr. Zhang in our district? He is better than me and he is CCP member. 
And there are other people who are well qualified in our district. Why don’t you select 
them as the candidates?’ They said, ‘we think that you are well qualified because you 
have more experiences in community affairs than them.’ So finally, I was elected as the 
deputy. Legislative participation took a lot of my time and energy. However, the 
constituents voted for me and needed me. So they have trust in me and I have obligations 
and promises to express their interest. Frankly speaking, I have the complete support of 
my constituents.” Because he performed very well in the legislative participation in 
People’s Congress, he has been elected as the district deputy by his constituents twice. 
When I asked some constituents in his district: “why did you choose him as deputy again 
and again?”, they told me, “in fact, he has been the best deputy in our district, he has 
constantly exerted himself for us, he has worked for us, we want him to be our deputy, 
and we want to re-elect him.”33 
It seems clear, therefore, that the active deputies view the election of their deputy 
status as highly dependent on the constituents’ trust in their community. In fact, the 
traditional community pressure through the constituents’ nomination has made these 
deputies realize that they must care and show concern for their constituents’ interest, not 
for their own interest. The bonds of trust and sense of community among the community 
members force the deputies to fulfill their obligations to the community. In China, an 
individual who does not honor his obligations to the community when clearly possessing 
the means to do so will lose “face” or social standing, and can even be ostracized from 
                                                 
33 My interview in Shenzhen city, Guangdong province, February 2004. 
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his community. Therefore, the community or constituents’ trust and sense of obligation 
spur these deputies to actively engage in legislative participation in LPCs.  
Obtaining their constituents’ nomination does not mean that these candidates 
could be elected as deputies successfully. Because of “difference voting” (Cha’e xuanju), 
they have to compete with other candidates, especially “official” candidates. This limited 
competitive election further increases the constituents’ pressure on these deputies. 
Compared with the candidates nominated by the Party, they have no advantage in term of 
organizational resource, power resource and so on. To win over the “official candidates,” 
they will experience innumerable trials and tribulations.34 Therefore, deputies coming 
from this limited competitive election would have a driven sense of obligation and 
pressure from their constituents when they participate in LPCs. 
In the indirect election, the non-official candidates also face similar pressure from 
their constituents (deputies). In the election of deputies to higher level People’s Congress, 
the deputies have opportunity to nominate their own candidates. In general, they will take 
full advantage of this opportunity to nominate their colleagues whom they are very 
familiar with and those who are active in legislative activities. Once the candidates are 
elected as deputies successfully, they will face peer pressure similar to deputies 




                                                 
34 My interview in Shenzhen city, Guangdong province, February 2004. 
35 My interview in Guangzhou city, Guangdong province, May 2004. 
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In sum, the analysis of the motivations of deputies could provide a better 
understanding of the deputies’ legislative participation. Three kinds of motivations could 
be identified for the active deputies. Firstly, a few deputies are more active because of 
their public-spirited nature whether they are nominated by the Party or constituents. 
Secondly, personal interests and their desire to pursue those interests is a powerfully 
motivating force for some of these active deputies, especially those nominated by the 
Party. These specific purposes and particular incentives include self–advancement for 
prestige and respect, developing valuable connections and contacts, seeking higher 
political positions and even taking political shelter. Thirdly, most importantly, most of 
the deputy activists are usually motivated by a sense of responsibility for their 
constituents because of the constituents’ nomination and competitive pressure in the 
election. This sense of responsibility basically comes from the constituents’ (community) 
pressure. This kind of community (constituent) pressure is different from the career (re-
election) pressure faced by legislators in Western democracies. 
 Thus far, my explicit motivation investigations are purely exploratory and 
descriptive. A motivation describes only a fraction of individual deputy and it is not a 
total picture of him. However, individual behaviors are determined by the preference 
ordering of the individual motivations and the opportunities or constraints the individual 
faces. The regression estimates in the Appendix 2 suggest that the preference and 
community pressure have a significant effect on the degree of deputies’ legislative 
activism. 
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 At the same time, to make active legislative participation possible in an 
authoritarian regime like China, the deputies with stronger motivation have adopted some 
risk and cost-reducing tactics, which I will discuss in the next chapter.
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Chapter Six     Tactics for Active Legislative Participation in LPCs 
 
I. Introduction  
 
To be active in the legislative participation in LPCs, the deputies have made 
substantial sacrifices of their time and energy, sometimes even incurring the risks 
because of the formal and informal institutional constraints in an authoritarian regime like 
China. In fact, under China’s political system, there are almost no resources for active 
deputies to take advantage of in LPCs. On the contrary, to be active in the legislative 
participation, there are some costs and risks that the deputies have to incur. For example, 
time and energy as well as political risk are the factors to be considered by the active 
deputies.  
However, facing these costs and risks, active deputies with strong motivation for 
their constituents’ interest have used some creative tactics on their own initiative to avoid 
the risks and decrease the costs during legislative participation, especially when 
supervising local governments. These tactics include: skillfully making use of the 
existing institutional space; taking the law as the weapon; learning by doing; depending 
on the collective power and using the media resources. Although the role of these tactics 
is limited, they have reduced the cost and risk, to some degree, and have made deputies’ 
active legislative participation possible in an authoritarian regime like China.  
Therefore, in this chapter, I will explore details on the tactics active deputies have 




II. Skillfully Making Use of the Existing Institutional Space  
 
Although China has conducted more than twenty-five years’ reform and open 
policy, some old systems and management style still exist. For example, department 
management is one of the characteristics of China’s administrative management. In China, 
there are lots of provincial and central department unit offices residing in the local 
jurisdiction. As Andrew C. Mertha writes, “individual offices within these bureaucracies 
are no longer beholden to superiors within local governments (Kuai); rather, they are 
directly controlled by their functional administrative superiors (Tiao)…”1 That is to say, 
these units have direct Party and administrative relation with the departments at the 
higher level. In general, this phenomenon is known as “Tiaokuai fen’ge” in China.2 
However, as far as the election of deputies to LPCs is concerned; these units must 
follow the leadership of LPCs where they reside in at the corresponding level. Meanwhile, 
the LPCs have to allot some quota of deputies to these department units. Therefore, many 
people in these units have become deputies in LPCs. However, these units have no Party 
and administrative subordination relations and no direct interest relations with the local 
Party committee and government. Sometimes, some deputies from these department units 
even have a higher administrative rank than the officials from local Party committees and 
governments. In so doing, there is a delicate institutional space under this circumstance: 
                                                 
1 Andrew C. Mertha, “China’s Soft Centralization: Shifting Tiao/Kuai Authority Relations,” The 
China Quarterly 184 (December 2005): 791-2. 
2 Kenneth G. Lieberthal and David M. Lampton, ed., Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making 
in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); Kenneth Lieberthal and 
Michel Oksenberg, ed., Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1988). 
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deputies from these department units do not need to worry about the risk of being 
retaliated by local Party and government in the legislative participation, especially 
supervising the local government.  
For example, there are lots of city, provincial and central department units in 
Haizhu district, Guangzhou city. Therefore, in one delegation in Haizhu district People’s 
Congress, most deputies come from city, provincial and central department units. Some 
of them are very active in appraising, inquiring and interrogating the district government 
when they are in the plenary session of district People’s Congress. There is a common 
understanding among these active deputies coming from the city, provincial and central 
department units: “since I am not the man of your district, you cannot do anything to 
me.”3 
Similarly, in Haidian district People’s Congress of Beijing city, 60% of deputies 
come from the central and city departments. Some of them come from the universities 
managed by the central departments. Meanwhile, others come from the central or city 
departments residing in the Haidian district. (See Table 6.1 below) 
Table 6.1: The Percentage of Deputies from Central, City and District Departments 
in Haidian District People’s Congress, Beijing City 
 
From central and city 
departments 
From district departments time Total 
number of 
deputies  The number    Percent (%) The number  Percent (%) 
9th  350 215 61.4 135 38.6 
10th  350 216 61.7 134 38.3 
11th  350 222 63.7 128 36.3 
 
Source: Li Buyun, Difang renda daibiao zhidu yanjiu (A Study of LPCs) (Changsha: 
Hunan Daxue Chubanshe, 2002), 213. 
 
                                                 
3 My interview in Guangzhou, Guangdong province, March 2004. 
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So these deputies do not need to worry about the risk of retaliation and have 
enough courage to supervise the district government. As one deputy from Haidian district 
said, “one point I must make is that people who dare to speak out are all deputies coming 
from the central or city level. The deputies coming from the district level basically cannot 
sing a tune opposite to district government.”4  
 
III. Rightful Supervision–“Taking Law as the Weapon” 
 
With the improvement of legal consciousness, more and more Chinese citizens 
are increasingly claiming legal rights and often citing the Constitution and laws to protect 
their personal and property rights. While a large number of Chinese laws describe a broad 
range of rights and have strong provisions for individual and property rights, however, in 
reality such provisions have little meaning because there is no respect for the law. The 
problem is not that the law provision lacks lofty ideals or is considered unimportant, but 
the governments, especially local authorities, either choose not to enforce them or can 
ignore them with impunity. This has created a huge discrepancy between the law 
provisions and enforcement. 
Kevin J. O’Brien uses the term “rightful resistance” to explain the peasants’ 
opposition to cadre misconduct in rural China. According to O’ Brien, “rightful resistance 
is a partly institutionalized form of popular action that employs laws, policies, and other 
established values to defy power holders who have failed to live up to some ideal or who 
                                                 
4 Yangguang xianzheng baogao (The Open Constitution Initiative Report), no. 3. 
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have not implemented a popular measure,” and “so long as a gap exists between rights 
promised and rights delivered, there is always room for rightful resistance to emerge.”5 
In fact, “rightful resistance” has also emerged in urban areas. Like peasants, some 
residents whose houses were demolished to make way for urban development also looked 
to the national Constitution and laws to protect their private interest. For example, they 
put up a slogan on the front of their wrecked house to state their claim such as: “use fresh 
blood to defend the Constitution; use life to protect private property; use the weapons of 
law to protect civil rights” and so on. When they took to the streets to demonstrate, they 
cited the spirit of Chinese Constitution to show that their constitutional rights were 
violated.6  
Like the peasants and urban residents, the deputies also have lots of rights 
stipulated by the Constitution and laws. For example, the 1982 Constitution gives the 
legislative branch considerable nominal constitutional powers and deputies’ legislative 
right. Meanwhile, deputies’ right to make suggestions, raise inquiries and interpellations 
on the governments are protected by the Constitution and related laws. However, on 
some occasions, deputies’ right has not been accorded sufficient respect. Therefore, like 
the peasants’ “rightful resistance” in rural China, the deputies also use the weapon of law 
to rightfully supervise the governments.  
For instance, making suggestions on government affairs and raising inquiries or 
interpellations over issues of public concern are deputies’ legal responsibilities. 
According to the law stipulations, related authorities have to give response to these 
                                                 
5 Kevin J. O’Brien, “Rightful Resistance,” World Politics 49, no. 1 (October 1996): 31-55. 
6 For example, in the recent case of “nail house” in Chongqing city, a Chinese flag appeared on 
the roof with a hand-painted banner that read: “A citizen’s legal property is not to be encroached 
on.” More details can be found in New York Times: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/27/world/asia/27china.html (accessed March 30, 2007). 
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suggestions, inquiries and interpellations item by item. So happen what may, at a 
minimum, the government officials must have a regard for the law superficially and they 
have to listen to any criticism over their jobs by active deputies. After all, this power is 
bestowed by law. As one active deputy said, “maybe some government officials come up 
against us purposely. However, I always tell them that it is not because I have some 
power, but because I am the ‘people’s representative’. Even though you dislike to meet 
me, you have to meet me. Even though you dislike to listen to me, you have to do that as 
long as I have something to say to you.”7 In some government officials’ eyes, some 
active deputies are hard to get along with because they always use the “the weapons of 
law” to supervise them. 
However, to fully perform their legislative responsibility and seek respect from 
the government officials, that is, “rightful supervision,” deputies’ legislative participation 
must depend on solid facts and law. In fact, the deputies generally do not know how to 
perform their mandate upon election, a problem especially affecting their performance in 
the first year or two. Therefore, when ordinary people or constituents come to pour out 
their grievances, deputies are sometimes at a loss as to how to help these constituents.8 
For example, one active deputy describes the situation when she just became a 
deputy, “when they (constituents) cried or knelt down to pour out their grievances, my 
sympathy came out immediately and I went out to quarrel with the law enforcement 
personnel, thumping on the table. At that time, I didn’t care about whether the case was 
reasonable or based on the facts. Later, I realized that my action would not solve the 
problem. Gradually, now when I get the ordinary people’s complaint, I must judge 
                                                 
7 Yangguang xianzheng baogao (The Open Constitution Initiative Report), no. 2. 
8 My own interview in Shenzhen city, Guangdong province, February 2004. 
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whether the case is reasonable or not. If it is unreasonable, I will not deal with it 
anyway.”9 
Therefore, to conduct the “rightful supervision,” everything the deputies do must 
be within the law and based on facts. When deputies prepare for the suggestion, criticism 
and motions, they must conduct further investigation and study. The suggestion, criticism 
and motion must be based on reliable facts and conform to the law. When supervising the 
government, one of deputies’ most important tasks is to investigate the cases properly and 
get reliable facts. Only in this way can they convince the government officials. For 
example, one deputy in Beijing People’s Congress had submitted one recalling 
suggestion with other deputies successfully because they have conducted intensive 
investigation and study on the recalling case. After deputies exchanged their idea with the 
responsible persons from Beijing Party committee and People’s Congress, they all 
thought that the suggestion was based on the Constitution and related laws and adopting 
this suggestion was responsible to the constituents. In the end, their recalling suggestion 
was totally accepted. Similarly, they also submitted the interpellation case successfully 
because their suggestion was credible and reliable. 10 
Meanwhile, deputies should be adept in using some clauses stipulated by the law 
and rules of procedure in LPCs. For example, the revised “Local Organization Law” 
stipulates that “deputies from different electorates or electoral units could discuss and 
nominate the candidates collectively.” The intention of this revised clause is to give more 
space to deputies’ legislative participation so that deputies can better nominate candidate 
                                                 
9 My interview at Foshan city, Guangdong province, May 2004. 
10 Renmin daibiao dahui zhidu yanjiusuo (Institute of People’s Congress System Studies), ed., Yu 
renda daibiao tan ruhe lvxing zhize (Discussing with the Deputies on How to fulfill the 
Responsibility) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2004), 139. 
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collectively.11 The creative deputies have skillfully used this legal clause in their 
legislative participation. For example, during the third plenary session of the third 
Shenzhen city People’s Congress, some deputies from A district visited the deputies in B 
district and hoped that they could nominate one person in A district. Traditionally, this 
nomination should be submitted by the deputies from A district. However, they were 
worried that their nomination would be opposed by related enterprise and industry 
deputies in A district because of interest conflicts. However, this nomination would be 
beneficial to all citizens and the whole city. Therefore, the active deputies from two 
different districts nominated together and got the support from the other deputies. And 
finally, their nomination was successful.12  
Therefore, to conduct the “rightful supervision” successfully, the active deputies 
must be familiar with the related law and the supervision should be based on the facts and 
laws. 
 
IV. Learning by Doing 
 
Generally, new deputies, especially those nominated by their constituents, always 
have the enthusiasm to help the constituents and supervise the governments. But they are 
not familiar with the function of LPC system and their rights and duties. For example, 
when the new deputies are speaking at the LPC annual plenary session for the first time, 
they are always nervous and dare not to say anything that may sound impolite.  
                                                 
11 Ibid, 298-299. 
12 My interview in Shenzhen city, Guangdong province, May 2004. 
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Therefore, deputies, like most people, must learn to make sense of the LPC 
system and understand their place in it. In fact, there is a lot to learn about being a deputy 
and about the way the LPC system works. During my fieldwork, a number of active 
deputies highlighted the importance of becoming familiar with all kinds of legislative 
activities in LPCs before one can really become active. For example, one active deputy 
said that “if you would like to be active in legislative participation, you must understand 
how the LPC system works. You must get involved in all kinds of activities, and then you 
can really understand that. By learning to take part in the process of legislative 
participation, you will become more familiar with that and you can be active.”13 
Therefore, in order to become actively involved in legislative participation, it is 
often the case that the deputies should go through a learning process, especially for the 
new deputies. Sometimes, the deputies even need to learn how to speak at the plenary 
session of LPC. For example, one deputy activist described in detail how he had 
experienced this process after he became a deputy, “at the first time when I attended the 
plenary session, I didn’t dare to say a word. I just sat and listened because I had no 
courage in opening my mouth as a new deputy. But after a couple of conferences, I began 
to be familiar with this process and dare to open my mouth and ask questions. Gradually, 
I have adapted to this process. I think that every new deputy has to go through this 
process …”14 
In fact, even an outstanding deputy activist has experienced this process. For 
example, Wang Zeke is one of the most active deputies in Guangdong provincial 
People’s Congress. Before he was nominated and elected as deputy to Guangdong 
                                                 
13 My interview in Guangzhou city, Guangdong province, March 2004. 
14 My interview in Shenzhen city, Guangdong province, February 2004. 
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provincial People’s Congress, he was a member of Standing Committee of Zhanjiang city 
Political Consultative Conference. Although very interested in politics, he just regarded 
being deputy as glorious but didn’t take his responsibility seriously when he was a new 
deputy. At that time, He just knew about People’s Congress plenary session that is held 
annually, but he did not know how to execute his mandate as deputy. Gradually, he spent 
a few months learning the ropes of how to be a deputy.15 
To put it simply, the new deputies must learn step by step if they would like to be 
active in legislative participation. Firstly, they can learn by watching what other older and 
active deputies do and by listening to what they say in the LPC. A number of deputies 
interviewed highlighted the importance of learning from other active deputies in an 
informal manner. For example, one of the deputies whom I spoke to mentioned that he 
learnt a lot about the nature of LPC and legislative activities by participating in the group 
meetings, investigation activities and listening to other deputies. Especially, new deputies 
should learn from experienced legislative participation activists.  
Secondly, they should keep up their efforts to learn their rights and duties 
stipulated by the law. A central aspect of becoming active in legislative participation is a 
willingness to be fully committed to keep on learning themselves. For example, one of 
active deputies owns a large collection of law books and has consulted lawyers and the 
NPC on the rights and duties of deputies.16 
Therefore, in order to become actively involved in any legislative activities, it is 
clearly necessary for deputy to be willing to apply oneself to a process of continuous 
learning.   
                                                 




V. Depending on Collective Power 
 
In general, the deputy can conduct the legislative participation individually. 
However, not only individual deputy’ time and energy but also his knowledge is very 
limited. Therefore, individual deputy cannot display enough strength in legislative 
participation in LPCs, especially in supervising the government. In fact, one of the 
characteristics of deputies’ legislative participation in LPCs is that they must exercise 
their power collectively. For example, to have their motions adopted by the plenary 
session of LPCs, deputies have to win at least 30 signatures for one motion as required by 
the law. Conducting the inquiries and interpellation of government also requires enough 
deputies.  
Sometimes if deputies act collectively and spontaneously in legislative 
participation, the influence would be very powerful. For example, in 1994, without 
consulting the opinion of Huangyan city (one county-level city belonging to Taizhou city 
in Zhejiang province), Taizhou city decided to repeal Huangyan’s city status and turn it 
into one district. Under this circumstance, Huangyan would lose its independent financial 
and jurisdiction right as a county-level city. In April 1994, during the plenary session of 
Huangyan city People’s Congress, 160 deputies (about 70% of all deputies) submitted 
one motion to oppose this decision and appealed to the Department of Civil Affairs, State 
Council and Central Committee of CCP in Beijing. However, the director of Standing 
Committee of Huangyan city People’s Congress took all kinds of measures to prevent 
them from appealing. Therefore, in March 1995, during the third plenary session of 11th 
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Huangyan city People’s Congress, 96 deputies submitted one motion and requested to 
recall the director. When some deputies indicated that this motion would not be listed on 
the agenda, more than 100 deputies collectively refused to enter into convention hall. The 
related leaders had to agree to list this motion on the agenda. The result of voting was: 
169 agreed, 22 disagreed, and 21 abstained among 212 deputies. So the director was 
recalled by deputies successfully. In this case, when more than 100 deputies carried out 
their cooperation spontaneously, any interference from related leaders became feeble.17 
A similar case happened in Hubei province, but one active deputy took the lead. 
In February 2002, during the second plenary session of 4th Qianiiang city People’s 
Congress in Hubei province, one active deputy-Yao lifa got word that Hubei provincial 
Party committee and government would merge three cities of Tianmen, Qianjiang and 
Xiaotao into Jianghan city without full communication with local governments. 
Meanwhile, the State Council in Beijing may well approve this scheme. However, this 
scheme was not beneficial to ordinary people in these three cities. So Yao Lifa 
immediately collaborated with other 166 deputies and submitted one opposition motion 
and sent one appeal letter to the State Council in Beijing. Finally, the State Council 
rejected this scheme. It was remarkable that Yao Lifa and other deputies won their 
motion against the merger of three cities.18 
In fact, to help the deputies perform their responsibilities better, the Standing 
Committees of LPCs at all levels have set up all kinds of deputy activity groups. It cannot 
                                                 
17 Zhu Yuchen, “Zhejiang Huangyan cheshishequ zhizheng: yige difang renda de shinian zhiyang 
(The Struggling on Repealing City and Establshing District in Huangyan, Zhejiang: Ten Years’ 
Experience of a LPC),” Liaowang dongfang zhoukan (Outlook Eastern Weekly), April 7, 2004. 
18 Chen Chuyue, “Wei renmin nahan: yige putong gongmin de canzheng chuanqi (Crying for the 
People: A legendary Story of an Ordinary Citizen’s Political Participation),” Tai’an renda 
(Tai’an People's Congress), no. 6 (2001): 25. 
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be denied that these groups have played some roles in improving the quality of deputy’s 
legislative activities. However, most of these groups’ activities are superficial. On the 
contrary, some kinds of “informal groups” spontaneously formed by the active deputies 
have played more important and remarkable role in the legislative participation. 
The “informal groups” could be defined as voluntary (or spontaneous) 
associations among members of deputies, without the recognition of LPC or its Standing 
Committee, which seek to play a role in the legislative participation.19 The informal 
groups may be based on member characteristics (such as social stratum, occupation etc), 
common interests or shared experience of active involvement in legislative activities-
including submitting motions, oversight of government, inspection and investigation and 
so on.    
If the deputies come from the same or similar social stratum or occupation, in 
general, it is easy for them to reach a common understanding on some matters of mutual 
concern and develop common interest. For example, there are many peasant deputies 
coming from different cities in Guangdong provincial People’s Congress. Coming from 
the same social stratum, they gradually become good friends and some informal groups 
spontaneously arise from them. They submit the motions on peasant affairs and conduct 
investigation together.20 
Attending some activities such as inspection and investigation during the closing 
of plenary session, deputies would touch on the same things and it is very easy for them 
to reach a common understanding. In fact, lots of important motions and suggestions 
                                                 
19 There are similar “informal groups” in America Congress. More details could be found in 
Arthur G. Stevens, J R., Daniel P. Mulhllon and Paul S. Rundquist, “U. S. Congressional 
Structure and Representation: The Role of Informal Groups,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 6, no. 
3 (August 1981):415-437. 
20 My interview in Guangdong People’s Congress, Janua
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were produced during these activities. For example, many deputies in Haidian district 
People’s Congress in Beijing actively attended these activities during the closing of 
plenary session, and subsequently they become good friends. Shared perspective has 
made these deputies belong to the same camp. And thereafter, they organized the 
informal group.21  
The existence of informal groups can enable individual deputies to form ties with 
their colleagues to get some kinds of specialized information they need in the legislative 
participation, to decrease the structural barriers and increase the ability of deputies to 
effectively identify and deal with some problems in the legislative participation.22 
For example, to submit high-quality motions, one active deputy in Shanghai 
invited other deputies from all various fields to organize a motions consulting group. 
These deputies are all experts in their own fields such as education, hygiene and foreign 
trade. This group maintains close ties with each other. When they have important issues, 
they exchange information voluntarily. In general, they hold meetings every quarter, 
discussing topics, approving and initiating investigative projects.23 
If deputies coming from the different levels organize informal groups, their 
legislative power would be very effective. One good and very famous example is: “seven 
person deputy group” in Jiaozuo city, Henan province. This group included national 
deputy Yao Xiurong, Henan provincial deputy Li Zhaoyi, Jiaozuo city deputies Lu Jingzi, 
                                                 
21 Renmin daibiao dahui zhidu yanjiusuo (Institute of People’s Congress System Studies), ed., Yu 
renda daibiao tan ruhe lvxing zhize (Discussing with the Deputies on How to fulfill the 
Responsibility) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2004), 140. 
22 Stevens, Mulhllon and Rundquist, op.cit., 415-437. 
23 Renmin daibiao dahui zhidu yanjiusuo (Institute of People’s Congress System Studies), op.cit., 
172. 
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Zhao Qiqun, Dong Shikun, Ma Xifang and Li Shunxing.24  In their spare time, they 
organized one legal study group, learned and used legal concepts together to supervise 
local governments. During the almost eight years as an informal group, they received 
more than 20,000 letters and visits, supervised one thousand cases and submitted 400 
motions and suggestions.  
They originally established this group because they encountered some 
discrimination from the government agencies and law enforcement departments when 
they conducted the legislative supervision activities. The discrimination forced them to 
consider how to raise the deputy’s status among government officials, and especially 
officials in law enforcement departments. Therefore, they began to supervise the public 
security bureau, then procuratorate and government department in Jiaozuo city. They 
thought that if they could supervise these powerful departments successfully, this would 
have an admonitory effect on other less powerful departments. After some successful 
supervision cases, they became very famous in Jiaozuo city. So they continued to take 
advantage of this track record and the reputations of Yao Xiurong and Li Zhaoyi as 
deputies to supervise other cities’ cases. Finally, they became very famous in the 
surrounding regions. 
Because of their achievement, many deputies would like to join them. But 
because there were no appropriate deputies, only Zhao Qiqun and Dong Shikun joined in 
                                                 
24 Shi Po, “Zhongguo you zheyang yige renda daibiao: Yao Xiurong shinian chenfu (China has 
this kind of Representative: Ups and Downs of Decade of Yao Xiurong),” Tai’an renda (Tai’an 
People's Congress), no. 4 (2003): 30-41; Shi Po, “Yao Xiurong daibiao shui? (Whom Yao 
Xiurong Represents?),” Tai’an renda (Tai’an People's Congress), no. 6 (2003): 33-36. In the 
“seven person group” in Jiaozuo, besides Yao Xiurong (national), Li Zhaoyi (provincial) is a 
worker in one ceramics factory, Li Shunxing and Tong Shikun are doctors, Zhao Qiqun is an 
engineer, Lu Jingzhi was vice editor-in-chief of “Jiaozuo Daily” and retired in 1998, only one 
among seven deputies who have been served as the leadership. 
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and the “seven person group” came into existence formally until 1998. However, they 
also invited other deputies into some supervision cases. It was said that there were about 
20 or 30 “periphery deputies” together with them actively participating in legislative 
activities.  
More importantly, during the process of conducting the supervision, they have 
summarized their experience as “different places supervision, intercrossing handling the 
case” (Yidi jiandu, jiaocha ban’an). To put it simply, if there is an unfair case in A city 
which needs to be supervised and it is inconvenient for the deputy in this city to conduct 
the supervision, they would let one provincial deputy in B city come out and supervise 
it.25 
In fact, among these informal groups, there is always one “core deputy” who is 
most active in the legislative participation. The “core deputy” always plays an exemplary 
role for other deputies, especially the new ones. For example, one deputy from Shenyang 
city People’s Congress recalled how the active deputy-Feng Youwei’s behavior 
influenced him, “in the first three or five years when I was a deputy, there was only Mr. 
Feng to put up his hand to oppose when People’s Congress took a vote. We admire him 
all the while. Although in my heart I would like to cast a negative vote, I had no courage 
to do that. Gradually, I have changed, too. Now I can express what I strongly feel in my 
heart when I cast a vote. For example, I cast a negative vote on the report of Shenyang 
intermediate court in 2001.”26 
                                                 
25 Ibid. 
26 Kang Jinda and Zhu Shaofan, Tianze: yige renda daibiao xingshi quanli de zhenhan jingli (The 
Shocking Experience of A Deputy Exercising His Power) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue 
chubanshe, 2003), 270. 
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With the influence of a “core deputy,” more and more ordinary deputies would be 
around him and one informal group would form gradually. What the “core deputy” had 
done has always been admired and understood by the ordinary deputies. Therefore, the 
“core deputy” is not alone in his legislative participation. Around him, there are lots of 
brave, high-calibre deputies such as famous writers, professors, lawyers and senior 
engineers and so on. They spontaneously organize and conduct law enforcement 
inspection, submit motions and interpellation cases, and pursue investigation and study, 
and provide policy suggestions. Where there are “hot” and “difficult” issues, the informal 
group of deputies would collectively deal with them.27  
So the “core deputy’s” legislative participation is not individual or separate 
behavior. On the one hand, when the “core deputy” conducts the legislative participation 
such as submitting the motions, and interpellation of government, it is easy for him or her 
to get support from his colleagues. On the other hand, the ordinary deputies always like 
to give the “core deputy” a hand behind his back at key juncture. For example, another 
deputy from Shenyang city People Congress expressed his support to the “core deputy”-
Feng Youwei, “we all said earlier that we support Mr. Feng unanimously. Who can dare 
to lay a finger on Feng, we will fight with him to the very end. We believe that justice 
will win over evil …” 28 
Therefore, the existence of informal groups can increase the abilities of members 
to effectively represent the interests of constituents and vigorously supervise the 
government.  
 
                                                 
27 Ibid, 269. 
28 Ibid, 270. 
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VI. Using Media Resources  
 
It is true that in many ways, Chinese society since the reform and opening to the 
outside has become freer than it used to be. This can be seen in the fact that the mass 
media is enjoying much more freedom than before. In fact, the mass media has become 
increasingly important as a source of systematic information for active deputies.  
Some active and experienced deputies are very familiar with the operations of the 
media and have a good and harmonious relationship with the local media. They always 
know how to take advantage of the mass media including television, newspapers, and 
magazines to collect related information for their legislative participation in LPCs. 
Besides using the media information to write motions, they would invite the media to 
report the handling result of some “hot issues” by the government, especially issues that 
ordinary citizens are concerned about. On the one hand, the ordinary citizens can receive 
the latest progress as soon as possible because of media coverage. On the other hand, the 
coverage can exact some pressure on the related government departments and they would 
speed up to deal with the related issues.29  
The reporting by the media, sometimes, would give a huge moral support to the 
active deputies. For example, in 2000, at the 9th Guangdong People’s Congress, Zhong 
Xincai and other 24 deputies conducted the interrogation against the provincial 
Environmental Protection Bureau on its misbehavior. During the process of interrogation, 
the coverage of the media hugely reinforced active deputies’ self-confidence and courage. 
This case of interrogation became a “hot issue” in town talk among the ordinary people. 
                                                 
29 Shenzhen renda changweihui (The Standing committee of Shenzhen People’s Congress), 
Renmin daibiao wei renmin (The Deputies for the People’s Interest), (internal document) (2003), 
56. 
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They wrote letters, sent faxes or emailed to the newspaper and gave the huge support to 
these deputies. Because of the tremendous public support, the active deputies conducted 
the confident vote on vice head of Environmental Protection Bureau and suggested to 
remove him from his position. Finally, the vice governor of Guangdong province himself 
wrote to the active deputies to explain this. Head of Environmental Protection Bureau 
conducted a thorough examination on the electroplating factory and made a final decision 
that any electroplating factories being built or to be built must stop.30 
At the same time, the reportage of the interrogation of Guangdong Environmental 
Protection Bureau has generated much public attention and demonstration effect on the 
deputies in different places. Because of the demonstration role of interrogation case in 
Guangdong provincial People’s Congress, the deputies at the low level became bolder in 
their legislative participation. After that, there were more than ten inquiries and 
interrogations that happened in Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Shaoguan and Lechang cities. The 
government and media have never expected that there were eight inquiries in seven days 
in Guangzhou 11th People’s Congress in 2000. Therefore, the experience of higher level 
of People’s Congress has provided a useful model for the deputies at lower level to 
follow because of media coverage.31  
Sometimes, the active deputies can skillfully take advantage of the reportage of 
media to attract some key Party leaders’ attention. In general, the media would give 
enough coverage on every inquiry case on government, which would prompt the 
government department to deal with the case. For example, in 2003, the media reported 
one inquiry case on “railway and road construction” during the plenary session of 
                                                 
30 My interview in Guangdong province, February 2004. 
31 My interview in Guangzhou city, Guangdong province, January 2004. 
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Guangdong People’s Congress. This coverage attracted Zhang Dejiang’s attention, who is 
secretary of Guangdong Party committee. The second day afternoon after the plenary 
session, Zhang led the government officials who were inquired by the deputies to handle 
official business on site. These officials are from provincial Development and Reform 
Committee, Transportation Bureau, and Guangzhou Railway Group. Soon, one road was 
open to traffic in 2004. Another road was open in 2005. Meanwhile, the Guangdong 
Party Committee communicated with the Railway Department in Beijing and developed 
the plan on constructing the railway.32 
When the active deputies dare to express their protest against the government’s 
undemocratic and infeasible policies in the media, it is no surprising that the knock-on 
would be very strong. For example, in March 2000, a few Guangzhou deputies strongly 
opposed the Price Bureau’s intention to raise the city water price without the deputies’ 
deliberation. After the media reported their opinion, they received millions of ordinary 
citizens’ support. Finally, the Price Bureau retreated and did not raise the city water 
price.33 
When the media works together with the active deputies, the authority of People’s 
Congress and spreading advantage of media can knit together nicely. On the one hand, 
under the media’s help, the active deputies can make their opinions public, obtain 
extensive popular support, and build up strong pressure on the administrative institution. 
On the other hand, depending on this combination, the media can express viewpoints or 
positions implicitly and smoothly achieve their supervisory function.  
                                                 
32 My talk with Mr. Wang Zeke in Zhanjiang city, Guangdong province, May 2004. 
33 My interview in Guangzhou city, Guangdong province, January 2004. 
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In fact, working together with the deputies, the mass media in Guangdong 
province has played an unprecedented and active role in the supervision of government. 
If the media does it alone, it is very difficult or even impossible to have a dialogue with 
the government on an equal footing. More importantly, the development of rather 
liberalized media in Guangdong has laid solid groundwork for the active deputies’ 
supervision. Today, Guangdong has China’s most liberalized media such as Nanfang 
zhoumo (Southern Weekend), Nanfang dushi bao (Southern Metropolitan News) and 
Nanfeng Chuang (Windows on Southern Wind).  
However, in 1980s, Guangdong media was not so active as it is today. One 
journalist recalled that when the Standing Committee of Guangdong People’s Congress 
took a vote on the candidate for head of provincial Trade and Economic Committee, 
eleven members voted against that person. This should be genuine news in the People’s 
Congress history. However, after the meeting came to a close, the secretariat specifically 
warned that the journalists cannot report this case. As expected, the media obeyed the 
command, keeping silent.34  Today, there is a great improvement on the media’ coverage 
of deputies’ legislative supervision. The active deputies’ interpellation, sharp indignation 
(such as the sentence “you are all deaf and blind” deputies said to officials), 
dissatisfaction regarding government officials, all these can appear in the newspaper, 
without any sanitization.   
There are some profound political and economical reasons for Guangdong’s 
media to become the active force in the supervision of government together with active 
deputies. In fact, Deng Xiaoping’s reform and open door policy has radically changed the 
economy of Guangdong province. Economically, Guangdong province is now one of the 
                                                 
34 My interview with one reporter from Yancheng wanbao (Canton Evening News), January, 2004.  
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richest provinces in China, with the highest total GDP among all provinces.35 The good 
economic situation of Guangdong has made it relatively democratic in the area of 
political and economic affairs. At the same time, Guangdong is located in the south coast 
and adjacent to Hong Kong and Macao. Compared with the inland regions, people in 
Guangdong are more democratic and active in the political participation. 
Correspondingly, the government has at times appeared to soften its stance. So this 
relatively open political climate in Guangdong has also provided a conducive 
environment for the media to say its say.  
More importantly, the commercialization of media and the vehement competition 
among the media have boosted the development of liberalized media in Guangdong. At 
the beginning of the reform, Chinese media depended almost exclusively on government 
subsidies for survival. However, with the development of Chinese market economy, 
government subsidies have dropped down sharply. The principal source of revenue for 
most of Chinese media is advertising. Therefore, the media has to pay more attention to 
“digging” the grand or exclusive news to attract readers. The more readers, the more 
advertising revenue. So lack of good reports will affect advertising revenue, and low 
advertising revenue will then endanger the media’s survival.36 Besides the traditional 
forms of media, competition also comes from the internet. Meanwhile, the Guangdong 
media has to beat off the competition from Hong Kong. Therefore, commercialization of 
and growing competition among the media have prompted more courageous reporting 
and even brought an explosion of coverage of anything in Guangdong, some of which 
                                                 
35 Its nominal GDP for 2005 was 2.17 trillion Yuan (US$267.6 billion), about 1/5 of GDP of 
whole China and a rise of 12.5% on a year-on-year basis.  More details can be found in 
www.gd.gov.cn (accessed March 15, 2006). 
36 Zhao Yuezhi, Media, Market, and Democracy in China: Between the Party Line and the 
Bottom Line (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1998). 
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have stirred up national outrage. For example, media coverage played a critical role in the 
rapid resolution of Sun Zhigang case in Guangzhou.37 
However, the Achilles’ heel of media supervision in China is that it substantially 
is a kind of administrative supervision from top to bottom. If one looks at the mechanism 
by which the media influences the supervisory case, it is not so much the threat of public 
exposure as it is the intervention from Party officials, or at least the threat of intervention 
from Party officials. One Chinese scholar conducted the statistical analysis on the 
Jiaodian fangtan (Focal Point Interview) 
38 from March 17 to April 26, 1999 and found 
that 21 times of programmme were closely supervised by the media. However, the 
objects of supervision were all local government officials including leaders of local state 
enterprises. Therefore, superficially, media supervision is neutral and objective, but 
substantially it is also one kind of supervision from the higher level government 
department. This kind of supervision makes the lower level officials feel the pressure 
more coming from the administrative “eye” hiding behind the higher level media. That is 
to say, “disclosing the social problem at the grassroots from higher level position could 
put fear into the officials at the grassroots.” 39 
                                                 
37 Sun Zhigang, an employee at one Guangzhou Company, originally from Hubei Province, was 
beaten to death in police custody after being arrested as a vagrant for not carrying ID. Southern 
Metropolis Daily uncovered and exposed widespread police abuses in this case to the public. 
Because of the media coverage, Sun’s case triggered a major debate on the validity of the holding 
system and eventually led the central government to abolish custody and repatriation detention 
system in China. More details can be found in “Sun Zhigang's Brutal Killers Sentenced” in 
Zhongguo ribao (China Daily) (online), June 10, 2003:  
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-06/10/content_168514.htm (accessed January 12, 
2006). 
38 Jiaodian fangtan (Focal Point Interview) is one of most popular and investigative programme 
run by CCTV in China. 
39 Yuan Zhengming and Liang Jianzheng, Jujiao jiaodian fangtan (Focusing on Focal Point 
Interview) (Beijing: Zhongguo dabaike chubanshe, 1999), 171. 
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We cannot deny that the mass media has greater freedom than before, but they 
still do not have total freedom. The Party continues to control the media through 
Propaganda Departments at various levels.40 Some journalists who cross “invisible 
political boundaries” risk losing their jobs or even face criminal prosecution.41 Recently, 
several of China’s aggressive publications have been shut down such as 21shiji huanqiu 
baodao (21st Century World Herald) and Zhongguo qingnian bao (China Youth Daily) 




Because of the institutional constraints in China, legislative activism in LPCs is 
plagued by high costs and risks. However, some active deputies have employed different 
tactics to reduce the cost and mitigate the risk. As for the active deputies, they have 
demonstrated great courage and skillful political capabilities. These tactics include: 
skillfully making use of the existing institutional space; rightful supervision; learning by 
                                                 
40 In general, the Central Propaganda Department in Beijing and its local branches still lay out 
guidelines and issue regular sets of instructions to the mainstream media about what they can 
report and can’t report and how they should report what they can report. More details can be 
found in Anne-Marie Brady, “Guiding Hand: The Role of CCP Central Propaganda Department 
in the Current Era,” Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture 3, no. 1 (2006): 58-77. 
41 For example, in 2004, Cheng Yizhong, former editor-in-chief of Southern Metropolitan News 
newspaper, was arrested for his reporting sensitive news without prior government approval such 
as Sun Zhigang case and the first suspected SARS case in Guangdong Province. More detaisl can 
be found in Joseph Kahn, “Police Raid Chinese Newspaper that Reported New Sars Case,” New 
York Times, January 8, 2004. Cheng was freed after five months in custody. “World Briefing: 
Asia: China: Editor Freed,” New York Times, September 1, 2004. 
42 21shiji huanqiu baodao (21st Century World Herald) was shut down in 2003 for its interview 
report on Li Rui-Mao Zedong’s former secretary. My interview with one former reporter from 
21st Century World Herald, January, 2004. More details on Bingdian (Freezing Point) weekly 
can be found in Joseph Kahn, “China Shuts down Influential Weekly Newspaper in Crackdown 
on Media,” New York Times, January 25, 2006. However, Bingdian (Freezing Point) weekly has 
resumed publication without its top two editors (its outspoken editor Li Datong was sacked). 
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doing; resorting to the collective power and exploiting media resources. Clearly, these 
tactics could, in some degree, have decreased the cost and reduced the risk of active 
legislative participation in LPCs. When the active deputies can use these tactics 
successfully, this would raise their confidence and encourage them to continue to actively 
engage in the legislative participation. 
 However, the role of these tactics is limited as I have described above. More 
importantly, whether the deputies actively use these kinds of tactics in their legislative 
participation or not depends on their motivation for constituents’ interest. Therefore, 
when deputies in LPCs have strong motivation and can skillfully use these tactics, they 
could play an important role in the legislative participation.
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Chapter Seven          Conclusion 
 
The main objective of this dissertation is to explore why some deputies are much 
more heavily involved in the legislative participation in LPCs whilst other deputies 
refrain from doing so. Survey data shows that there is quite a big difference among the 
deputies’ legislative participation activities in LPCs. In fact, only a few deputies are more 
active in the legislative participation than others. The formal and informal institutional 
constraints in the election process and LPC system can explain a large majority of 
deputies’ inactiveness in the legislative participation. However, my study finds that most 
of the legislative participation activists are those nominated by their constituents. Their 
legislative activism could be attributed to their strong motivation arising from the sense 
of responsibility to represent their constituents’ interest because of the electoral 
institutional reform on the nomination and semi-competitive election. The causal 
mechanism underlying the election and active legislative participation in LPCs in China 
is the community (constituent) pressure, not the career (re-election) pressure in Western 
legislature. 
The legislative activism in LPCs in China can give us a compelling case study of 
transitional politics and related fields because this took place in the absence of a 
democratic political system. The experience of democratic transition in many developing 
countries suggests that some incremental institutional adaptations and buildings in a 
former authoritarian regime could be a favorable precondition in the process of a peaceful, 
gradual regime transformation, even for the democratic consolidation in future.  
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China has an authoritarian political system controlled by the CCP, but the 
transition to a market economy requires a new form of Party control, so the Chinese 
leaders have turned to legal means to direct lower-level officials. Therefore, “the turn 
away from Party policy to a more law-based order has resulted in a more independent, 
authoritative, and professional legislature at both the national and local levels.”1 With 
regards to this, apart from the separation of leadership mechanism between the Party and 
government, and promoting the development of legal system, the incremental 
institutional reform in the election system has contributed to the rise of LPCs and 
legislative activism.  
On the other hand, the empowered legislature and legislative activism might be of 
appreciably greater consequence in the promotion of the rule of law and further gradual 
political transformation in China. Promoting the rule of law has become a priority for the 
Chinese government. “The essence of the rule of law is the ability of the law to impose 
meaningful limits on the state and individual members of the ruling elite.”2 The 
legislative activism in LPCs has played an important role in improving the rule of law by 
supervising the government and helping the constituents in China. 
Most analysts of parliaments agree that the essential task of a legislature is, or 
should be, to watch over and control the executive. However, legislatures play a 
relatively minor role in determining or formulating government policy.3 In fact, the 
                                                 
1
 Randall Peerenboom, China’s Long March toward Rule of Law (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), 12. 
2 Lowell Dittmer and Guoli Liu, China’s Deep Reform: Domestic Politics in Transition (Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publisher, 2006), 12. 
3 G. R. Boynton and Chong Lim Kim, Legislative Systems in Developing Countries (Durham, 
N.C.: Duke University Press, 1975), 18. 
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legislatures are rarely “strong,” even in “liberal democracies.”4 In most parliamentary 
systems, legislators individually do not have much power to influence government policy. 
But the legislators collectively can sometimes exercise considerable power especially 
when the policies or officials of the government are unpopular. In theory, LPCs in China 
should be the highest local state organs and have the power to oversee local governments, 
courts and procuratorates. But in reality, they are not. However, as the system of People’s 
Congress is becoming stronger as an institution, some deputies are becoming more 
outspoken and more assertive, and as a result the officials are facing more and more 
pressures. The pressures come mostly from the stricter supervisory forms such as the 
appraisal, inquiry and interpellation of the government departments or their officials. The 
most effective method in supervision is the inquiry and interpellation. The strength of 
these techniques lies in the ability of the active deputy to confront an official in charge 
and compel him to justify and explain their behaviors. The mass media generally reports 
the content of all questions the deputies asked as well as the answers of the officials. 
Because of the media coverage, these methods may expose some relevant officials to 
public criticism and even severe embarrassment for their administrative abuses. So, 
inquiry or interpellation of government periodically has helped rectify administrative 
abuses and improve the local governance in China.  
Therefore, these supervisions conducted by the legislative activists have some 
deterrent functions on the officials, to some degree, improving the accountability of the 
ruling Party and the government, and thus, making them more accountable to citizens.  
Dealing with citizens’ grievances (constituency service) is increasingly another 
major task of the active deputies. This kind of work is not confined to deputies in China. 
                                                 
4 J. Blondel, Comparative Legislatures (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973), 3. 
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In fact, constituency service activity has been found to be an important part of the work 
of legislators in the United States, France, and England.5  As a particularly important 
dimension of the deputy’s role, constituency service almost invariably involves the 
deputies liaising with the “bureaucracies on behalf of constituents, dealing with 
complaints that citizens might have about bureaucratic inefficiency or corruption.”6 One 
of the serious problems with an authoritarian government is that it does not have enough 
feedback mechanisms. Especially in a country as vast as China, there are no effective 
ways for the government to hear from its citizenry. More often than not, local 
governments tend to ignore public complaints, fuelling the rising conflict between 
citizens and the local authorities. As the “bridge” between them, legislative activists have 
begun to play a rather important role in conflict-resolution. Therefore, the legislative 
activism is important in providing services to their constituents and in relaying the 
opinions of their constituents to the governments. 
In all, the legislative activism could play a very important role in alleviating the 
conflicts between government and citizenry, curbing corruption and improving local 
governance and the rule of law in China. Therefore, we should not overlook the 
significance of legislative activism. 
Yet, on the other hand, we should not exaggerate the role of legislative activism in 
the development of China’s legislative or political system. It would also be naïve to 
ignore the fact that involvement in active legislative participation remains a peripheral 
pursuit for the vast majority of deputies. The vast majority of deputies tend to have few 
or no legislative activities, and it is only a committed few who undertake regular and 
                                                 
5 Boynton and Kim, op.cit., 23. 
6 Michael L. Mezey, Comparative Legislatures (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1979), 9. 
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sustained legislative participation. Indeed, inactiveness is a fundamental part of deputies’ 
legislative participation. Most importantly, it is dubious whether the legislative activism 
could be sustainable in the long term because these active deputies have sacrificed a lot 
of time, energy and resources. Therefore, further institutional reforms are especially 
necessary in the electoral system and People’s Congress system in China. 
Lastly, it is also important to be aware of the nature of legislative participation. 
Even in the most effective form of supervision such as inquiry and interpellation, their 
effectiveness is limited, however, by the inability of the deputies to force the responsible 
officials to alter their behaviors and by the officials’ advantage of possessing specialized 
knowledge as against the more general knowledge of individual deputies. More 
importantly, few examples of legislative activism represent a challenge to the state and 
the Party power, for example. China remains an authoritarian regime and the CCP’s 
continued hegemonic rule effectively prevents any possibility of the appearance of 
organized political opposition.  
 However, the CCP has accepted and accommodated these deputies’ legislative 
activism and assertiveness as long as they do not threaten its hegemony or pose a political 
challenge. The Party is not willing to tolerate legislative activism that is in any way 
confrontational towards the CCP or to the principle of CCP rule. However, it should be 
noted that the relationship between the People’s Congress and the government at the local 
level is not destined to be confrontational. If legislative activism is seen to act in a 
constructive manner, it is likely to endure.7
                                                 
7 L. Dali Yang, Remaking the Chinese Leviathan: Market Transition and the Politics of 
Governance in China (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004), 277. 
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                                    Appendices  
 
 







2. Educational level 
 What is your level of education? 
 (1) Primary school 
 (2) High school 
 (3) University and college 
 (4) Post-Graduate 
 
3. Occupational Background 
    What would you consider yourself to be in terms of occupation? _______________ 
 
4. Political affiliation 
   Are you a member of Chinese Communist Party? 
    (1) Yes  
    (2) No 
 
If you answered “no”, please proceed to Question No.5! 
 
5. Are you affiliated with any political parties except CCP? If so, which party? 
    (0) No 
    (1) Yes, _______________ 
  
6. Political experience 
    Do you have any experience working for the government or Party department? 
    (1) Yes  
    (2) No 
 
7. Parliamentary experience 
   How many times have you been elected as a deputy of People’s Congress? 
   (1) One time  
    (2) Two times 
     (3) More than two times 
 
8. Attitude on the deputy’s Job 
    Which of various job of being a deputy do you think the most important? 
     (1) Scrutiny or keeping a check on the government and the civil service 
     (2) Supporting Party and helping it achieve its policy objective;  
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     (3) Influencing or changing Party’s policy  
     (4) Helping constituents with their problems/ dealing with constituency issues. 
     (5) Others 
9. Deputy-Constituent Connection   
   A. how often do you visit your constituents per year?     
   (1) Never 
   (2) Seldom 
   (3) Often 
    
    B. how often do your constituents visit you and reflect their problems per year? 
  (1) Never 
   (2) Seldom 
   (3) Often 
     
Attitudinal and behavioral indicators for deputy’s responsibility  
10. Decision influence 
 In deciding how to participate in People’s Congress such as vote are you strong    
influenced by  
   (1) The advice of Party leadership? 
   (2) Your own personal opinions?  
   (3) Constituency opinion?  
   (4) Representations from special interest groups or 
   (5) Peers 
 
Parliamentary participation 
11. Participation in discussion  
      How often do you participate in group speeches and discussions during the plenary 
session? 
    (1) Never 
    (2) Seldom 
     (3) Often 
    
12. The asking of questions, appraisal and interrogation of government  
      How often do you ask the questions, appraise and interrogate the government in the 
session? 
     (1) Never 
      (2) Seldom 
      (3) Often 
    
13. Attendance 
    A. Do you attend every meeting of People’s Congress? 
      (1)Yes 
      (2) No 
    B. How often do you attend all activity of People’s Congress such as inspection when 
the congress is not in session? 
     (1) Never 
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      (2) Seldom 
   (3) Often 
 
 14. Tabling or signing motions 
      How many Ti’an( such as motions, suggestions and criticisms)  do you submit  per 
year? 
      (1)0 (2)1-5 (3) 6-10 (4) more than 10 
  
 
 15. Which factor(s) do you think affect the deputy’s parliamentary participation in 
People’s Congress? (Please write). 
 
 
 16. How were you nominated and elected as the deputy? For example: nomination by 
Party    or social organization, constituents (or deputies in the indirect election) or self-
nominated. (Please write) 
 
 





























Appendix 2:  Multiple Linear Regression Analysis  
 
Coding of Variables for Statistical Analysis 
 
 I recode the following factors into dummy variables: the variable (education level) 
into a dummy variable (=0, if a deputy don’t have a university or post graduate diploma, 
=1, if a deputy has a university or post graduate diploma), the variable (party affiliation) 
into a dummy variable (=0,  if a deputy is non-CCP member, =1, otherwise), the variable 
(legislative experience)into a dummy variable( =0, if a deputy is elected more than one 
time, =1, if a deputy is elected for the first time), the variable (the form of nomination) 
into a dummy variable(=0, if a deputy is not nominated by constituents, =1, if a deputy is 
nominated by constituents). 
 By recoding data, the variable (deputies’ attitude on the legislative job) has three 
categories: constituent-centered, median, party-centered.1 I further recode this variable 
into a dummy variable (=0, if the deputy’s preference is not constituent-centered, =1, 
otherwise). I recode this variable (community pressure) into a dummy variable (=0, if the 











1 .730(a) .533 .508 1.15673 
a  Predictors: (Constant), Education, community pressure, the forms of nomination, party 








Square F Sig. 
Regress
ion 
172.669 6 28.778 21.508 .000(a) 
Residua
l 
151.198 113 1.338     
1 
Total 323.867 119       
                                                 
1 There are five answers to this question: (1) Scrutiny or keeping a check on the government and 
the civil service; (2) Supporting Party and helping it achieve its policy objective; (3) Influencing 
or changing Party’s policy; (4) Helping constituents with their problems/ dealing with 
constituency issues; (5) Others. Based on the survey data, there are 6 categories of answers to this 
question: (1), (2), (4), (1) + (2), (1) + (4), (2) + (4). By recoding, I transform the value of variable 
into 3 categories: constituent-centred, median, party-centred. If the deputies chose the answer (4), 
or (1) + (4), their preference is constituent-centred. If the deputies chose the answer (1), or (1) + 
(2), or (2) + (4), their preference is median. If the deputies chose the answer (2), their preference 
is party-centred. 
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a  Predictors: (Constant), Education, community pressure, the forms of nomination, party 
affiliation, preference, legislative experience 
 b  Dependent Variable: legislative activism 
 





Coefficients t Sig. 
     
  
  
  B 
Std. 
Error Beta     
 (Constant) 2.968 .412   7.213 .000 
   
Nomination 
2.482 .400 .436 6.197 .000 
   
Community 
pressure 
1.510 .249 .402 6.071 .000 
   
Preference 
.497 .225 .149 2.211 .029 
   
Party 
affiliation 
.124 .308 .027 .402 .688 
   
Legislative 
experience 
.648 .237 .188 2.738 .007 
   
Education 
.236 .224 .072 1.051 .296 
a  Dependent Variable: legislative activism 
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